Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 A cognitive theory of religion
- 2 The supernatural and the uses of the intentional
- 3 Dissemination and the comprehension of mysteries
- 4 Pragmatics and pragmatism
- 5 Authority
- 6 Conceptual innovation and revelatory language
- References
- Index
6 - Conceptual innovation and revelatory language
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 January 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 A cognitive theory of religion
- 2 The supernatural and the uses of the intentional
- 3 Dissemination and the comprehension of mysteries
- 4 Pragmatics and pragmatism
- 5 Authority
- 6 Conceptual innovation and revelatory language
- References
- Index
Summary
Spreading through minds, concepts that are epidemiologically successful originate somewhere. The aim of Chapter 6 is to suggest how conceptual change and innovation occurs, especially with respect to rational-aesthetic concepts at the core of religion. It ends by opening up a broader philosophical response to the general problems posed by religious representations.
Conceptual and language change
The epidemiology of representations is exciting because it provides the basis for a theory of conceptual change. In doing this, it contributes to the theory of language change with respect to word meaning. The theory of language change has been developing since the nineteenth century, especially with respect to sound and grammar; but much less so with respect to content (see Aitchison, 1991). In my 1998 book, Language and Society, I surveyed language change from a social perspective. Epidemiology of representations suggests new principles for innovation and change over time within a population with respect to semantic content – how word meanings, concepts and hence thoughts, systematically change.
What is conceptual change?
We need to distinguish conceptual change from other changes in language. Concepts are mental functions which are not per se linguistic. Lexical items are also mental functions but realized in abstract phonological schemas unique to each language. They are the conscious, public face of conceptual addresses, manifested as constituents of sentences uttered in inner speech or public communication. Within a conceptual address, the lexical entry functions as the input–output means in both inner and outer speech.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Language and ReligionA Journey into the Human Mind, pp. 227 - 263Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010