Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Federations and the Theoretical Problem
- 2 Federal Bargaining
- 3 Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining
- 4 Representation
- 5 Incentives
- 6 Political Parties in a Federal State
- 7 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I
- 8 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II
- 9 Designing Federalism
- References
- Name Index
- Subject Index
4 - Representation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Federations and the Theoretical Problem
- 2 Federal Bargaining
- 3 Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining
- 4 Representation
- 5 Incentives
- 6 Political Parties in a Federal State
- 7 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I
- 8 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II
- 9 Designing Federalism
- References
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
Madison, Federalist 55The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of State Governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty by allowing them direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain elusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a Foederal Government.
Hamilton, Federalist 9That legislators have an abiding interest in the nature of opinion in their constituencies there can be no doubt. How their estimates of that opinion bear on their work in the assembly is not nearly so clear. At times they bow down before constituency opinion, and at times they ignore it.
Key 1963: 482Opportunism by the national government is best constrained by fragmenting power at the national level. By making it harder for a national will to form and be sustained over time, these mechanisms will tend to disable national authorities from invading state authority, especially as to controversial issues.
Bednar et al. 2001: 230Two Alternative Models of Federalism
To avoid choices of the sort that led to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the USSR, not only must federal bargaining be regulated to encourage coherent outcomes and discourage the inefficiencies that follow from a disruption of federal functions, but ways must be found to avoid a wholesale revision of the Level 1 constraints that are part of any initial agreement among federal subjects.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Designing FederalismA Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions, pp. 111 - 141Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004