Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Misaligned Priorities: How Disconnect between Donors and Citizens Doomed AIDS Intervention in Africa
- 2 AIDS in Africa: A Significant Challenge and a Disconnected Response
- 3 Principal–Agent Problems and AIDS Interventions in Africa
- 4 AIDS in Malawi
- 5 Policy Priorities in the Time of AIDS
- 6 Seeing Like a Village: Headmen as Agents of the Global AIDS Intervention
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2017
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Misaligned Priorities: How Disconnect between Donors and Citizens Doomed AIDS Intervention in Africa
- 2 AIDS in Africa: A Significant Challenge and a Disconnected Response
- 3 Principal–Agent Problems and AIDS Interventions in Africa
- 4 AIDS in Malawi
- 5 Policy Priorities in the Time of AIDS
- 6 Seeing Like a Village: Headmen as Agents of the Global AIDS Intervention
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The government is never wrong. It does what it wants.
Headman Interview #70, Mchinji District, July 8, 2008I also must thank you because for the government to know that we have problems it's through these kinds of interviews. So I thank those who sent you to continue this that you will come again to ask us because in so doing you will know the thoughts of all the chiefs.
Headman Interview #122, Rumphi District, October 16, 2008My Fulbright fellowship ended with a dissemination of preliminary findings to “key stakeholders” in Lilongwe, Malawi's capital city, where most government offices are located and many international NGOs base their country headquarters. The people shaping Malawi's national response to AIDS – technocrats from government ministries and program officers representing bilateral partners (e.g., the US Department of State) or major international NGOs (e.g., Save The Children) – gathered in a conference room at the US Embassy in late 2008. I went through slides with interview quotes and histograms of survey data documenting what I learned during my fellowship. The bulk of that presentation drew from early analysis of what now makes up Chapters 5 and 6 – results showing that among Malawian villagers and their headmen, AIDS is a relatively low priority. The participants were surprised at my findings. I was, in turn, surprised at their surprise: I expected these highly educated, locally posted specialists to have already known AIDS was a low priority among citizens and to be annoyed to have sat through another dull powerpoint presentation by an academic only in Malawi for a few months. Instead, after registering their surprise, they asked questions akin to “Now what?” With that, my cynical view of the bureaucratic world of AIDS intervention in Africa shifted.
Powerful decision-makers – at least in one African capital – wanted to reconfigure their response to reflect the priorities of their intended beneficiaries. Questions they asked reflected an intuition that matching interventions to local policy priorities would increase the likelihood that an intervention would succeed. One program officer asked my opinion on whether an AIDS program “bundled” with a water well initiative would increase the AIDS program's potential for success. Their questions demonstrated how they were constrained: the higher-ups in their North American and European headquarters would continue to prioritize AIDS programs and the locally posted expatriates were not seeking strategies to change those minds.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Doomed InterventionsThe Failure of Global Responses to AIDS in Africa, pp. 160 - 168Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017