Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- PART I Security, power or welfare? Eastern enlargement in a rationalist perspective
- 1 Rationalist institutionalism and the enlargement of regional organizations
- 2 NATO enlargement
- 3 EU enlargement
- Conclusion: the rationalist puzzle of Eastern enlargement
- PART II Expanding the Western community of liberal values and norms: Eastern enlargement in a sociological perspective
- PART III Association instead of membership: preferences and bargaining power in Eastern enlargement
- PART IV From association to membership: rhetorical action in Eastern enlargement
- Strategic action in international community: concluding remarks
- Appendix (Interviews)
- List of references
- Index
2 - NATO enlargement
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- PART I Security, power or welfare? Eastern enlargement in a rationalist perspective
- 1 Rationalist institutionalism and the enlargement of regional organizations
- 2 NATO enlargement
- 3 EU enlargement
- Conclusion: the rationalist puzzle of Eastern enlargement
- PART II Expanding the Western community of liberal values and norms: Eastern enlargement in a sociological perspective
- PART III Association instead of membership: preferences and bargaining power in Eastern enlargement
- PART IV From association to membership: rhetorical action in Eastern enlargement
- Strategic action in international community: concluding remarks
- Appendix (Interviews)
- List of references
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, I analyze whether it was instrumentally rational for the CEECs to seek membership in NATO and for the NATO members to admit CEECs as full members to their alliance. If all states involved in the decision could expect to reap higher net benefits from the limited first round of enlargement than from other NATO–CEEC relationships, the rationalist explanation would be successful. I will argue, however, that rationalist institutionalism only succeeds in explaining the CEECs' bid to join NATO. It cannot account for NATO's enlargement decisions.
The CEECs and NATO membership
The security approach to enlargement, especially balance-of-threat theory, provides a largely convincing explanation of why the CEECs wanted to join NATO.
Russia was a potential threat to the CEECs. Although the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the Russian Federation has remained by far the most powerful country among the CEECs. It inherited most of the territory, population, and military forces of the Soviet Union and it is the only nuclear-weapon state and “great power” among the post-communist countries. Russia is not only more powerful than each individual CEEC but also poses a potential threat to them. An Eastern European state itself, Russia is located in the geographical proximity of the CEECs, and although Russia's offensive capabilities are not as high as those of the former Soviet Union, they remain considerable.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The EU, NATO and the Integration of EuropeRules and Rhetoric, pp. 37 - 51Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003