Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Taxation
- 3 Money Laundering and Counterterrrorism Financial Enforcement
- 4 Transnational Corruption
- 5 Transnational Organized Crime
- 6 Export Control and Economic Sanctions
- 7 International Environmental Crimes
- 8 International Securities Enforcement
- 9 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
- 10 International Evidence Gathering
- 11 Extradition and Alternatives
- 12 International Prisoner Transfer
- 13 The United Nations
- 14 The World Bank Group
- 15 INTERPOL
- 16 Economic Integration and Business Crimes
- Index
- References
16 - Economic Integration and Business Crimes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Taxation
- 3 Money Laundering and Counterterrrorism Financial Enforcement
- 4 Transnational Corruption
- 5 Transnational Organized Crime
- 6 Export Control and Economic Sanctions
- 7 International Environmental Crimes
- 8 International Securities Enforcement
- 9 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
- 10 International Evidence Gathering
- 11 Extradition and Alternatives
- 12 International Prisoner Transfer
- 13 The United Nations
- 14 The World Bank Group
- 15 INTERPOL
- 16 Economic Integration and Business Crimes
- Index
- References
Summary
Introduction
Economic integration plays an important role with respect to transnational white collar crimes, although for the most part, governments concluding free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic integration agreements have seen that element as an afterthought. Persuading legislatures to overcome nationalist sentiments and limit sovereignty in order to support the negotiation and ratification of FTAs or single markets consumes significant political capital. The decision to include regulatory – let alone criminal and quasi-criminal measures – within an FTA or single market arrangement is not taken lightly.
As a result of political decisions to minimize criminal and enforcement institutions and mechanisms when sovereign states enter into an FTA, common market, or an economic integration arrangement, criminals are often quick to identify and exploit opportunities to enlarge their illicit operations. The lowered barriers allow them to conduct crime transnationally.
In some cases signatories include criminal and enforcement provisions and mechanisms relating to one or two economic sectors in FTAs and single market arrangements. For instance, as noted later, due to intense and successful lobbying by U.S. intellectual property interests, NAFTA provisions cover intellectual property and customs enforcement.
The relationship among economic integration, international criminal and enforcement cooperation, and criminal justice integration is thus ambiguous and complex. Yet, all involve state responses to increases in transnational interactions among nonstate actors and try to mitigate the tensions and frictions that hamper efficient cross-border interactions.
Successful criminal justice systems require three elements: information, evidence, and the accused or convicted person. The more dispersed these elements are and the less they exist within the physical jurisdiction of the investigating government, the greater the obstacles for law enforcement. The main barrier impeding international law enforcement efforts is the sovereignty that some countries assert, because normally a national government without the agreement of another government cannot perform criminal justice activities in the other government's territory. To do so would violate the territorial sovereignty of the other government. Additionally, sovereign states have distinctive political, social, economic, and legal systems and cultures. Criminals can and do take advantage of the distinctions that prevent effective international enforcement cooperation (e.g., requirements of dual criminality in order to extradite or provide mutual assistance in criminal matters). National and subnational law enforcement officials try to nullify the advantages criminals derive from operating across borders and reduce, circumvent, or transcend the frictions that impede international law enforcement.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- International White Collar CrimeCases and Materials, pp. 635 - 674Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015