Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511610608.003

2 - Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2010

Evan Thompson ,

Antoine Lutz and

Diego Cosmelli

Edited by

Andrew Brook and

Kathleen Akins

Show author details

Evan Thompson: Affiliation:
Canada Research Chair and Associate Professor of Philosophy, York University
Antoine Lutz: Affiliation:
Postdoctoral Fellow, W. M. Keck Laboratory for Functional Brain Imaging and Behavior, Waisman Center, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Diego Cosmelli: Affiliation:
Ecole Polytechnique, Paris
Andrew Brook: Affiliation:
Carleton University, Ottawa
Kathleen Akins: Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University, British Columbia

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Summary

Introduction

One of the major challenges facing neuroscience today is to provide an explanatory framework that accounts for both the subjectivity and neurobiology of consciousness. Although neuroscientists have supplied neural models of various aspects of consciousness, and have uncovered evidence about the neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs), there nonetheless remains an ‘explanatory gap’ in our understanding of how to relate neurobiological and phenomenological features of consciousness. This explanatory gap is conceptual, epistemological, and methodological:

An adequate conceptual framework is still needed to account for phenomena that (ⅰ) have a first-person, subjective-experiential or phenomenal character; (ⅱ) are (usually) reportable and describable (in humans); and (ⅲ) are neurobiologically realized.
The conscious subject plays an unavoidable epistemological role in characterizing the explanandum of consciousness through first-person descriptive reports. The experimentalist is then able to link first-person data and third-person data. Yet the generation of first-person data raises difficult epistemological issues about the relation of second-order awareness or meta-awareness to first-order experience (e.g., whether second-order attention to first-order experience inevitably affects the intentional content and/or phenomenal character of first-order experience).
The need for first-person data also raises methodological issues (e.g., whether subjects should be naïve or phenomenologically trained).

Neurophenomenology is a neuroscientific research program whose aim is to make progress on these issues associated with the explanatory gap. In this chapter we give an overview of the neurophenomenological approach to the study of consciousness.

Type: Chapter
Information: Cognition and the Brain
The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement
, pp. 40 - 97

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610608.003 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2005

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