Introduction

More than a decade on from the dramatic Battle for Seattle and, in sharp contrast to its founding hubris, the World Trade Organization (WTO) confronts an existential crisis. While for many years ardent critics have actively campaigned for the WTO's demise, such voices have been increasingly displaced by the warnings of equally ardent advocates concerned as to its very survival. In a media briefing following the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, Pascal Lamy commented: ‘we are in a crisis’. More recently, amplifying such concerns, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a seminar with the provocative title ‘The Future of the WTO’, while in the wake of the repeated failures to resuscitate the Doha Round many have questioned not only ‘the future of the WTO as a forum for trade liberalisation’ but have also conjectured on the ‘danger that the organization could collapse’ (Baldwin 2006; Irwin and Mavroidis 2008).

Obituaries for the WTO are undoubtedly premature but the widespread conviction that, without substantive reform, it will become increasingly marginalised has acquired a strong hold on a broad swathe of elite and academic opinion. Deadlock in the Doha Round, the rise of plurilaterals, forum shifting and institutional bypassing through expanding preferential trade agreements (PTAs), rising protectionist sentiments, and the ineffectiveness of the WTO throughout the financial crash have contributed to a widespread perception of organic crisis: declining legitimacy conjoined with an eroding sense of purpose and efficacy.