Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Abstracts
- Preface
- Editors' Note
- PART I INTERNATIONAL REGIMES THEORY: DOES LAW MATTER?
- PART II COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE
- PART III LEGALIZATION AND ITS LIMITS
- PART IV INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS
- PART V TREATY DESIGN AND DYNAMICS
- PART VI LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
- PART VII OTHER SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
- 20 Security: Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace (2003)
- 21 Trade: In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO (2002)
- 22 Money: The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs (2000)
- 23 War Crimes: Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (2001)
- 24 Human Rights: The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe (2000)
- 25 Environment: Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance (1994)
- 26 Intellectual Property: The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources (2004)
- References
- Index
25 - Environment: Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance (1994)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Abstracts
- Preface
- Editors' Note
- PART I INTERNATIONAL REGIMES THEORY: DOES LAW MATTER?
- PART II COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE
- PART III LEGALIZATION AND ITS LIMITS
- PART IV INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS
- PART V TREATY DESIGN AND DYNAMICS
- PART VI LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
- PART VII OTHER SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
- 20 Security: Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace (2003)
- 21 Trade: In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO (2002)
- 22 Money: The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs (2000)
- 23 War Crimes: Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (2001)
- 24 Human Rights: The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe (2000)
- 25 Environment: Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance (1994)
- 26 Intellectual Property: The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources (2004)
- References
- Index
Summary
Too many people assume, generally without having given any serious thought to its character or its history, that international law is and always has been a sham. Others seem to think that it is a force with inherent strength of its own. … Whether the cynic or sciolist is the less helpful is hard to say, but both of them make the same mistake. They both assume that international law is a subject on which anyone can form his opinions intuitively, without taking the trouble, as one has to do with other subjects, to inquire into the relevant facts.
–J. L. BrierlyRegime design matters. International treaties and regimes have value if and only if they cause people to do things they would not otherwise do. [Whether] a treaty elicits compliance or other desired behavioral changes depends upon identifiable characteristics of the regime's compliance systems. As negotiators incorporate certain rules into a regime and exclude others, they are making choices that have crucial implications for whether or not actors will comply.
For decades, nations have negotiated treaties with simultaneous hope that those treaties would produce better collective outcomes and skepticism about the ability to influence the way governments or individuals act. Both lawyers and political scientists have theorized about how international legal regimes can influence behavior and why they often do not.
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- Information
- International Law and International RelationsAn International Organization Reader, pp. 653 - 683Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
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