Pragmatist readings of Kierkegaard, like fideistic readings, treat the conceptual apparatus of faith as all neatly in place: All that’s missing is an act of will (i.e., something other than understanding) to execute the program. But what we actually find in Kierkegaard are new conceptual distinctions. The chapter argues that in The Sickness unto Death, the question of what it means to be a self is answered through a process of abstraction.  Rather than the text motivating us to do more, feel more, or commit more decisively (as we might expect from Kierkegaard), what we "experience" in The Sickness unto Death is an enumeration of conceptual distinctions that enable us to notice more, question more, and reason better – that is, to engage in the kinds of activities normally associated with traditional philosophy. It is argued that the minimal (i.e., “naked”) self described in this text is not something one can experience concretely but rather exists only for abstract reflection.