vii.1.1 We must investigate friendship, what it is and what qualities it has; who is a friend, and whether friendship is a term used univocally or in many ways; and if it is used in many ways, how many; and also how one should interact with a friend and what the justice associated with friendship is. This investigation is no less important than the investigation of what is fine and choiceworthy in character traits. vii.1.2 For it is a particular function of the political art to produce friendship; and people say that virtue is useful for this reason, since those who are treated unjustly by one another cannot be friends to each other. vii.1.3 Moreover, we all say that justice and injustice have a particular bearing on friends; and we think that the same man is both good and a friend, and that friendship is a state connected to character. And if one wants to bring it about that people not commit injustice it is a good idea to make them friends to one another, since true friends do not commit injustice. vii.1.4 But it is also the case that if they are just they will not commit injustice. Consequently justice and friendship are either the same thing or nearly so.

vii.1.5 In addition, we hold that a friend is one of the greatest goods and that friendlessness and isolation are most dreadful, since our whole life and our voluntary associations are bound up with friends. For we pass our days either with members of our household, or with our relatives, or with our companions, or with our children, parents or our wife. vii.1.6 And the private justice that deals with our friends is the only one that is up to us, while that which involves other relationships is subject to legislation and is not up to us.