In the essay that accompanies his translation of Kant's “Über Kästners Abhandlungen”, Michel Fichant discusses some of the analyses I proposed in my book (KPJ). His discussion of my view centers on the nature of space as put forth in the Critique of Pure Reason. More specifically, it centers on the distinction between “form of intuition” and “formal intuition” (introduced by Kant in §26 of the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition of the Critique), and on the phrase in the Transcendental Aesthetic according to which space is “represented as an infinite given magnitude” (B40). Michel Fichant thinks that the explanation I propose for Kant's distinction leads me to intellectualize the forms of sensibility expounded in the Transcendental Aesthetic and, true to a tradition begun by Fichte and represented in France by Lachièze-Rey among others, leads me, in effect, to deny that Kant grants any independence to sensibility with respect to the understanding.

This last reproach surprises me. Recognizing the irreducible character of sensibility in the Kantian conception of knowledge is of central importance to the argument of my book. More particularly, I try to elucidate the consequences of the irreducibly receptive character of our sensibility for Kant's conception of the logical-discursive forms themselves, that is, of the forms of spontaneity. In fact, Michel Fichant takes pains to make clear that his criticism concerns only a “side issue” in my book, and in no way challenges its central thesis.