Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Maps
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 ‘A determined campaign against the terrorist bands’
- 2 ‘Harmonious relations’: soldiers, civilians and committees
- 3 ‘Possibly restrictive to the operations’: marginalising international law in colonial rebellions
- 4 ‘The degree of force necessary’: British traditions in countering colonial rebellions
- 5 ‘Restraint backed by good discipline’
- 6 ‘A dead man cannot talk’: the need for restraint
- 7 ‘A lot of indiscriminate shooting’: military repression before Erskine's arrival
- 8 ‘Severe repressive measures’: the army under Erskine
- 9 ‘An essential part of the campaign’: civil-military alliances
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - ‘A lot of indiscriminate shooting’: military repression before Erskine's arrival
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Maps
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 ‘A determined campaign against the terrorist bands’
- 2 ‘Harmonious relations’: soldiers, civilians and committees
- 3 ‘Possibly restrictive to the operations’: marginalising international law in colonial rebellions
- 4 ‘The degree of force necessary’: British traditions in countering colonial rebellions
- 5 ‘Restraint backed by good discipline’
- 6 ‘A dead man cannot talk’: the need for restraint
- 7 ‘A lot of indiscriminate shooting’: military repression before Erskine's arrival
- 8 ‘Severe repressive measures’: the army under Erskine
- 9 ‘An essential part of the campaign’: civil-military alliances
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
There were strategic and disciplinary imperatives for the army in Kenya to avoid an all-out annihilationist campaign against the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru peoples. These logics compensated for the marginalisation of international law and the dangerous flexibility in national law and military doctrine. While the army certainly did not try to destroy the civilian populations in rebellious areas, they consistently sought to coerce them. The form and extent of the violence used depended upon the identity, experiences and functions of different units, and the perceived strategic requirements. It included forced population movement, beatings, rape, torture and shootings. The political and military leaderships never issued direct orders for mass atrocities, but they created a permissive environment by failing to halt the abuses brought to their attention. Official policies such as the evictions from the Rift Valley, and later villagisation, radicalised the military and existed symbiotically with the pseudo-policies of atrocity which aimed at terrorising the population into supporting the government.
Coercion of the entire Kikuyu population was the norm in the campaign's first phase, from October 1952 until July 1953. Force was exemplary, designed to be observed. As the commander of the Kenya Regiment wrote in 1955: ‘The Kikuyu must be taught a lesson that will be remembered for generations and which will act as a warning to other tribes.’ From the available records a picture of beatings, torture and murder emerges, in addition to government collusion with vigilante groups. These actions did not result from poor command and control, or a breakdown in military discipline. Although the Emergency's early commanders were less effective than Erskine, they and the War Office in London approved the punitive approach. Discipline in general remained strong, with only violence against the Kikuyu allowed. The nexus between policy and discipline is examined by looking in detail at ‘B’ Company, 5 KAR. Revenge, racism, competition for kills and, perhaps most importantly, a culture of impunity allowed several atrocities to occur. Events in ‘B’ Company are considered in the light of the widespread violence against civilians for intelligence-gathering and terrorising purposes. Evidence suggests that ‘B’ Company's brutalities were far from unique.
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- Information
- Fighting the Mau MauThe British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency, pp. 160 - 193Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012