Kuhn was part of the vanguard that ushered in the historical turn in philosophy of science which looked to the history of science as a source of data for developing a philosophy of science. This was a monumental change in philosophy of science, marking, if not causing, the demise of positivism. The historical turn had a wider impact, contributing to important developments in the sociology of science, including the rise of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. In this respect, Steve Fuller (2000) is correct to claim that with the writing of Structure Kuhn unleashed a series of events that were no part of his intentions.

As Structure was subjected to criticism Kuhn changed his view about the relevance of the history of science to the philosophy of science. He came to believe that the key insight that philosophers could gain from the history of science was a particular perspective on science, a historical or developmental perspective. In this chapter, I aim to both trace the path that led Kuhn to this change of view and to clarify what it is that the historical perspective offers us.