Book contents
- China’s Governance Puzzle
- China’s Governance Puzzle
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 China’s Approach to Governance Reform
- 2 Concept, Chronology, and Drivers of Transparency Reform
- 3 Transparency and Corruption: Analysis of Variation Within China and Hypothesis Testing
- 4 Comparing Approaches to Combating Corruption: The Guangdong and Chongqing Models
- 5 Concept, Chronology, and Drivers of Participation Reform
- 6 Participation and Compliance: Analysis of Variation and Hypothesis Testing
- 7 Making Policy in Public: A Comparison of Three Chinese Provinces
- 8 The Road Ahead
- Select Bibliography
- Index
3 - Transparency and Corruption: Analysis of Variation Within China and Hypothesis Testing
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2017
- China’s Governance Puzzle
- China’s Governance Puzzle
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 China’s Approach to Governance Reform
- 2 Concept, Chronology, and Drivers of Transparency Reform
- 3 Transparency and Corruption: Analysis of Variation Within China and Hypothesis Testing
- 4 Comparing Approaches to Combating Corruption: The Guangdong and Chongqing Models
- 5 Concept, Chronology, and Drivers of Participation Reform
- 6 Participation and Compliance: Analysis of Variation and Hypothesis Testing
- 7 Making Policy in Public: A Comparison of Three Chinese Provinces
- 8 The Road Ahead
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, we explore the core theoretical hypothesis that transparency initiatives introduced in China over the past decade, including Open Governance Information (OGI) regulations, have led to reductions in macro-corruption among subnational officials. To test this theory, we take advantage of archived websites at China’s National Library and Internet Archive – recording the type, scale, and scope of information about government structure, processes, and outputs listed on each web page. Our dependent variable, macro-corruption, is operationalized by the amount of misused funds discovered by the China National Auditing Office as a share of provincial expenditures. We find evidence that increases in information about government power structure and decision-making processes are strongly associated with reductions in the misuse of public funds.
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- Chapter
- Information
- China's Governance PuzzleEnabling Transparency and Participation in a Single-Party State, pp. 60 - 96Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
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