Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- PART I THE MAKING OF THE MULTIPLE TRAP
- PART II THE RESCUE DEBATE, THE MACRO PICTURE, AND THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
- 10 Missed Opportunities?
- 11 The Intelligence Services and Rescue Options
- 12 The Jewish “Refugee Traffic”: The Road to Biltmore and Its Ramifications
- 13 American Wartime Realities, 1942–1943
- 14 Bermuda, Breckinridge Long, G-2, Biddle, Taylor and Rayburn, and Palestine Again
- 15 Roosevelt, Stimson, and the Palestine Question: British Inputs
- 16 The Views of Harold Glidden and/or British Intelligence, Consul General Pinkerton, and Rabbi Nelson Glueck
- 17 Various Methods of Rescue
- PART III THE SELF-DEFEATING MECHANISM OF THE RESCUE EFFORTS
- PART IV THE BRAND–GROSZ MISSIONS WITHIN THE LARGER PICTURE OF THE WAR AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS
- PART V THE END OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: BACK TO HOSTAGE-TAKING TACTICS
- Epilogue: Self-Traps: The OSS and Kasztner at Nuremberg
- Notes on Sources
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
10 - Missed Opportunities?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- PART I THE MAKING OF THE MULTIPLE TRAP
- PART II THE RESCUE DEBATE, THE MACRO PICTURE, AND THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
- 10 Missed Opportunities?
- 11 The Intelligence Services and Rescue Options
- 12 The Jewish “Refugee Traffic”: The Road to Biltmore and Its Ramifications
- 13 American Wartime Realities, 1942–1943
- 14 Bermuda, Breckinridge Long, G-2, Biddle, Taylor and Rayburn, and Palestine Again
- 15 Roosevelt, Stimson, and the Palestine Question: British Inputs
- 16 The Views of Harold Glidden and/or British Intelligence, Consul General Pinkerton, and Rabbi Nelson Glueck
- 17 Various Methods of Rescue
- PART III THE SELF-DEFEATING MECHANISM OF THE RESCUE EFFORTS
- PART IV THE BRAND–GROSZ MISSIONS WITHIN THE LARGER PICTURE OF THE WAR AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS
- PART V THE END OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: BACK TO HOSTAGE-TAKING TACTICS
- Epilogue: Self-Traps: The OSS and Kasztner at Nuremberg
- Notes on Sources
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The so-called “rescue debate” (e.g., the accusations leveled against the Jewish leadership in Palestine and in the United States, as well as against the British, with the American administration being added to the list a little later) could be divided into contemporary concerns, some motivated by politics and some by morality, and to ongoing serious and less serious historiographic inquiries. None, however, has invoked the trap theorem to explain the actual multidimensional aspects of the tragedy. Some have even invoked rescue options as if they really existed and hence golden opportunities were missed, or at least the reader may be led to such conclusions.
The problem here with regard to the Zionists, blamed by various politically motivated persons but also by historians for “Palestinocentrism” (e.g., for focusing on their own narrow community's interests while abandoning the Jews of Europe to their fate), does not only relate to the archival sources but to the reconstruction of the “spirit of the time,” which must be based on a “kaleidoscopic” overall study of the realities of that period from German, Allied, and Jewish points of view combined. Allied and Jewish behavior must be reconstructed on the basis of more sources and interviews. In some research, the “spirit of the time” is hidden or simplified to Allied adherence to the Casablanca Conference decree of “unconditional surrender,” while the behavior of the mainstream Zionists is possibly taken for granted in the sense that they indeed were primarily interested in their narrow, nationalistic socialist dream.
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- Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews , pp. 75 - 78Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004