In July 1948, about midway in the first Arab–Israeli war, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernst Bevin, wrote that ‘on a long term view … there may be something to be said for an exchange of populations between the areas assigned to the Arabs and the Jews respectively.’ A few days later, he expatiated:

But he then went on to argue that as there were only a handful of Jews living in the territory earmarked for Arab sovereignty in Palestine, there was no ‘basis for an equitable exchange of population’ and therefore Britain should pursue with the United Nations Mediator the possibility of a return of the displaced Palestinian Arabs to their homes. By this time, 400,000–500,000 Arabs (and less than five thousand Jews) had been displaced in the fighting.

But the logic propelling Bevin's thinking, before he pulled on the reins, was highly persuasive: The transfer of the large Arab minority out of the areas of the Jewish state (as of the minuscule Jewish minority out of the Arab-designated areas) would solve an otherwise basic, insurmountable minority problem that had the potential to subvert any peace settlement.