Kant's Concept of Duty

Why ‘duty’ is an odious word. ‘Duty’ is not only a crucial concept in Kant's ethics but also in effect a technical term in Kantian vocabulary. Whatever affinity the Kantian sense of ‘duty’ may have with the ordinary meaning of the word in English (or of Pflicht in German), any hope we might have of gaining a sympathetic hearing for Kantian ethics must depend on our putting some distance between the technical Kantian meaning of this word and the sense, and even more some of the pragmatics, of the term as it is commonly used.

Duties are often what we have in consequence of some role we play in a social institution, arrangement, or relationship. This includes many social arrangements that involve us in behavior that is morally questionable or worse. As a result, appeals to duty are commonly used not only to override our temptations to avoid playing our part in some arrangement but also to put out of action any reservations or moral scruples we might have about playing that part. People therefore appeal to duty when they want to put a stop to critical reflection about what we are doing. Soldiers are supposed to think of their duty – to their buddies, to their unit, to their commanders, to their “mission,” to their country – and of nothing else. This is what makes them the fearless and efficient killing machines (and cannon fodder) the politicians and commanders want them to be.