Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of maps
- Preface and acknowledgments
- List of abbreviations
- 1 The rivalry revisited
- 2 Kargil and after
- 3 The troubled decade in Kashmir
- 4 The road to Operation Parakram
- 5 The composite dialogue and beyond
- 6 An extension of the rivalry
- 7 Policy implications
- In lieu of an epilogue
- Appendices
- References
- Index
6 - An extension of the rivalry
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2016
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of maps
- Preface and acknowledgments
- List of abbreviations
- 1 The rivalry revisited
- 2 Kargil and after
- 3 The troubled decade in Kashmir
- 4 The road to Operation Parakram
- 5 The composite dialogue and beyond
- 6 An extension of the rivalry
- 7 Policy implications
- In lieu of an epilogue
- Appendices
- References
- Index
Summary
AFGHANISTAN AND AN EXTENSION OF THE RIVALRY
Pakistan's propensity to provoke, needle and otherwise trouble India is not confined to the territorial dispute over Kashmir. Since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 designed to topple the Taliban regime and eviscerate Al Qaeda, it has also sought to limit India's presence in Afghanistan. This quest, of course, has deep roots. It stems from the Pakistani military establishment's stated need for “strategic depth” in the event of another war with India. To that end, Pakistani strategists have argued that they need to have a sympathetic regime in Kabul.
It is interesting to note that even Pakistan's overt acquisition of nuclear weapons, which should deter a significant Indian conventional assault, has not led to the abandonment of this search for “strategic depth.” If indeed Pakistan possesses a robust nuclear deterrent then the issue of relying on Afghanistan for “strategic depth” becomes redundant. Nevertheless, this effort has yet to be abandoned and, as this chapter will demonstrate, the Pakistani security apparatus has made a concerted attempt to undermine India's position in Afghanistan. Pakistan's pursuit of this strategy, once again, has relied upon various proxy forces. These non-state actors have sought to harass, threaten and intimidate Indian diplomats, developmental specialists and even ordinary workers in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani argument is that India's goals and activities in Afghanistan are far from benign. Instead, Pakistani spokespersons contend that India seeks to encircle Pakistan with a substantial presence in Afghanistan, thereby creating a two-front problem. The evidence for India's putative efforts to place Pakistan at a strategic disadvantage, however, is quite tenuous. The argument about India's dubious intentions is made mostly on the basis of inference and attribution.
This chapter will provide a brief account of the past history of the Indo-Pakistani commitments to the country after the US toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001, and then delineate how Pakistan has sought to use a range of non-state actors to dislodge India from Afghanistan. It will be demonstrated that India's choices and actions in Afghanistan have been transparent, that they have focused primarily on developmental activities and have not sought to undermine Pakistan's security. Above all, given that it suffered grievously when the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan, India's policy-makers remain acutely concerned that a neo-Taliban regime does not emerge again in the country.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Deadly ImpasseIndo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century, pp. 105 - 119Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016