Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- PART I Introduction
- PART II Escalation Forms and Outcomes
- 2 Deadlocks in Negotiation Dynamics
- 3 Deterrence, Escalation, and Negotiation
- 4 Quantitative Models for Armament Escalation and Negotiations
- 5 Entrapment in International Negotiations
- 6 The Role of Vengeance in Conflict Escalation
- PART III Negotiating out of Escalation
- PART IV Conclusion
- Index
- About the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Network at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
2 - Deadlocks in Negotiation Dynamics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- PART I Introduction
- PART II Escalation Forms and Outcomes
- 2 Deadlocks in Negotiation Dynamics
- 3 Deterrence, Escalation, and Negotiation
- 4 Quantitative Models for Armament Escalation and Negotiations
- 5 Entrapment in International Negotiations
- 6 The Role of Vengeance in Conflict Escalation
- PART III Negotiating out of Escalation
- PART IV Conclusion
- Index
- About the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Network at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
Summary
One day, a clam opened its shell to sunbathe on a beach. Suddenly, a snipe stuck its beak in the clam. The latter closed its shell immediately, and trapped the snipe's beak. The clam refused to open its shell, and the snipe refused to remove its beak. Neither of them would make a move to overcome the deadlock. Finally, a fisherman came along and caught both of them.
“The Snipe and the Clam,” A Chinese folktaleIntroduction
Escalation and deadlocks share complex mutual causal relations. On the one hand, escalation may lead to a deadlock; on the other, a deadlock may trigger an escalation strategy. In the first case, a deadlock appears to be one of the few possible ways to escape an escalation process as both parties start to fear that the consequences of a bidding war will lead far beyond what was expected. The escalation may also have mobilized so many means of action that the parties feel resources have been exhausted, which thus greatly limits further escalation. Then may come a stage of equalization in threats, in pain inflicted or endured. In the second case, in the midst of a negotiation, a deadlock may trigger an escalation strategy from one party with the goal of moving out of the impasse and forcing the other party to restart the process. Thus, functionally deadlock can be a producer and a product of an escalation process.
Escalation may stop as a result of a swing in the process orientation.
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- Information
- Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts , pp. 23 - 52Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005
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