Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T14:24:35.606Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Hard-ERM, hard ECU and European Monetary Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2012

David Currie
Affiliation:
London Business School and CEPR
Dale W. Henderson
Affiliation:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Andrew J. Hughes Hallett
Affiliation:
University of Strathclyde and CEPR
Matthew B. Canzoneri
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
Vittorio Grilli
Affiliation:
Birkbeck College, University of London
Paul R. Masson
Affiliation:
International Monetary Fund Institute, Washington DC
Get access

Summary

Introduction

The vision of Monetary Union in Europe is of long standing. The Werner Report of 1970 advocated the attainment of Monetary Union by 1980, but was buried beneath a soaring oil price and the collapse of Bretton Woods and the move to generalised floating in the early 1970s. The European Community, with some key exceptions, returned to an adjustable peg exchange rate system in 1979 with the launch of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM for short). Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard d'Estaing embarked on the ERM against majority technical advice from economists at the time, but despite that the ERM must be judged an appreciable success: much more durable than its critics expected, and much more successful in establishing a credible and stable framework for anti-inflationary policy. Even the British have finally been won round.

In the early years of the ERM, parity realignments were frequent and sometimes large, on occasions requiring the temporary closure of foreign exchange markets while bargaining over the realignment went on. These frequent realignments were necessary because of the diversity of inflation rates between the participating countries. But the gradual convergence of inflation rates, itself a product of the ERM, led over time to smaller and less frequent realignments. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1, which shows realignments of the participating countries against the Deutsche Mark, which over this period did not devalue against any currency.

Type
Chapter
Information
Establishing a Central Bank
Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S.
, pp. 127 - 163
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×