Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Prolegomenon
- Aristotle on the Nature of Truth
- 1 The Saying of Things
- 2 A History of Truth as Cor-respondence
- 3 Saving the Things Said
- 4 By Way of Address
- 5 By Way of Response
- 6 The Truth of Nature and the Nature of Truth in Aristotle
- 7 On Saying the Beautiful in Light of the Good
- 8 Ecological Justice and the Ethics of Truth
- Works Cited
- Index of Passages Cited
- General Index
- References
5 - By Way of Response
The Logic of Cooperative Encounter
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 December 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Prolegomenon
- Aristotle on the Nature of Truth
- 1 The Saying of Things
- 2 A History of Truth as Cor-respondence
- 3 Saving the Things Said
- 4 By Way of Address
- 5 By Way of Response
- 6 The Truth of Nature and the Nature of Truth in Aristotle
- 7 On Saying the Beautiful in Light of the Good
- 8 Ecological Justice and the Ethics of Truth
- Works Cited
- Index of Passages Cited
- General Index
- References
Summary
[T]hinking and walking are different ways of getting about in a common world which has a make-up agreeable to each of these ways.
Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge, The Realm of MindThe way of address has led to a λόγος capable of going down to the things themselves and articulating them according to the way they show themselves. This way to the things themselves is itself rooted already in a kind of perceptive response that grows out of the most rudimentary encounters between living things and the things with which they live. Such encounters involve a logic of cooperation between the powers of the soul and the nature of things. Things express themselves according to a λόγος capable of awakening those natural capacities of living beings by which they first become alive to things. The site of this awakening activity Aristotle calls τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, perceiving. If we attend carefully to what this middle-voiced infinitive says, it will not be possible to think the activity of perceiving in purely passive terms as the mere reception of sensations. Rather, as Heidegger puts it, “With αἴσθησις [Aristotle] thinks the ‘apprehending’ [Vernehmen] of beings in the natural way, a hearing that is outstanding in that the senses involved thereby are those with which it mediates access.” Apprehending in this natural sense involves a kind of cooperative mediation between the perceiving and perceived.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Aristotle on the Nature of Truth , pp. 116 - 159Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010