Skip to main content Accessibility help
The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 71
  • Export citation
  • Recommend to librarian
  • Buy the print book

Book description

The explosive growth and increasing complexity of global financial markets are defining characteristics of the contemporary world economy. Unfortunately, financial globalization has been accompanied by a marked increase in the frequency and severity of financial crises. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has taken a central role in managing these crises through its loans to developing countries. Despite extensive analysis and criticism of the IMF in recent years, key questions remain unanswered. Why does the Fund treat some countries more generously than others? To what extent is IMF lending driven by political factors rather than economic concerns? In whose interests does the IMF act? In this book, Mark Copelovitch offers novel answers to these questions. Combining statistical analysis with detailed case studies, he demonstrates how the politics and policies of the IMF have evolved over the last three decades in response to fundamental changes in the composition of international capital flows.


‘The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the world’s most important economic institutions, especially in times of crisis. Yet we lack a full understanding of how and why it operates as it does, and in particular of the political forces that affect it. In The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy, Mark Copelovitch makes the case that the IMF’s behavior responds to the interests represented by the major financial powers, as well as to the goals of the IMF’s professional staff. Copelovitch presents a series of clear-headed, theoretically grounded arguments, then subjects them to empirical assessment. He analyzes an original database of 197 IMF programs over twenty years, and then provides two extensive country studies, of IMF relations with Mexico and Korea in the 1980s and 1990s. Both the statistical analysis and the detailed narratives provide compelling evidence for Copelovitch’s political economy arguments. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy is a careful, persuasive application of the ideas and methods of modern political economy to a crucially important topic. It will be of interest to any serious scholar or student of international political economy, international relations, and international economics.’

Jeffry Frieden - Harvard

‘This is an outstanding piece of political science that combines richly detailed case studies based on primary documents with impressive quantitative results. Copelovitch argues convincingly that banks heavily influence IMF lending, but their influence depends on the composition of capital flows and the consistency of the interests of the major powers.’

Randall Stone - University of Rochester

'This book represents a major contribution to the growing literature on the IMF and, more generally, to the understanding of the political economy of international organizations. Using an original 'common agency' perspective, Mark Copelovitch presents an innovative way to address decision-making at the international financial institutions, which is driven both by the major shareholder governments and by the bureaucratic staff of these organizations. Copelovitch shows that both the intensity and the heterogeneity of the preferences of the IMF’s major shareholders determine whether a country will receive favorable treatment from the institution. The book furthermore shows that the nature of IMF lending has changed because of major historical shifts in patterns of international financing from concentrated sovereign bank lending to decentralized portfolio investment and bank lending to the private sector. The greater collective action problems generated by these new forms of international finance force the IMF to make larger loans with more extensive conditionality in order to reassure global markets. Copelovitch substantiates his theoretical claims with both sophisticated statistical analysis and detailed case studies. This is a must-read for both scholars of international political economy and policy-makers interested in the IMF’s evolving role in the global financial system.'

James Raymond Vreeland - Georgetown University and author of The IMF and Economic Development

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Send to Kindle
  • Send to Dropbox
  • Send to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.


Abadie, Alberto, Drukker, David, Herr, Jane Leber, and Imbens, Guido. 2004. “Implementing matching estimators for average treatment effects in Stata.” Stata Journal 4(3): 290–311.
Abbott, Kenneth, and Snidal, Duncan. 2000. “Hard and soft law in international governance.” International Organization 54(3): 421–56.
Achen, Christopher H. 1986. The Statistical Analysis of Quasi-experiments. Berkeley:University of California Press.
Andrews, David (ed.). 2006. International Monetary Power. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Bagehot, Walter. 2006 [1873]. Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. New York: Cosimo Classics.
México, Banco. 1996. The Mexican Economy 1996. Mexico City: Banco de México.
México, Banco 1997. The Mexican Economy 1997. Mexico City: Banco de México.
,BIS 1983. Annual Report. Basel: Bank for International Settlements.
,BIS 2007a. Annual Report. Basel: Bank for International Settlements.
,BIS 2007b. Quarterly Review. Basel: Bank for International Settlements.
Barnett, Michael, and Finnemore, Martha. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organization in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Barro, Robert, and Lee, Jong-Wha. 2002. IMF Programs: Who Is Chosen and What Are the Effects? Working Paper no. 8951. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.Barth, James R., Caprio, Gerard, and Levine, Ross. 2005. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. “Time-series–cross-section data: what have we learned in the past few years?Annual Review of Political Science 4: 271–93.
Beck, Nathaniel. 2004. “Longitudinal (panel and time series cross-section) data” (
Beck, Thorsten, Clark, George, Groff, Alberto, Keefer, Philip, and Walsh, Patrick. 2001. “New tools in comparative political economy: the database of political institutions.” World Bank Economic Review 15(1): 165–76.
Beck, Nathaniel, and Katz, Jonathan N.. 1995. “What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data.” American Political Science Review 89(3): 634–47.
Beck, Nathaniel, and Katz, Jonathan N.. 2004. Time-series–Cross-section Issues: Dynamics, 2004. Working paper. Society for Political Methodology, American Political Science Association, Washington, DC ( id=36).
Beck, Nathaniel, Katz, Jonathan N., and Tucker, Richard. 1998. “Taking time seriously: time-series–cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable.” American Journal of Political Science 42(4): 1260–88.
Berinsky, Adam. 1999. “The two faces of public opinion.” American Journal of Political Science 43(4): 1209–30.
Bird, Graham. 1996. “The International Monetary Fund and developing countries: a review of the evidence and policy options.” International Organization 50(3): 477–511.
Bird, Graham, and Rowlands, Dane. 2003. “Political economy influences within the life-cycle of IMF programmes.” World Economy 26(9): 1255–78.
Bird, Graham, and Willett, Thomas. 2004. “IMF conditionality, implementation and the new political economy of ownership.” Comparative Economic Studies 46(3): 423–50.
Blustein, Paul. 2001. The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF. New York: PublicAffairs.
Bordo, Michael, Eichengreen, Barry, Klingebiel, Daniela, and Martinez-Peria, Maria Soledad. 2001. “Is the crisis problem growing more severe?Economic Policy 16 (April): 51–82.
Boughton, James. 2001. Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979–1989. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Brambor, Thomas, Clark, William Roberts, and Golder, Matthew. 2006. “Understanding multiplicative interaction models: improving empirical analyses.” Political Analysis 14(1): 63–82.
Braumoeller, Bear. 2004. “Hypothesis testing and multiplicative interaction terms.” International Organization 58(4): 807–20.
Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. “The domestic politics of international financial rescues: Congressional voting on bailouts in the 1990s.” Unpublished manuscript. University of California, San Diego (
Broz, J. Lawrence. 2005. “Congressional politics of international financial rescues.” American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 479–96.
Broz, J. Lawrence, and Hawes, Michael Brewster. 2006. “Congressional politics of financing the International Monetary Fund.” International Organization 60(1): 367–99.
Bryant, Ralph C. 2008. “Reform of IMF quota shares and voting shares: a missed opportunity.” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution ( international+monetary+fund).
Buira, Ariel. 2004. “The governance of the International Monetary Fund.” Washington, DC: G-24 Secretariat (
Buiter, Willem M. 2008. “Some suggestions for the G20 on November 15th.” In Eichergreen, Barry and Baldwin, Richard (eds.). What G20 Leaders Must Do to Stabilise Our Economy and Fix the Financial System. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 17–20 (
Calomiris, Charles. 1998. “The IMF's imprudent role as lender of last resort.” Cato Journal 17(3): 275–94.
Caprio, Gerard, and Klingebiel, Daniela. 2003. “Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises.” World Bank electronic database.
Chang, Roberto. 1999. “Understanding recent crises in emerging markets.” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, 84(2): 6–16.
Chayes, Abram, and Chayes, Antonia H.. 1993. “On compliance.” International Organization 47(2): 175–205.
Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2008. “Cheerleading for liberalization: the International Monetary Fund and financial globalization in emerging markets.” Paper presented at the first annual conference on the “Political economy of international organizations,” Ascona, Switzerland, February 6.
Claessens, Stijn, and Forbes, Kristin J. (eds.). 2001. International Financial Contagion. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Cline, William R. 1983. International Debt and the Stability of the World Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cline, William R. 1995. International Debt Reexamined. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Cline, William R. 2002. Private Sector Involvement in Financial Crisis Resolution: Definition, Measurement, and Implementation. Working Paper no. 18. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
Cohen, Benjamin J. 2002. “International finance.” In Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Simmons, Beth A. (eds.). Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage, 429–47.
Conway, Patrick. 2005. “The revolving door: duration and recidivism in IMF programs.” Unpublished manuscript. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Copelovitch, Mark S. 2005. “Governing global markets: private debt and the politics of International Monetary Fund lending.” Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
Crockett, Andrew. 1997. The Theory and Practice of Financial Stability. Essay in International Finance no. 203. Princeton, NJ: International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University.
Dobson, Wendy, and Hufbauer, Gary Clyde. 2001. World Capital Markets: Challenge to the G-10. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Downs, George, Rocke, David, and Barsoom, Peter. 1996. “Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?International Organization 50(3): 379–406.
Dreher, Axel, and Jensen, Nathan. 2007. “Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF conditions.” Journal of Law and Economics 50(1): 105–24.
Dreher, Axel, and Sturm, Jan-Egbert. 2006. Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly? Working Paper no. 06–137. Zurich: KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich (–137.html).
Dreher, Axel, and Vaubel, Roland. 2004a. “Do IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data.” Open Economies Review 15(1): 5–22.
Dreher, Axel, and Vaubel, Roland. 2004b. “The causes and consequences of IMF conditionality.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 40(3): 26–54.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1991. “Historical research on international lending and debt.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(2): 149–69.
Eichengreen, Barry. 1999. Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Kenen, Peter. 1994. “Managing the world economy under the Bretton Woods system: an overview.” In Kenen, Peter (ed.). Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 3–57.
Eichengreen, Barry, Kletzer, Kenneth, and Mody, Ashoka. 2005. The IMF in a World of Private Capital Markets. Working Paper no. 05/84. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Mody, Ashoka. 2000. Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? Working Paper no. 7458. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Eichengreen, Barry, and Portes, Richard. 1995. Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors. London: Center for Economic Policy Research.
Eichengreen, Barry, Rose, Andrew K., and Wyplosz, Charles. 1996. Contagious Currency Crises. Working Paper no. 5681. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Kar, Debayani, and Richardson, J. David. 2002. Assessing Globalization's Critics: “Talkers Are No Good Doers???” Working Paper no. 02–5. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics (–5.pdf).
Ferejohn, John. 1986. “Incumbent performance and electoral control.” Public Choice 50(1): 5–25.
Fischer, Stanley. 1999. “On the need for an international lender of last resort.” Paper prepared for the joint luncheon of the American Economic Association and the American Finance Association. New York, January 3 (
Frankel, Jeffrey. 2000. “Globalization of the economy.” In Nye, Joseph S. and Donahue, John D. (eds.). Governance in a Globalizing World. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 45–71.
Frankel, Jeffrey, and Rose, Andrew K.. 1996. “Currency crashes in emerging markets: an empirical treatment.” Journal of International Economics 41(3/4): 351–66.
Frieden, Jeffry. 2005. Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century. New York: W. W. Norton.
Gartzke, Erik. 2006. “The affinity of nations index, 1946–2002: version 4.0.” University of California, San Diego (
Gawande, Kishore, and Krishna, Pravin. 2003. “The political economy of trade policy: empirical approaches.” In Choi, E. Kwan and Harrigan, James (eds.). Handbook of International Trade. Malden, MA: Basil Blackwell, 213–50.
Gelos, R. Gaston, Sahay, Ratna, and Sandleris, Guido. 2004. Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access? Working Paper no. 04/221. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Gelpern, Anna. 2005. After Argentina. Policy Brief no. 05–2. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute of International Economics (
,General Accounting Office. 1996. Mexico's Financial Crisis: Origins, Awareness, Assistance, and Initial Efforts to Recover. Washington, DC: Office, General Accounting.
George, Alexander L., and Bennett, Andrew. 2005. “Process-tracing and historical explanation.” In Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (eds.). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 205–32.
Giannini, Curzio. 1999. “Enemy of None but a Common Friend of All?” An Internationalist Perspective on the Lender-of-Last-Resort Function. Working Paper no. 99/10. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Gold, Joseph. 1979. Conditionality. Pamphlet no. 31. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Gould, Erica R. 2003. “Money talks: supplementary financiers and International Monetary Fund conditionality.” International Organization 57(3): 551–86.
Gould, Erica R. 2006. Money Talks: The International Monetary Fund, Conditionality, and Supplementary Financiers. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
Grossman, Gene M., and Helpman, Elhanan. 1994. “Protection for sale.” American Economic Review 84(3): 833–50.
Hawkins, Darren, Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L., and Tierney, Michael J.. 2006. “Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations and principal agent theory.” In Hawkins, Darren, Lake, David A., Nelson, Daniel, and Tierney, Michael J. (eds.). Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 337.
Heckman, James J. 1979. “Sample selection bias as a specification error.” Econometrica 47(1): 153–61.
Helleiner, Eric. 1994. States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Henning, C. Randall. 1999. The Exchange Stabilization Fund: Slush Fund or War Chest?Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Hillman, Arye L. 1982. “Declining industries and political-support protectionist motives.” American Economic Review 72(5): 1180–7.
Ho, Daniel, Imai, Kosuke, King, Gary, and Stuart, Elizabeth. 2007. “Matching as nonparametric preprocessing for reducing model dependence in parametric causal inference.” Political Analysis 15(3): 199–236.
Hoggarth, Glenn, Reidhill, Jack, and Sinclair, Peter. 2003. “Resolution of banking crises: a review.” Financial Stability Review (December): 109–23.
,IEO. 2003. The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (
,IMF. 1983. Annual Report 1983. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
,IMF. 2000. International Capital Markets. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
,IMF. 2001. “Financial organization and operations of the IMF” (
,IMF. 2004. “The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)” (
,IMF. 2005. “IMF conditionality: a factsheet” (
,IMF. 2008. Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
,Institute for International Finance. 1998. Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies. Washington, DC: Institute for International Finance.
James, Harold. 1996. International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods. New York: Oxford University Press.
James, Harold. 2001. The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Joyce, Joseph. 2004. “Adoption, implementation and impact of IMF programmes: a review of the issues and evidence,” Comparative Economic Studies, 46(3): 451–67.
Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kenen, Peter B. 2001. The International Financial Architecture: What's New? What's Missing?Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Kiewiet, Roderick, and McCubbins, Mathew. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kim, Woochan, and Byeon, Yangho. 2001. “Restructuring Korean banks' short-term debts in 1998: detailed accounts and their implications.” Unpublished manuscript (
King, Gary, Tomz, Michael, and Wittenberg, Jason. 2000. “Making the most of statistical analyses: improving interpretation and presentation.” American Journal of Political Science 44(2): 347–61.
Kirshner, Jonathan. 1997. Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Knight, Malcolm, and Santaella, Julio A.. 1997. “Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements.” Journal of Development Economics 54(2): 405–36.
Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. “Contracting around international uncertainty.” American Political Science Review 99(4): 549–65.
Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles, and Snidal, Duncan. 2001. “The rational design of international institutions.” International Organization 55(4): 761–800.
Kraft, Joseph. 1984. The Mexican Rescue. New York: Group of Thirty.
Krueger, Anne. 2001. “A new approach to sovereign debt restructuring.” Address given at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations. Delhi, December 20 (
Leuven, Edwin, and Sianesi, Barbara. 2003. “PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate imbalance testing” (
Linn, Johannes F., Bryant, Ralph C., and Bradford, Colin I.. 2008. “Experts critique proposal for International Monetary Fund quota reform.” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution ( fund).
Lipson, Charles. 1985. “Bankers' dilemmas: private cooperation in rescheduling sovereign debts.” World Politics 38(1): 200–25.
Lipson, Charles. 1986. “International debt and international institutions.” In Kahler, Miles (ed.). Politics of International Debt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 219–43.
Lipworth, Gabrielle, and Nystedt, Jens. 2001. “Crisis resolution and private sector adaptation.” Finance and Development 38(2): 1–8.
Long, J. Scott, and Freese, Jeremy, 2001. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press.
Lustig, Nora. 1992. Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Lustig, Nora. 1996. Mexico in Crisis, the U.S. to the Rescue. Did History Repeat Itself? Brookings Discussion Paper (June). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Lyne, Mona M., Nielson, Daniel L., and Tierney, Michael J.. 2006. “Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid.” In Darren Hawkins, , David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney (eds.). Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 41–76.
Lyne, Mona M., and Tierney, Michael J.. 2002. “Variation in the structure of principals: conceptual clarification for research on delegation and agency control.” Paper presented at the conference “Delegation to international organizations.” Park City, UT, May 3, 2002.
Martin, Lisa L. 1992. “Interests, power, and multilateralism.” International Organization 46(4): 765–92.
Martin, Lisa L. 2006. “Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality.” In Darren Hawkins, , Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L., and Tierney, Michael J. (eds.). Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 140–64.
Martin, Lisa L., and Simmons, Beth A.. 1998. “Theories and empirical studies of international institutions.” International Organization 52(3): 729–57.
Martin, Lisa L., and Woods, Ngaire. 2005. “Multiple-state constituencies in the IMF: an agency approach.” Paper presented at the sixth annual Jacques Polak Research Conference. Washington, DC, November 4 (
Meltzer, Allan. 2000. Report of the International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission (“Meltzer Report”). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Mishkin, Frederic. 2006. The Next Great Globalization: How Disadvantaged Nations Can Harness Their Financial Systems to Get Rich. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Modigliani, Franco, and Miller, Merton H.. 1958. “The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment.”American Economic Review 48(3): 261–97.
Mosley, Layna. 2003. Global Markets and National Governments. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mosley, Layna. 2005. “Private governance for the public good? Exploring private sector participation in global financial regulation.” Paper presented at the London School of Economics conference “Financial innovations: markets, cultures and politics.” London, June 17 (
Mosley, Layna, and Singer, David Andrew. 2008. “Taking stock seriously: equity market performance, government policy, and financial globalization.” International Studies Quarterly 52(2): 405–25.
Mussa, Michael. 2002. “Reflections on moral hazard and private sector involvement in the resolution of emerging market financial crises.” Paper presented at the Bank of England conference “The role of the official and private sectors in resolving international financial crises.” London, July 23 (
Mussa, Michael, and Savastano, Miguel. 1999. The IMF Approach to Economic Stabilization. Working Paper no. 99/104. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Oatley, Thomas, and Yackee, Jason. 2004. “American interests and IMF lending.” International Politics 41(3): 415–29.
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (2nd edn.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Przeworski, Adam, and Vreeland, James. 2000. “The effect of IMF programs on economic growth.” Journal of Development Economics 62(2): 385–421.
Rajan, Raghuram, and Zingales, Luigi. 1995. “What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data.” Journal of Finance 50(5): 1421–60.
Raustiala, Kal. 2006. “Form and substance in international agreements.” American Journal of International Law 100(3): 581–614.
Rieffel, Lex. 2003. Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for Ad Hoc Machinery. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Has Globalization Gone Too Far?Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Rogoff, Kenneth, and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin. 2002. “Bankruptcy procedures for sovereigns: a history of ideas, 1976–2001.” IMF Staff Papers 49(3): 470–507.
Roubini, Nouriel, and Setser, Brad. 2004. Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Rubin, Robert. 1998. “Strengthening the architecture of the international financial system.” Remarks to the Brookings Institution. Washington, DC, April 14.
Rubin, Robert, and Weisberg, Jacob. 2003. In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington. New York: Random House.
Sachs, Jeffrey, Tornell, Aaron, and Velasco, Andres. 1996. “The collapse of the Mexican peso: what have we learned?Economic Policy 11: 13–63.
Sartori, Anne E. 2003. “An estimator for some binary-outcome selection models without exclusion restrictions.” Political Analysis 11(2): 111–38.
Simmons, Beth A. 2000. “International law and state behavior: commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs.” American Political Science Review 94(4): 819–35.
Simmons, Beth A. 2001. “The international politics of harmonization: the case of capital market regulation.” International Organization 55(3): 598–620.
Simmons, Beth A., and Hopkins, Daniel J.. 2005. “The constraining power of international treaties: theory and methods.” American Political Science Review 99(4): 623–31.
Simmons, Beth A., and Martin, Lisa L.. 2002. “International organizations and institutions.” In Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas, and Simmons, Beth A. (eds.). Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage, 192–211.
Singer, David Andrew. 2007. Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the International Financial System. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Smith, Roy C., and Walter, Ingo. 2003. Global Banking. New York: Oxford University Press.
Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “The limits of hegemonic stability theory.” International Organization 39(4): 579–615.
Southard, Frank A., Jr. 1979. The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund. Essays in International Finance no. 135. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Spiegel, Mark M. 1996. Collective Action Difficulties in Foreign Lending: Banks and Bonds. Economic Letter no. 1996-24. San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Steil, Benn, and Litan, Robert. 2006. Financial Statecraft: The Role of Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Stigler, George. 1971. “The theory of economic regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics 2(1): 3–21.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton.
Stone, Randall. 2002. Lending Credibility: The IMF and the Post-Communist Transition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Stone, Randall. 2004. “The political economy of IMF lending in Africa.” American Political Science Review 98(4): 577–91.
Stone, Randall. 2008. “The scope of IMF conditionality.” International Organization 62(4): 589–620.
Stone, Randall, and Steinwand, Jonathan. 2008. “The International Monetary Fund: a review of recent evidence.” Review of International Organizations 3(2): 123–49.
Strand, Jonathan, and Rapkin, David. 2005. “Voting power implications of a double majority voting procedure in the IMF's Executive Board.” In Buira, Ariel (ed.). Reforming the Governance of the IMF and World Bank. London: Anthem Press, 235–50.
Sturzenegger, Federico, and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin. 2006. Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crisis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thacker, Strom. 1999. “The high politics of IMF lending.” World Politics 52(1): 38–75.
Thomas, Alun, and Ramakrishnan, Uma. 2006. The Incidence and Effectiveness of Prior Actions in IMF-supported Programs. Working Paper no. 06/213. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Tomz, Michael. 2001. “Sovereign debt and international cooperation: reputational reasons for lending and repayment.” Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
Truman, Edwin M. (ed.). 2006. Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century. Special Report no. 19. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Uppal, Raman, and Hulle, Cynthia. 1997. “Sovereign debt and the London Club: a precommitment device for limiting punishment for default.” Journal of Banking and Finance 21(5): 741–56.
Houtven, Leo. 2002. Governance of the IMF: Decision Making, Institutional Oversight, Transparency, and Accountability. Pamphlet no. 53. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Vaubel, Roland. 1991. “The political economy of the International Monetary Fund: a public choice analysis.” In Vaubel, Roland and Willett, Thomas (eds.). The Political Economy of International Organizations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 204–44.
Vaubel, Roland. 1994. “The political economy of the International Monetary Fund: a public choice analysis.” In Bandow, Doug and Vasquez, Ian (eds.). Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 37–55.
Vines, David, and Gilbert, Christopher L.. 2004. The IMF and Its Critics: Reform of Global Financial Architecture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stein, Jana. 2005. “Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance.” American Political Science Review 99(4): 611–22.
Vreeland, James. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Vreeland, James. 2005. “The international and domestic politics of IMF programs.” Unpublished manuscript. Yale University, New Haven, CT.
White, William. 2000. What Have We Learned from Recent Financial Crises and Policy Responses? Working Paper no. 84. Basel: Bank for International Settlements.
Willett, Thomas. 2000. A Soft-core Public Choice Analysis of the International Monetary Fund. Claremont Colleges Working Paper no. 2000–56. Claremont, CA: Claremont Graduate University.
Wilson, Sven, and Butler, Daniel M., 2007. “A lot more to do: the sensitivity of time-series cross-sectional analyses to simple alternative specifications.” Political Analysis 15(2): 101–23.
Winship, Christopher, and Mare, Robert D.. 1992. “Models for sample selection bias.” Annual Review of Sociology 18: 327–50.
Woods, Ngaire. 2006. The Globalizers: The IMF, The World Bank, and Their Borrowers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
,World Bank. 2003. Global Development Finance. Washington, DC: World Bank.
,World Bank. 2005. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
,World Bank. 2006a. Global Development Finance. Washington, DC: World Bank.
,World Bank. 2006b. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Wyplosz, Charles. 1999. “International financial instability.” In Kaul, Inge, Grunberg, Isabelle, and Stern, Marc (eds.). Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 152–89.
Zhang, Zhaohui. 2001. “The impact of IMF term loans on US bank creditors' equity values: an event study of South Korea's case.” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions, and Money 11(3–4): 363–94.


Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.