Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Theory
- Part II Empirical analysis
- Appendices
- A Solution to the basic crisis bargaining game
- B Solution to the bargaining game with opposition
- C Data and methods
- D Coding and sources for opposition stances
- References
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
D - Coding and sources for opposition stances
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Theory
- Part II Empirical analysis
- Appendices
- A Solution to the basic crisis bargaining game
- B Solution to the bargaining game with opposition
- C Data and methods
- D Coding and sources for opposition stances
- References
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Summary
1. Penjdeh dispute (1885)
party: Conservative.
Position: Support.
Evidence: The Conservative Party supported Prime Minister Gladstone's call-up of army reservists as well as his request for war credits. Party leader Salisbury agreed that Britain must draw the line against Russian expansionism (Morgan 1981, p. 196; Jeyes 1898, pp. 100–01).
3. Greece (1886)
party: Conservative.
Position: Support.
Evidence: The Annual Register (1887, pp. 85–86) reports that Prime Minister Rosebery received “applause on all sides” for his firm stance in the crisis.
5. Crete and the Greco-Turkish War (1897)
party: Liberal.
Position: Oppose.
Evidence: The Liberal Party staunchly favored Greek claims and opposed the efforts of the great powers to coerce Greece from withdrawing from Crete. The party supported the government as long as Prime Minister Salisbury worked to soften the position of the other powers but increasingly distanced itself as Salisbury joined the proposed blockade. Party leader William Harcourt put forward a resolution that force should not be used against Greece or Crete and argued publicly that, despite the government's large majority in parliament, its position on this issue was not reflective of public opinion in the nation (Annual Register 1898, pp. 105–07; Gardiner 1923, pp. 438–43).
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- Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy , pp. 273 - 281Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001