I have argued that Milton exploits the Free Will Defense as a literary and philosophical model. Now readers as well as writers employ models, consciously or unconsciously, and part of the purpose of this book is to make explicit some of the models Milton uses, in order to keep them from being shouldered aside by someone else's. My assumption in all of this is not that one must accept Milton's models before one can understand his poetry, but that no critical acceptance or rejection of them is possible at all unless one has some appreciation of what they are and mean. In Chapter 31 argued that an orthodox Calvinist model of grace ought not to be allowed to displace the Arminian one that actually operates in Paradise Lost. In the present chapter I shall seek to show what model of free will functions in Milton's theodicy, first contrasting this version of free will with a major but little–recognized deterministic definition of it, secondly concentrating on the peculiar definition given to God's freedom and on its significance for the issue of divine justice, and thirdly turning to Milton's case against the better–known argument that human free will is inconsistent with divine foreknowledge.