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Living without Free Will
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  • Cited by 330
  • Cited by
    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Fischer, J. M. 2003. 'Ought-implies-can', causal determinism and moral responsibility. Analysis, Vol. 63, Issue. 3, p. 244.

    Mele, Alfred R. 2003. Chisholm on freedom. Metaphilosophy, Vol. 34, Issue. 5, p. 630.

    Wilks, Duffy 2004. Perceptions of Moral Responsibility and Self-Attribution: Unique Findings. Journal of Professional Counseling: Practice, Theory & Research, Vol. 32, Issue. 1, p. 41.

    DOUBLE, RICHARD 2004. The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 69, Issue. 2, p. 411.

    SMILANSKY, SAUL 2005. Free Will and Respect for Persons. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, Issue. 1, p. 248.

    McKENNA, MICHAEL 2005. Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, Issue. 1, p. 163.

    CLARKE, RANDOLPH 2005. On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, Issue. 1, p. 13.

    Judisch, Neal 2005. Responsibility, manipulation and ownership. Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 8, Issue. 2, p. 115.

    Korthals, Michiel 2005. Ethics for Life Scientists. Vol. 5, Issue. , p. 163.

    Mele, Alfred R. 2005. DENNETT ON FREEDOM. Metaphilosophy, Vol. 36, Issue. 4, p. 414.

    HAJI, ISHTIYAQUE 2005. Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, Issue. 1, p. 106.

    CLARKE, RANDOLPH 2005. AGENT CAUSATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LUCK. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 86, Issue. 3, p. 408.

    Mele, A. R. 2005. A critique of Pereboom's 'four-case argument' for incompatibilism. Analysis, Vol. 65, Issue. 1, p. 75.

    WIDERKER, DAVID 2005. Blameworthiness, Non-robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, Issue. 1, p. 292.

    MELE, ALFRED R. 2005. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, Issue. 1, p. 146.

    Berofsky, Bernard 2006. Global Control and Freedom. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 131, Issue. 2, p. 419.

    NAHMIAS, Eddy MORRIS, STEPHEN G. NADELHOFFER, Thomas and TURNER, Jason 2006. Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 73, Issue. 1, p. 28.

    Ratheal, Juli D'Ann and Wilks, Duffy 2006. Perceptions of Free Will, Determinism and Moral Responsibility Reexamined. Journal of Professional Counseling: Practice, Theory & Research, Vol. 34, Issue. 1-2, p. 88.

    MCKENNA, MICHAEL 2006. Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 30, Issue. 1, p. 16.

    Timpe, Kevin 2006. A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism. Philosophia, Vol. 34, Issue. 2, p. 189.

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    Living without Free Will
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Book description

Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living Without Free Will. Pereboom argues that our best scientific theories have the consequence that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform, and that because of this, we are not morally responsible for any of them. He seeks to defend the view that morality, meaning and value remain intact even if we are not morally responsible, and furthermore, that adopting this perspective would provide significant benefit for our lives.


’… this is a very fine book. All philosophers who wish to argue that there are free human beings will need to deal with Pereboom's objections. And it they cannot refute them, they can take comfort in Pereboom's good, optimistic work on what a world without free will can be like.’

Source: Oxford Academic Journals

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