Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 Rationality and commitment
- 2 Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choice
- 3 The logic of full belief
- 4 Consequentialism and sequential choice
- 5 Prediction, deliberation, and correlated equilibrium
- 6 On indeterminate probabilities
- 7 Consensus as shared agreement and outcome of inquiry
- 8 Compromising Bayesianism: A plea for indeterminacy
- 9 Pareto unanimity and consensus
- 10 The paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg
- 11 Conflict and inquiry
- 12 The ethics of controversy
- Name Index
- Subject Index
12 - The ethics of controversy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- 1 Rationality and commitment
- 2 Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choice
- 3 The logic of full belief
- 4 Consequentialism and sequential choice
- 5 Prediction, deliberation, and correlated equilibrium
- 6 On indeterminate probabilities
- 7 Consensus as shared agreement and outcome of inquiry
- 8 Compromising Bayesianism: A plea for indeterminacy
- 9 Pareto unanimity and consensus
- 10 The paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg
- 11 Conflict and inquiry
- 12 The ethics of controversy
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
Toleration, according to Isaiah Berlin (1969, p. 184), “implies a certain disrespect. I tolerate your absurd beliefs and your foolish acts, though I know them to be absurd and foolish”. This view, which Berlin attributes to John Stuart Mill, implies that “sceptical respect for the opinions of our opponents” is “preferable to indifference or cynicism”. But even these attitudes “are less harmful than intolerance or an imposed orthodoxy which kills rational discussion” (1969, p. 184).
Berlin (1953, pp. 3–4) claimed that Tolstoy “was by nature a fox but believed in being a hedgehog” and Mill, though declaring loyalty to utilitarian doctrine, was in rebellion against the views of his father and Bentham. Attributing views to others contrary to those they explicitly endorse is a risky business. Berlin's construal of Mill's ideas on liberty and toleration should perhaps be treated with a respectful and cautious scepticism.
We do not have to decide, however, whether Mill endorsed the views on toleration Berlin attributes to him in order to explore the issues raised by Berlin's remarks concerning toleration and respect for others and their views.
In the remarks quoted in part above, Berlin insists that toleration of the views of others does not require a detached attitude towards the issues under dispute or avoidance of firm, deeply and passionately held views on these matters. Precisely because one may hold views deeply and passionately, one may reveal a disrespect for the views of others.
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- Information
- The Covenant of ReasonRationality and the Commitments of Thought, pp. 239 - 254Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997