Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Table of contents
- List of illustrations
- List of figures
- List of maps
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Wehrmacht and German society
- 2 Preparations for war
- 3 “Attack with a ruthless offensive spirit and … a firestorm of destruction”
- 4 “Will the continuation of this attackbe worth it?”
- 5 “It is only a question of where, not if, civilians will starve”
- 6 The failure of Operation Barbarossa
- 7 The Soviet winter offensive, 1942
- 8 “The population … shouted out to the interpreter that one would rather be shot instead of being left to starve”
- 9 “From one mess to another”
- 10 “We need to fight to the end, so oder so”
- 11 A more rational occupation?
- 12 “As miserable representatives of themiserable twentieth century, we burnedall of the villages”
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
12 - “As miserable representatives of themiserable twentieth century, we burnedall of the villages”
The scorched-earth retreat to the Panther Line
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2014
- Frontmatter
- Table of contents
- List of illustrations
- List of figures
- List of maps
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Wehrmacht and German society
- 2 Preparations for war
- 3 “Attack with a ruthless offensive spirit and … a firestorm of destruction”
- 4 “Will the continuation of this attackbe worth it?”
- 5 “It is only a question of where, not if, civilians will starve”
- 6 The failure of Operation Barbarossa
- 7 The Soviet winter offensive, 1942
- 8 “The population … shouted out to the interpreter that one would rather be shot instead of being left to starve”
- 9 “From one mess to another”
- 10 “We need to fight to the end, so oder so”
- 11 A more rational occupation?
- 12 “As miserable representatives of themiserable twentieth century, we burnedall of the villages”
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
The respite from major operations that occurred in late 1943 allowed Army Group North to prepare for an evacuation of Russia proper to the Panther Line, a fortified line that stretched along the old imperial Russian border with the Baltic states. Beginning in October 1943, German authorities focused on two issues: the withdrawal of troops in a smooth manner and the necessity of carrying out a systematic scorched-earth retreat. From the perspective of the army group, pulling back to a shortened, more defensible position was the only sensible option at this stage of the war. In terms of manpower and matériel, the Red Army completely surpassed Army Group North. By July 1943, Küchler commanded 710,000 troops, only half of which the Germans considered to be frontline soldiers. In support of the infantry, the Germans possessed roughly 2,400 guns and a mere forty tanks and other mechanized assault guns. According to Fremde Heere Ost, the Soviet forces opposing Army Group North numbered 734,000 men, supported by nearly 2,800 guns and over 200 tanks; an additional 491,000 soldiers, 1,800 guns, and 209 tanks lay in reserve. The shifting of German troops on the Eastern Front only exacerbated this problem as Army Group North functioned as a manpower reservoir for other German formations.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Combat and Genocide on the Eastern FrontThe German Infantry's War, 1941–1944, pp. 357 - 373Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014