Book contents
- Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Bank Capital
- Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Bank Capital
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Mortgage Public Policies and the Financial Crisis
- 3 Precrisis Executive Compensation and Misaligned Incentives
- 4 Managerial Incentives Hypothesis versus Unforeseen Risk Hypothesis
- 5 Bank CEOs’ Buys and Sells during 2000–8
- 6 Executive Compensation Reform
- 7 Director Compensation Policy
- 8 Are Large Banks Riskier?
- 9 Bank Capital Structure and Executive Compensation
- 10 Why Banks Should Be Mostly Debt Financed
- 11 Conclusion
- Book part
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Bank Capital Structure and Executive Compensation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2017
- Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Bank Capital
- Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Bank Capital
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Mortgage Public Policies and the Financial Crisis
- 3 Precrisis Executive Compensation and Misaligned Incentives
- 4 Managerial Incentives Hypothesis versus Unforeseen Risk Hypothesis
- 5 Bank CEOs’ Buys and Sells during 2000–8
- 6 Executive Compensation Reform
- 7 Director Compensation Policy
- 8 Are Large Banks Riskier?
- 9 Bank Capital Structure and Executive Compensation
- 10 Why Banks Should Be Mostly Debt Financed
- 11 Conclusion
- Book part
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Bank Capital , pp. 154 - 167Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017