Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Contributors
- The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation
- Part One Exposition and Defense
- Part Two Interpretation and Intention
- 4 Simple-Minded Originalism
- 5 The Intentionalist Thesis Once More
- 6 Origin Myth: The Persons Case, the Living Tree, and the New Originalism
- Part Three Originalism and Constitutional Settlement
- Part Four Challenges and Critiques
- Index
- References
4 - Simple-Minded Originalism
from Part Two - Interpretation and Intention
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Contributors
- The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation
- Part One Exposition and Defense
- Part Two Interpretation and Intention
- 4 Simple-Minded Originalism
- 5 The Intentionalist Thesis Once More
- 6 Origin Myth: The Persons Case, the Living Tree, and the New Originalism
- Part Three Originalism and Constitutional Settlement
- Part Four Challenges and Critiques
- Index
- References
Summary
‘Tis a Gift to be Simple1
I confess. (Actually, I boast.) I’m a simple-minded originalist. I believe that given what we accept as legally authoritative, the proper way to interpret the Constitution (and statutes, regulations, and judicial orders as well) is to seek its authors’ intended meanings – the same thing we do when we read a letter from Mom, a shopping list from our spouse, or instructions for how to assemble a child’s toy made in China. Interpreting the Constitution and interpreting a toy’s assembly instructions are two tokens of the same type, namely a search for the authors’ intended meaning.
Because simple-minded originalism is considered heretical among most legal academics – even if it is so orthodox among ordinary folks as to escape notice – I shall attempt to defend it. But that defense will not be lengthy. The defense of simple-minded originalism is, well, simple.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Challenge of OriginalismTheories of Constitutional Interpretation, pp. 87 - 98Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
References
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