We have been presenting liberalism in this book as the best form of human association for the modern world: that is to say a world composed for the most part of medium-sized independent states whose economies are organized on the mass scale of the national or international unit rather than through small-scale and tightly knit bodies such as the guilds or manorial villages. Since individuals have ceased to be integrated into and protected by such modest and relatively static communities but have to find their feet in a larger and more fluid mass governed by a powerful bureaucratic state, both individuals and their societies will do better if the former enjoy the basic liberties and welfare rights endorsed by liberalism.

This is, however, only a utilitarian justification for liberal regimes. We see such pragmatic claims as necessary but not sufficient grounds for an adequate defence of liberalism. The form of social and political life that constitutes liberal practice has to be expressed also in terms of principles that establish its distinctive character and these principles have to be defended against their critics. We have already in our previous chapters covered much of this ground. We have, we hope, made clear what we take liberal practice to be, both nationally and internationally, what its principled commitments are and the weakness of most attacks on them.