Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Inside Job
  • Cited by 5
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
April 2017
Print publication year:
2017
Online ISBN:
9781316599983
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316599983
Subjects:
Economics, Macroeconomics, Political Economy, Politics and International Relations
Information

Book description

National decline is typically blamed on special interests from the demand side of politics corrupting a country's institutions. The usual demand-side suspects include crony capitalists, consumer activists, economic elites, and labor unions. Less attention is given to government insiders on the supply side of politics - rulers, elected officials, bureaucrats, and public employees. In autocracies and democracies, government insiders have the motive, means, and opportunity to co-opt political power for their benefit and at the expense of national well-being. Many storied empires have succumbed to such inside jobs. Today, they imperil countries as different as China and the United States. Democracy - government by the people - does not ensure government for the people. Understanding how government insiders use their power to subvert the public interest - and how these negative consequences can be mitigated - is the topic of this book by Mark A. Zupan.

Reviews

'In the tradition of Parkinson’s Law, this fascinating and novel contribution to political theory examines in horrifying but eloquent detail just how vulnerable government is, not just to demand-side capture by special interests, but to supply-side take-over by insiders operating for their own benefit and at the expense of the public good.'

Vicount Matthew Ridley - Journalist, Member of the House of Lords and author of The Evolution of Everything

'Mark A. Zupan brings an economist’s perspective and wit along with sharp scholar's eyes to political economy issues of great contemporary import. I found answers in this book to many of my long-held and vexing questions about the functioning of our government. This book is a must read for anyone wanting to understand why and how Washington and, for that matter, all levels of government, do and do not work.'

Ira Solomon - Dean, A. B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, New Orleans

'In a world of public sector unions, Clinton Foundations, Berlusconis and the like, Mark A. Zupan illustrates how government insiders have reduced economic freedom and contributed greatly to the secular stagnation in developed countries. Economists, policymakers, the media and voters would do well to take Inside Job seriously before it is too late to reverse.'

Steven N. Kaplan - University of Chicago

'With remarkable clarity and wisdom Mark A. Zupan explains to us how government rent-seeking works in practice today. This book is a treasure of breath-taking information and fundamental insights into the workings of modern as well as historic governments.'

Hans-Werner Sinn - President Emeritus of Ifo Institute, University of Munich and author of The Euro Trap

'In this deeply insightful investigation of public sector integrity, Mark A. Zupan not only chronicles the corrosive effect that government corruption has upon the national well-being, but also explores the manner by which the ruling elite seek to retain power by monopolizing the supply side of policymaking. This ground-breaking work should serve as a wake-up call for those entrusted with governing responsibility. Mark A. Zupan's Inside Job is required reading for all who seek to seriously explore the issue of public sector integrity - as well as those who wish to better understand the potential consequences when a ruling elite fails to administer 'government for the people.'

Michael P. Ryan - Chief Investment Strategist, Wealth Management Americas, Union Bank of Switzerland

'In this insightful and illuminating book, Mark A. Zupan lays bare the sources of corruption that have brought down governments through the ages and which now threaten the success of the American experiment in limited government. Inside Job is that rare book that tells us not only what is happening but why it is happening. This book is a must read for anyone seeking to understand the inside forces that are impeding progress and prosperity while profiting from our national malaise.'

James Piereson - President of the William E. Simon Foundation and Director of the Center for the American University

'The negative influence that special interests have on public policy is well-recognized. In Inside Job, Mark A. Zupan uses the tools of economic analysis to show why the influence of government insiders - elected officials and government bureaucrats - often is even more pernicious. Zupan's rigorous analysis, supported by many examples and case studies, makes this book a significant contribution to the academic literature that describes the way government actually works.'

Randall G. Holcombe - Florida State University, former president of the Public Choice Society and author of Producing Prosperity

''What do government insiders stand to gain?' in his compelling and important work, Inside Job answers this question with precision and persuasion.'

Tyler Cowen - George Mason University, Virginia and writer for the New York Times, The New Republic, The Wall Street Journal, Forbes and Newsweek

'Mark A. Zupan’s magnificent book Inside Job guides the reader through the labyrinth of motives, means, and opportunities of the supply side of political markets comprised of statesmen, bureaucrats, and public employees. As such, this book on political economy does not just build on public choice theory, but also thoughtfully applies the theory to the practical issues - among them the United States presidential election of 2016. Finally, the book also comprehensively lays out ways of improving government transparency that could enable citizens to monitor their public officials more effectively.'

Tanja Porčnik - President of the Visio Institute, and co-author of 'The Human Freedom Index'

'As reformers across the globe seek to ‘drain the political swamps’ and restore government to the people, Inside Job reminds us that government responsiveness is threatened not only by the interest groups that swarm the centers of power but also by the personal agendas of government officials themselves. Zupan’s fascinating study combines a sweeping historical analysis spanning centuries, examination of modern data on government integrity, and economic theory to show how capture of government by insiders undermines popular control and can threaten the viability of the state.'

John Matsusaka - Charles F. Sexton Chair in American Enterprise, University of Southern California

'How corrupt is government? And how much does democracy help? Inside Job tours readers through the basic facts of global corruption, and shows that democracy is no panacea for this age-old problem.'

Bryan D. Caplan - George Mason University, Virginia and author of The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies

'Mark A. Zupan’s Inside Job shifts today’s typical study of the demand-side of politics towards analysis of how and why rulers, elected officials, and bureaucrats subvert public interest. The supply-side analysis of Zupan’s book links the motive, power and incentives of ‘insiders’ with the consequences of their behavior on the national well-being. Inside Job should be read by all graduate students in social sciences.'

Steve Pejovich - Professor Emeritus, Texas A & M University

'Zupan provides a compelling and systematic explanation of how the general interest of the people is frustrated by the service of public officials to special interests. He further illustrates that these so-called 'inside jobs' threaten economic growth, domestic tranquility, and other key aspects of the common good. This book is an important resource for students of politics and helps explain some of the rise of modern populism throughout contemporary western democracies.'

Thomas W. Gilligan - Stanford University

'Mark A. Zupan raises a series of questions that could not be more topical. Why are politicians growing richer, while decrying others' wealth? Why do political performances increasingly dismay their constituents? Why do American institutions increasingly fail, eliciting more voter disdain? Zupan's insight is that all these questions really have one answer: the phenomenal growth of government, attended by increasing voter disgust with politicians.'

Fred McChesney - University of Miami, School of Law

'Zupan succeeds brilliantly in producing a self-contained book that lays out a coherent framework to address the critical issues related to the role of government insiders in the success or demise of political systems. This is an impressive book which tackles a number of important substantive topics about the relative desirability of alternative political institutions.'

Antonio Merlo - George E. Peterkin Chair of Economics and Dean of the School of Social Sciences, Rice University, Texas

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Contents
References

Bibliography

Abram, Michael and Cooper, Joseph (1968). “The Rise of Seniority in the House of Representatives.” Polity 1 (1): 52–85.
Abramowitz, Moses (1986). “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind.” Journal of Economic History 46 (2): 389–406.
Abrams, Burton A. and Settle, Russell F. (1978). “The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections.” Journal of Political Economy 86 (2): 245–257.
Acemoglu, Daron (2003). “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics.” Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4): 620–652.
Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2006). “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective.” American Political Science Review 100 (1): 115–131.
Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Publishers.
Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2013). “Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (2): 173–192.
Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 29 (1): 3–28.
Acemoglu, Daron, Robinson, James A., and Verdier, Thierry (2004). “Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule.” Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (2–3): 162–192.
Acemoglu, Daron and Jackson, Matthew (2015). “History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms.” Review of Economic Studies 82 (1): 1–34.
Acemoglu, Daron, Naidu, Suresh, Restrepo, Pascual, and Robinson, James A. (2014). “Democracy Does Cause Growth.” Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, MIT.
Acemoglu, Daron, Reed, Tristan, and Robinson, James A. (2014). “Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone.” Journal of Political Economy 122 (2): 319–368.
Ackerman, Kenneth D. (2011). Boss Tweed: The Corrupt Pol Who Conceived the Soul of Modern New York. Falls Church, VA: Viral History Press.
Aghion, Philippe, Alesina, Alberto, and Trebbi, Francesco (2008). “Democracy, Technology, and Growth.” In Institutions and Economic Performance, 511–543. Edited by Helpman, Elhanan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Aghion, Philippe, Algan, Yann, Cahuc, Pierre, and Shleifer, Andrei (2010). “Regulation and Distrust.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (3): 1015–1049.
Ahman, Ehtisham, Keping, Li, and Richardson, Thomas J. (2002). “Recentralization in China,” IMF Working Paper, Number 2/168.
Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold (1972). “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62 (5): 777–795.
Alesina, Alberto and Giuliano, Paola (2015). “Culture and Institutions.” Journal of Economic Literature 53 (4): 898–944.
Anzia, Sarah F. and Moe, Terry M. (2015). “Public Sector Unions and the Costs of Government.” Journal of Politics 77 (1): 114–127.
Aranson, Peter H. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1977). “A Prolegomenon to a Theory of the Failure of Representative Democracy.” In American Re-evolution Papers and Proceedings, 23–46. Edited by Auster, Richard D. and Sears, Barbara. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
Atsmon, Yuval and Magni, Max (2012). “Meet the Chinese Consumer of 2020.” The McKinsey Quarterly 50 (1): 1–10.
Barro, Robert J. (1996). “Democracy and Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (1): 1–27.
Becker, Gary S. (1983). “Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (3): 371–398.
Bell, Daniel A. (2015). The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bensel, Richard F. (1990). Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bernstein, Peter L. (2005). Wedding of the Waters: The Erie Canal and the Making of a Great Nation. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Berry, Christopher R. (2009). Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multi-level Governments. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bloom, David E., Canning, David, and Fink, Gunther (2008). “Urbanization and the Wealth of Nations.” Science 319: 772–775.
Borcherding, Thomas E. (1977). Editor. Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of Government Growth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Borcherding, Thomas E., Pommerehne, Werner W., and Schneider, Friedrich (1982). “Comparing the Efficiency of Private and Public Production: The Evidence from Five Countries.” Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 42 (2): 127–156.
Brill, Steven (August 31, 2009). “The Rubber Room: The Battle over New York’s Worst Teachers.” The New Yorker: 30–36.
Browder, Bill (2015). Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man’s Fight for Justice. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Browning, Edgar K. (1975). “Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy.” Economic Inquiry 13 (3): 373–388.
Browning, Edgar K. (2008). Stealing From Each Other: How the Welfare State Robs Americans of Money and Spirit. Westport, CN: Praeger.
Brunner, Karl (1978). “Reflections on the Political Economy of Government: The Persistent Growth of Government.” Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 114 (3): 649–680.
Buchanan, James M. (1972). “Before Public Choice.” In Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, 27–37. Edited by Tullock, Gordon. Blacksburg, VA: Center for the Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon (1977). “The Expanding Public Sector: Wagner Squared.” Public Choice 31 (1): 147–150.
Buchanan, James M. and Wagner, Richard E. (1977). Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes. Indianapolis, IN: The Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, James M. and Musgrave, Richard A. (1999). Public Finance and Public Choice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bueno, de Mesquita, and Smith, Alastair (2011). The Dictator’s Handbook. New York: Public Affairs.
Buck, Pearl S. (1931). The Good Earth. New York: P. F. Collier & Son.
Burgess, Robin, Jedwab, Remi, Miguel, Edward, Morjaria, Ameet, and Miquel, Gerard Padro (2015). “The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya.” American Economic Review 105 (6): 1817–1851.
Burns, John P. (2007). “Civil Service Reform in China.” OECD Journal on Budgeting 7 (1): 57–81.
Cain, Bruce E. and Kousser, Thad (2004). Adapting to Term Limits: Recent Experiences and New Directions. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.
Cain, Bruce, Ferejohn, John, and Fiorina, Morris (1987). The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Camerer, Colin (1983). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interactions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cameron, Averil (1993). The Later Roman Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Caplan, Bryan (2006). The Myth of the Rational Voter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Card, David, and Krueger, Alan (1992a). “Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States.” Journal of Political Economy 100 (1): 1–40.
Card, David, and Krueger, Alan (1992b). “School Quality and Black-White Relative Earnings: A Direct Assessment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1): 151–200.
Carlin, John (2009). Invictus. New York: Penguin Press.
Carlyle, Thomas (1841). On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. London: James Fraser.
Caro, Robert A. (1974). The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
Caro, Robert A. (2012). The Passage of Power. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
Carson, Jamie L., Engstrom, Erik J., and Roberts, Jason M. (2006). “Redistricting, Candidate Entry, and the Politics of Nineteenth-Century U.S. House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (2): 283–293.
Chayes, Sarah (2015). Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Chen, Jowei, and Johnson, Tim (2015). “Federal Employee Unionization and Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy: Estimating and Explaining Ideological Change in Executive Agencies.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 27 (1): 151–171.
Chetty, Raj, Friedman, John N., and Rockoff, Jonah E. (2014). “Measuring the Impacts of Teachers II: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood.” American Economic Review 104 (9): 2633–2679.
Chua, Amy (2011). Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother. New York: Penguin Press.
Chubb, John E., and Moe, Terry M. (1990). Politics, Markets, and American Schools. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Coase, Ronald H. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (16): 386–405.
Coase, Ronald H. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1): 1–44.
Coase, Ronald H. (1964). “The Regulated Industries: Discussion.” American Economic Review 54 (2): 194–197.
Coase, Ronald H., and Wang, Ning (2012). How China Became Capitalist. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Cornell, Stephen, and Kalt, Joseph P. (2000). “Where’s the Glue? Institutional and Cultural Foundations of American Indian Economic Development.” Journal of Socio-Economics 29 (3): 443–470.
Corruption Perceptions Index (Annual). Berlin, Germany: Transparency International.
Cost, Jay (2015). A Republic No More: Big Government and the Rise of American Corruption. New York: Encounter Books.
Cowen, Tyler, and Sutter, Daniel (1997). “Politics and the Pursuit of Fame.” Public Choice 93 (1–2): 19–35.
Cowen, Tyler, Glazer, Amihai, and McMillan, Henry (1994). “Rent Seeking Can Promote the Provision of Public Goods.” Economics and Politics 6 (2): 131–145.
Crew, Michael A., and Kleindorfer, Paul R. (1993). Editors. Regulation and the Nature of Postal and Delivery Services. Boston, MA: Kluwer.
Crow, Carl (1938). The Chinese Are Like That. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Dalberg-Acton, John E. E. (1907). “Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887.” In Historical Essays and Studies, 504. Edited by Figgis, John N. and Laurence, Reginald V.. London: Macmillan.
Deaton, Angus (2013). The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
DeCelles, Katherine, DeRue, D. Scott, Margolis, Joshua D., and Ceranic, Tara L. (2012). “Does Power Corrupt or Enable?: When and Why Power Facilitates Self-Interested Behavior.” Journal of Applied Psychology 97 (3): 681–689.
DeLong, Bradford J., and Shleifer, Andrei (1993). “Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial Revolution.” Journal of Law and Economics 36 (2): 671–702.
Demsetz, Harold E. (1968). “Why Regulate Public Utilities?” Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1): 55–65.
Diamond, Jared (1997). Guns, Germs and Steel. New York: W. W. Norton.
Diermeier, Daniel, Keane, Michael P., and Merlo, Antonio M. (2005). “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers.” American Economic Review 95 (1): 347–373.
Di Lodovico, Amadeo M., Lewis, William W., Palmade, Vincent, and Sankhe, Shirish (2001). “India: From Emerging to Surging.” The McKinsey Quarterly 4 (Special Edition): 28–50.
DiIulio, John J. Jr. (2014). Bring Back the Bureaucrats. West Coshohocken, PA: Templeton Press.
DiSalvo, Daniel (2010). “The Trouble with Public Sector Unions.” National Affairs 5: 3–19.
DiSalvo, Daniel (2015). Government Against Itself: Public Union Power and Its Consequences. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Dobbie, Will, and Fryer, Roland G. Jr. (2015). “The Medium-Term Impacts of High-Achieving Charter Schools.” Journal of Political Economy 123 (5): 985–1037.
Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Doyle, Michael W. (1983). “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (4): 205–235.
Duhigg, Charles (2012). The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business. New York: Random House.
Duhigg, Charles (2016). Smarter Faster Better. New York: Random House.
Edwards, Chris, and Gokhale, Jagadeesh (2006). “Unfunded State and Local Health Costs: $1.4 Trillion.” Tax and Budget Bulletin 40. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.
Eliot, T. S. (1943). “Little Gidding.” Four Quartets. New York: Harcourt, Inc.
Ellison, Sarah (January 2015). “Which Blair Project.” Vanity Fair, 54–68.
Farr, W. Ken, Lord, Richard A., and Wolfenbarger, J. Larry (1998). “Economic Freedom, Political Freedom, and Economic Well-Being: A Causality Analysis.” Cato Journal 18 (2): 247–262.
Fenno, Richard (1978). Homestyle: House Members and Their Districts. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Ferguson, Niall (2006). The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. New York: Penguin Books.
Fiorina, Morris P., and Noll, Roger G. (1978). “Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy.” Journal of Public Economics 9 (2): 239–254.
Fisman, Raymond, Schulz, Florian, and Vig, Vikrant (2014). “The Private Returns to Public Office.” Journal of Political Economy 122 (4): 806–862.
Fox, J. Ronald (1988). The Defense Management Challenge. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Freedom House (Annual). Freedom in the World: Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Boston: Freedom House.
Freeman, Richard B. (1986). “Unionism Comes to the Public Sector.” In When Public Sector Workers Unionize, 365–398. Edited by Freeman, Richard B. and Ichniovski, Casey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Friedman, Milton (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Friedman, Milton, and Friedman, Rose D. (1984). Tyranny of the Status Quo. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Fukuyama, Francis (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
Fukuyama, Francis (2011). The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Fukuyama, Francis (2014). Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Galbraith, John Kenneth (1958). The Affluent Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Galloway, George B. (1959). “Development of the Committee System in the House.” The American Historical Review 65 (1): 17–30.
Gandhi, Jennifer, and Przeworski, Adam (2007). “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” Comparative Political Studies 40 (11): 1279–1301.
Garen, John, and Clark, Jeff R. (2015). “Trust and the Growth of Government.” Unpublished manuscript, Gatton College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky.
Geddes, Barbara, Wright, Joseph, and Frantz, Erica (2014). “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2): 313–331.
Gibbon, Edward ([1776–1789] 1974). The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Edited by Bury, John Bagnell. New York: AMS Press.
Gladwell, Malcolm (October 2010). “Small Change.” The New Yorker, 42–49.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Shleifer, Andrei (2005). “The Economics of Shaping the Electorate.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 21 (1):1–19.
Glaeser, Edward L., Gyourko, Joseph, and Saks, Raven E. (2005). “Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?” American Economic Review 95 (2): 329–333.
Glassman, Matthew E., and Wilhelm, Amber H. (2015). Congressional Career: Service Tenure and Patterns of Member Service, 1789–2015. CRS Report for Congress 7–5700. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Goff, Brian L., and Tollison, Robert D. (1990). “Is National Defense A Pure Public Good?” Defence Economics 1: 141–147.
Goldin, Claudia, and Katz, Lawrence F. (2008). The Race Between Education and Technology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goodwin, A.J.H. (1957). “The Medieval Empire of Ghana.” South African Archaeological Bulletin (12): 108–112.
Greenstein, Shane (2015). How the Internet Became Commercial: Innovation, Privatization, and the Birth of a New Network. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Grief, Avner (1994). “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies.” Journal of Political Economy 102 (5): 912–950.
Gropper, Daniel M., Jahera, John, and Park, Jung-Chul (2015). “Political Power, Economic Freedom, and Congress: Effects on Bank Performance.” Journal of Banking and Finance 60:76–92.
Guiso, Luigi, Sapienza, Paola, and Zingales, Luigi (2015). “Corporate Culture, Societal Culture, and Institutions.” American Economic Review 105 (5): 336–339.
Gwartney, James D., Holcombe, Randall G., and Lawson, Robert A. (1998). “The Scope of Government and the Wealth of Nations.” Cato Journal 18: 163–190.
Gwartney, James D., Lawson, Robert A., and Hall, Joshua (Annual). Economic Freedom of the World. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute.
Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, and Madison, James ([1788] 1982). The Federalist Papers. Toronto: Bantam Books.
Hansmann, Henry B. (1986). “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise.” In The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy, 161–184. Edited by Rose-Ackerman, Susan. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hanushek, Eric A. (2009). “Teacher Deselection.” In Creating a New Teaching Profession, 165–180. Edited by Goldhaber, Dan and Hannaway, Jane. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
Harrell, Stevan (1985). “Why Do the Chinese Work So Hard?” Modern China 11 (2): 203–226.
Hayek, Friedrich A. (1944). The Road to Serfdom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Hayes, Kathy, and Chang, Semoon (1990). “The Relative Efficiency of City Manager and Mayor-Council Forms of Government.” Southern Economic Journal 51 (1): 167–177.
Heitger, Bernhard (2004). “Property Rights and the Wealth of Nations: A Cross-Country Study.” Cato Journal 23 (3): 381–402.
Hibbert, Christopher (1980). The French Revolution. New York: Penguin Press.
Hibbing, John R. (1991). “The Modern Congressional Career.” The American Political Science Review 85: 404–425.
Higgs, Robert (1990). Editor. Arms, Politics, and the Economy. New York: Holmes and Meier.
Hirschman, Albert O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hodler, Roland, and Raschky, Paul A. (2014). “Regional Favoritism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (2): 995–1033.
Holcombe, Randall G. (2012). “Make Economics Policy Relevant: Depose the Omniscient Benevolent Dictator.” The Independent Review 17 (2): 165–176.
Holcombe, Randall G. (2015). “Political Capitalism.” Cato Journal 35 (1): 41–66.
Holcombe, Randall G., and Boudreaux, Christopher J. (2013). “Institutional Quality and the Tenure of Autocrats.” Public Choice 156 (3): 409–421.
Holderlin, Friedrich (2008). Hyperion. Translated by Benjamin, Ross. Brooklyn, NY: Archipelago Books.
Hollyer, James R., and Wantchekon, Leonard (2015). “Corruption and Ideology in Autocracies.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 31 (3): 499–533.
Holt, Frank L. (2016). The Treasures of Alexander the Great: How One Man’s Wealth Shaped the World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hoxby, Caroline M. (1996). “How Teachers Unions Affect Education Production.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 111 (3): 671–718.
Hoxby, Caroline M. (2000). “Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?” American Economic Review 90 (5): 1209–1238.
Hoxby, Caroline M. (2011). Editor. The Economics of School Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hoxby, Caroline M., and Leigh, Andrew (2004). “Pulled Away or Pushed Out: Explaining the Decline of Teacher Aptitude in the U.S.” American Economic Review 94 (2): 236–240.
Hubbard, Glenn, and Kane, Tim (2013). Balance: The Economics of Great Powers From Ancient Rome to Modern America. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Hummler, Konrad. (2004). “Globalization: Phase 2,” Wegelin Investment Commentary No. 232.
Hummler, Konrad. (2009). “States Under Stress.” Wegelin Commentary No. 264. Wegelin & Company.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone.
Hurwicz, Leonid (2008). “But Who Will Guard the Guardians?” American Economic Review 98 (3): 577–585.
Isaacson, Walter, and Thomas, Evan (1986). The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Ito, Takatoshi (1996). “Japan and the Asian Economies: A Miracle in Transition.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 27 (2): 205–272.
Jensen, Michael C., and Meckling, William H. (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305–360.
Jensen, Michael C., and Murphy, Kevin J. (1990). “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives.” Journal of Political Economy 98 (2): 225–264.
Johnson, George E., and Stafford, Frank P. (1973). “Social Returns to Quantity and Quality of Schooling.” Journal of Human Resources 8 (2): 139–155.
Johnson, Paul E. (1978). A Shopkeeper’s Millennium. New York: Hill & Wang.
Johnson, Ronald N., and Libecap, Gary D. (1994). The Federal Civil Service and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Kalt, Joseph P., and Zupan, Mark A. (1984). “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics.” American Economic Review 74 (3): 279–300.
Kalt, Joseph P., and Zupan, Mark A. (1990). “The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions.” Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1): 103–131.
Kaplan, Robert S., and Walker, David M. (2013). “Government Debt and Competitiveness.” Harvard Business School U.S. Competitiveness Project. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School.
Kau, James B., and Rubin, Paul H. (1979). “Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law and Economics 22 (2): 365–384.
Kauffmann, Daniel, Kray, Aart, and Mastruzzi, Massimo (2003). “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3106, Washington D.C.
Kayser, Mark A., and Peress, Michael (2012). “Benchmarking Across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison.” American Political Science Review 106 (3): 661–682.
Keech, William, and Munger, Michael (2015). “The Anatomy of Government Failure.” Public Choice 164: 1–42.
Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, and Frantz, Erica (2014). “How Autocracies Fall.” Washington Quarterly 37 (1): 35–47.
Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, and Frantz, Erica (2015). “Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Autocracies.” Washington Quarterly 37 (4): 71–84.
Kennedy, Paul (1987). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House.
Kenny, Lawrence W., and Schmidt, Amy B. (1994). “The Decline in the Number of School Districts in the U.S.: 1950–1980.” Public Choice 79 (1–2): 1–18.
Khaldun, Ibn (2005). The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Translated by Rosenthal, Franz. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kinross, Patrick (2001). Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation. London: Phoenix.
Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. New York: Penguin Press.
Kissinger, Henry (2014). World Order. New York: Penguin Press.
Klein, Benjamin, Crawford, Robert G., and Alchian, Armen A. (1978). “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.” Journal of Law and Economics 21 (2): 297–326.
Knack, Stephen, and Keefer, Philip (1997). “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Analysis.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4): 1251–1288.
Kolko, Gabriel (1963). The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900–1916. New York: Free Press.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J., and Burns, Scott (2012). The Clash of Generations: Saving Ourselves, Our Kids, and Our Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kravitz, Walker (1974). “Evolution of the Senate’s Committee System.” Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 411: 27–38.
Krueger, Anne (1974). “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” American Economic Review 64 (3): 291–303.
Kuhrt, Amelie (1995). The Ancient Near-East c. 3000–330 BC. London: Routledge.
Kumar, Krishna B., and Matsusaka, John G. (2009). “From Families to Formal Contracts: An Approach to Development.” Journal of Development Economics 90 (1): 106–119.
Kuziemko, Illyana, Norton, Michael I., Saez, Emmanuel, and Stantcheva, Stefanie (2015). “How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments.” American Economic Review 105 (4): 1478–1508.
Laffer, Arthur B., Moore, Stephen, Sinquefield, Rex A., and Brown, Travis H. (2014). Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of States: How Taxes, Energy, and Worker Freedom Change Everything. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
Landry, Pierre F. (2003). “The Political Management of Mayors in Post-Deng China.” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 17: 31–58.
Landsberg, Henry A. (1958). Hawthorne Revisited. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Lardy, Nicholas (2014). Markets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Lasswell, Harold D. (1936). Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How. New York: Whittlesey House.
Lawson, Robert A., and Clark, J. R. (2010). “Examining the Hayek-Friedman Hypothesis on Economic and Political Freedom.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 74 (3): 230–239.
Lemos, Margaret H., and Minzner, Max (2014). “For Profit Public Enforcement.” Harvard Law Review 127 (3): 853–913.
Levitt, Steven D. (1996). “How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology.” American Economic Review 86 (3): 425–441.
Levy, David M., and Peart, Sandra J. (2011). “Soviet Growth and American Textbooks: An Endogenous Past.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 78 (1–2): 110–125.
Lewis, Bernard (1995). The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years. New York: Touchstone.
Lewis, Michael (2011). Boomerang. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Lewis, Michael (2014). Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Lott, John R. Jr. (1987). “Why is Education Publicly Provided? A Critical Survey.” Cato Journal 7 (2): 475–501.
MacMillan, Margaret (2014). The War That Ended the Peace: The Road to 1914. New York: Random House.
Manne, Henry G. (1965). “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.” Journal of Political Economy 73 (2): 110–120.
Marshall, Monty G. (2013). “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2013.” North Vienna, VA: Center for Systematic Peace.
Marx, Karl ([1867] 2009). Das Capital: Critique of Political Economy. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.
Mayer, Jane (2016). Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right. New York: Doubleday.
McChesney, Fred S. (1997). Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
McCloskey, Deirdre N. (2010). Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McCloskey, Deirdre N. (2016). Bourgeois Equality: How Betterment Became Ethical, 1600 to 1848, and Then Suspect. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McCormick, Robert E., and Tollison, Robert D. (1981). Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An Inquiry Into the Interest Group Theory of Government. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing.
McDonald, Patrick J. (2009). The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, The War Machine, and International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
McKean, Roland N. (1965). “The Unseen Hand in Government.” American Economic Review 55 (3): 496–506.
McKelvey, (1984). Rochester: A Brief History. New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
Meltzer, Allan H., and Richard, Scott F. (1981). “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” Journal of Political Economy 89 (5): 914–927.
Meltzer, Allan H., and Richard, Scott F. (2014). “A Rational Theory of the Growth of Government and the Distribution of Income.” The Wharton School Research Paper No. 67.
Merewitz, Leonard, and Zupan, Mark (1993). “Franchise Bidding, Contracting Out, and Worksharing in the Production of Postal Services: Can They Collect, Sort, and Deliver?” In Regulation and the Nature of Postal and Delivery Services, 69–89. Edited by Crew, Michael A. and Kleindorfer, Paul R.. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Micklethwait, John, and Wooldridge, Adrian (2014). The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State. New York: Penguin Press.
Milgram, Stanley (1974). Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York: HarperCollins.
Miller, Terry, Kim, Anthony B., and Holmes, Kim R. (Annual). Index of Economic Freedom. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
Moe, Terry M. (2006). “Political Control and the Power of the Agent.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22 (1): 1–29.
Moe, Terry M. (2009). “Collective Bargaining and the Performance of Public Schools.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (1): 156–174.
Moe, Terry M. (2011). Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America’s Public Schools. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Moe, Terry M. (2015). “Vested Interests and Political Institutions.” Political Science Quarterly 30 (2): 277–318.
Moe, Terry M., and Chubb, John E. (2009). Liberating Learning: Technology, Politics, and the Future of American Education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Morck, Randall, and Yeung, Bernard (2014). “Corporate Governance in China.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 26 (3): 20–41.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1979). Public Choice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1909). Thoughts Out of Season. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh Press.
Niskanen, William A. Jr. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
Niskanen, William A. (2008). Reflections of a Political Economist: Selected Articles on Government Policies and Political Processes. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.
North, Douglass C. (1968). “Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 1600–1850.” Journal of Political Economy 76 (5): 953–970.
North, Douglass C. (1991). “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 97–112.
North, Douglass C., and Thomas, Robert P. (1973). The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., and Weingast, Barry R. (1989). “Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England.” Journal of Economic History 49 (4): 803–832.
Novy-Marx, Robert, and Rauh, Joshua D. (2014a). “Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6 (1): 193–229.
Novy-Marx, Robert, and Rauh, Joshua D. (2014b). “Linking Benefits to Investment Performance in U.S. Public Pension Systems.” Journal of Public Economics 116: 47–61.
Nye, Joseph S. Jr., Zelikow, Philip D., and King, David C. (1997). Why People Don’t Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
OECD (2012). PISA 2012 Results. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD (2015). “Urban Policy Review: China 2015.” Paris: OECD Publishing.
Ogilvie, Sheilagh (2014). “The Economics of Guilds.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (4): 169–192.
Okun, Arthur M. (1975). Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Olson, Mancur (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. New York: Shocken.
Olson, Mancur (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Olson, Mancur (1993). “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review 87 (3): 567–576.
Olson, Mancur (2000). Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books.
Ornstein, Norman (1955). Editor. Congress in Change. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Paulson, Henry M. Jr. (2015). Dealing With China: An Insider Unmasks the New Economic Superpower. New York: Hachette Book Group.
Peden, Edgar A. (1991). “Productivity in the United States and its Relationship to Government Activity: An Analysis of 57 Years, 1929–1986.” Public Choice 69 (2): 153–173.
Peltzman, Sam (1976). “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.” Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2): 211–240.
Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Peterson, Paul E. (2007). Saving Schools: From Horace Mann to Virtual Learning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey (2015). Leadership BS. New York: Harper Collins.
Pharr, Susan J., and Putnam, Robert D. (2000). Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pigou, Arthur C. (1932). The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed. London: Macmillan.
Piketty, Thomas (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pink, Daniel H. (2011). Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us. New York: Penguin Press.
Pinker, Steven Arthur (2011). The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined. New York: Penguin Press.
Polsby, Nelson (1968). “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” The American Political Science Review 41 (1): 144–168.
Posner, Richard A. (1974). “Theories of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (2): 335–358.
Posner, Richard A. (1977). Economic Analysis of Law. Boston: Little-Brown.
Primo, David M. (2007). Rules and Restraints: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Primo, David M. (2014). “Making Budget Rules Work: 2014 Edition.” Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
Pritchett, Lant, and Summers, Lawrence H. (2014). “Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean.” Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 20573.
Pritchett, Lant, and Woolcock, Michael (2002). Solutions When the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 10.
Putti, Joseph M., Aryee, Samuel, and Liang, Tan Kim (1989). “Work Values and Organizational Commitment: A Study in the Asian Context.” Human Relations 42: 275–288.
Querebin, Pablo (2016). Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 11 (2): 151–181.
Reading, Brian (1992). Japan: The Coming Collapse. London: Orion Books.
Ridley, Matt W. (2010). The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves. New York: HarperCollins.
Ridley, Matt W. (2015). The Evolution of Everything. New York: HarperCollins.
Rivkin, Steven, G., Hanushek, Eric A., and Kain, John F. (2005). “Teachers, Schools and Academic Achievement.” Econometrica 73 (2): 417–458.
Rodrik, Dani (2014). “When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (1): 189–208.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1978). Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Academic Press.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1986). Editor. The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Roser, Max (2015). “Democratization.” www.OurWorldInData.org.
Roth, Alvin E. (2015). Who Gets What – and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Russakoff, Dale (2015). The Prize. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2006). The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. New York: Penguin Press.
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew M. (2001). “The Curse of Natural Resources.” European Economic Review 45: 827–838.
Sandel, Michael J. (2009). Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Sandel, Michael J. (2012). What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limit of Markets. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Schama, Simon (1989). Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Schuck, Peter H. (2014). Why Government Fails So Often: And How it can do Better. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schweizer, Peter F. (2011). Throw Them All Out: How Politicians and Their Friends Get Rich Off Insider Stock Tips, Land Deals, and Cronyism That Would Send the Rest of Us to Prison. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Schweizer, Peter F. (2013). Extortion: How Politicians Extract Your Money, Buy Votes, and Line Their Own Pockets. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Schweizer, Peter F. (2015). Clinton Cash: The Untold Story of How and Why Foreign Governments and Businesses Helped Make Bill and Hillary Rich. New York: Harper Collins.
Scully, Gerald W. (1988). “The Institutional Framework and Economic Development.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (3): 652–662.
Scully, Gerald W. (1994). What Is the Optimal Size of Government in the United States? Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis.
Shambaugh, David (2016). China’s Future. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Shaw, Ian (2003). The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shelley, Mary (2013). The Complete Poems of Percy Bysshe Shelley. New York: Modern Library/Random House.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1980). “The Private Use of Public Interest.” Society 17 (4): 35–41.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. (1993). “Corruption.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (3): 599–617.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. (1998). The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Silverstein, Michael J., Singhi, Abheek, Liao, Carol, and Michael, David (2012). The $10 Trillion Prize: Captivating the Newly Affluent in China and India. Boston: Harvard Business Review Press.
Simon, Herbert A. (1978). “Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought.” American Economic Review 68 (2): 1–16.
Sinn, Hans-Werner (2014). The Euro-Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs. New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Adam ([1776] 1937). An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by Cannan, Edwin. New York: Random House.
Smith, Noah (2015). “Japan’s Debt Dilemma.” The Milken Institute Review, 2nd Quarter: 46–54.
Smith, Richard Norton (2014). On His Own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller. New York: Random House.
Solow, Robert M. (1956). “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70 (1): 65–94.
Sowell, Thomas (1975). Race and Economics. New York: David McKey Co.
Spencer, Herbert (1896). The Study of Sociology. New York: D. Appleton and Company.
Stansel, Dean (2005). “Local Decentralization and Local Economic Growth: A Cross-Sectional Examination of U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” Journal of Urban Economics 57 (1): 55–72.
Stansel, Dean (2006). “Jurisdictional Competition and Local Government Spending in U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” Public Finance Review 34 (2): 173–194.
Stewart, Whitney (2001). Deng Xiaoping: Leader in a Changing China. Minneapolis, MN: Lerner Publications Company.
Stigler, George J. (1971). “The Economic Theory of Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1): 3–21.
Strouse, Jean (1999). Morgan: American Financier. New York: Random House.
Surowiecki, James (2004). The Wisdom of Crowds. New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books.
Svensson, Jakob (2005). “Eight Questions about Corruption.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (3): 19–42.
Tax Foundation (Annual). Facts & Figures: How Does Your State Compare? Washington, DC: Tax Foundation.
Telser, Lester G. (1980). “A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements.” Journal of Business 53 (1): 27–44.
Thomas, Melissa A. (2015). Govern Like Us: U.S. Expectations of Poor Countries. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy 64 (5): 416–424.
Tocqueville, Alexis ([1835–1840] 2003). Democracy in America. Edited by Kramick, Isaac. New York: Penguin Press.
Tolstoy, Leo (2010). War and Peace. New York: Oxford University Press.
Toynbee, Albert Joseph ([1934–1961] 1989). A Study of History. Edited by Caplan, Jane. New York: Gramercy.
Tullock, Gordon (1967). “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western Economic Journal 5 (3): 224–232.
Tullock, Gordon, Seldon, Arthur, and Brady, Gordon L. (2002). Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.
UNESCO (2014). Higher Education in Asia. Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Global Study on Homicide 2013. Vienna, Austria: United Nations.
Wagner, Adolph (1958). “Three Extracts on Public Finance.” In Classics in the Theory of Public Finance 1–15. Edited by Musgrave, Richard A. and Peacock, Alan. New York: Macmillan.
Wallis, W. Allen (1976). An Overgoverned Society. New York: Free Press.
Walters, Stephen J. K. (2014). Boom Towns: Restoring the Urban American Dream. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Wang, Xuanhui (1998). Taxation in China, 1997/1998. Hong Kong: FT Law and Tax, Asia Pacific.
Weber, Max ([1905] 2002). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Penguin Press.
Weitzman, Martin L. (1974). “Prices vs. Quantities.” Review of Economic Studies 41 (4): 472–491.
Welch, Finis (1966). “Measurement of the Quality of Schooling.” American Economic Review 56 (2): 379–392.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1976). “Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-In General with Respect to CATV.” Bell Journal of Economics 1 (1): 73–104.
Wilson, James Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.
Winter, Jay (2003). Editor. America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wittman, Donald (1989). “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results.” Journal of Political Economy 97 (6): 1395–1424.
Wolf, Charles J. (2003). Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Woods, Frederick A. (1913). The Influence of Monarchs: Steps in a New Science of History. New York: Macmillan.
Workman, Samuel (2015). The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the U.S. Government: How Congress and Federal Agencies Process Information and Solve Problems. New York: Cambridge University Press.
World Factbook (2015). Central Intelligence Agency. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html February 2, 2016.
Zhang, Weiying (2015). “The Power of Ideas and Leadership in China’s Transition to a Liberal Society.” Cato Journal 35 (1): 1–40.
Zimbardo, Philip G. (2007). The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil. New York: Random House.
Ziobrowski, Alan J., Boyd, James W., Cheng, Ping X., and Ziobrowski, Brigitte J. (2004). “Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of Members of the United States Senate.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39 (4): 661–676.
Ziobrowski, Alan J., Boyd, James W., Cheng, Ping X., and Ziobrowski, Brigitte J. (2011). “Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives.” Business and Politics 13 (1): 1–24.
Zingales, Luigi G. (2012). A Capitalism for the People: Recapturing the Lost Genius of American Prosperity. New York: Basic Books.
Zucman, Gabriel (2015). The Hidden Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zupan, Mark A. (1989). “The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some Systematic Evidence.” Journal of Law and Economics 32 (2): 401–456.
Zupan, Mark A. (1991a). “Paradigms and Cultures: Some Economic Reasons for Their Stickiness.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 50 (1): 99–103.
Zupan, Mark A.(1991b). “An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of Political Ticket Splitting.” Journal of Law and Economics 34 (2): 343–369.
Zupan, M.A. (2011). “The Virtues of Free Markets.” Cato Journal 31 (2): 36.
Zupan, Mark A. (2015a). “Government Self-Capture and the Decline of Nations.” Unpublished working paper, Simon Business School, University of Rochester
Zupan, Mark A.(2015b). “The Duration and Motivation of Autocracies.” Unpublished working paper, Simon Business School, University of Rochester.
Zupan, Mark A.(2015c). “The Road to Virtue.” Schweizer Monat, Issue 1030.

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.