Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Note on Sources and Texts
- Introduction
- 1 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Wage War against the Church
- 2 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Accept the Peace Agreement that the Duke of Milan is Offering
- 3 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Launch a War of Aggression against Lucca
- 4 On Whether or Not the King of France Should Make Peace with the Duke of Milan
- 5 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Sign an Offensive Alliance with the King of France
- 6 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the King of the Romans or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 7 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the Emperor or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 8 On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
- 9 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
- 10 On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
- 11 On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
- Name index
- Subject index
9 - On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 April 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Note on Sources and Texts
- Introduction
- 1 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Wage War against the Church
- 2 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Accept the Peace Agreement that the Duke of Milan is Offering
- 3 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Launch a War of Aggression against Lucca
- 4 On Whether or Not the King of France Should Make Peace with the Duke of Milan
- 5 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Sign an Offensive Alliance with the King of France
- 6 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the King of the Romans or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 7 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the Emperor or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 8 On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
- 9 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
- 10 On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
- 11 On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
- Name index
- Subject index
Summary
Although the Venetian Republic had reluctantly shifted sides and signed a defensive alliance with Charles V in July 1523 (see the penultimate debate above), when the French passed into Italy again its assistance to the Imperials was lukewarm at best. In particular, as the Imperials evacuated Milan upon the arrival of Francis I, in the autumn of 1524 (see the introduction to the previous debate),
being required […] to send to their army the troops they had engaged for in the articles of the league, the Venetians, though they did not absolutely refuse, yet gave cool answers, with an intention to regulate their counsels according to the turn of affairs, either because some of them called to mind their ancient confederacy with Francis or because they believed that the King of France being in Italy with so powerful an army, and his enemy in so weak a condition, he must be victorious; or that they more than ever suspected the ambitious designs of Caesar, for to the surprise, and almost with the complaints, of all Italy, he had not yet given to Francesco Sforza the investiture of the Duchy of Milan. (The History of Italy, XV, x)
It is not surprising, then, that upon the justifications that the Venetian ambassador made to Charles after his decisive victory at Pavia (24 February 1525), the Emperor ‘said to the attendants that his excuses were not true, however he would accept of them as such’ (ibid.).
More than any other Italian state, Venice could not possibly like the implications of the imperial success in Lombardy. The shaky position of Francesco Sforza entailed the possibility that Charles reserved the right to seize the Duchy of Milan, in which case the Republic would have found itself squeezed in between Habsburg and imperial dominions on all sides. In addition, the French eclipse from Italian affairs meant the disappearance of the only credible counterweight to Charles's power. At the same time, the Venetians could not challenge the Emperor on their own. The year was thus spent in negotiations with Charles, on the one hand, and with all those who had reason to oppose his triumph, on the other – especially Pope Clement VII and the French regency.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Debating Foreign Policy in the RenaissanceSpeeches on War and Peace by Francesco Guicciardini, pp. 113 - 128Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017