THE SITUATIONIST CRITIQUE OF CHARACTER IN BRIEF

Virtue ethics has developed as a type of theoretical alternative to deontology and consequentialism (e.g. Hursthouse 1999; Swanton 2003; Adams 2006; Russell 2009; Annas 2011). It takes virtue to be the primary concept of ethical concern, as opposed to rules (deontology) and consequences (consequentialism). Traditionally, virtue is thought to be a type of global or robust trait implicated in producing regular behaviour across many different types of situations. Thus, according to virtue ethicists, if someone possesses the virtue of courage, she can be expected to be courageous in many different kinds of situations – on the battlefield, when facing serious illness, in standing up against prejudice, in blowing the whistle on corruption, and so on. Good character, for virtue ethicists, is a constellation of coherently organized virtues, which are thought to be deeply entrenched in the fabric of personality. In a person of good character, the virtues work together harmoniously, and, in some versions of virtue ethics (e.g. Hursthouse 1999; Annas 2011), are necessary for happiness or flourishing.

Harman (1999, 2000), Doris (1998, 2002, 2005) and Merritt (2000) use social psychological studies to critique virtue ethics and the conception of character central to it. Known as “situationism”, their critique takes several forms, but all include the claim that empirical psychology provides overwhelming reason to think that situations, and not global or robust traits, are the main factors that influence behaviour.