Coming from a generation of theologians who wrote treatises on the De Anima linked with tracts De Bono et Virtutibus, Albert the Great included in his De Bono a discussion of memory, both from the standpoint of psychology and from that of Cicero's Rhetoric and the De Inventione. As was clear in earlier tracts like that of John of la Rochelle, memory and reminiscence were already linked with the virtue of prudence, following John of Damascus's classification of the virtues. Whilst memory, according to Albert, is said to pertain to the sensible part of the soul, prudence pertains to the rational part since, we are told, according to Aristotle's definition, reminiscence pertains to the rational part and hence is the type of memory which constitutes a part of prudence. By this Albert means to distinguish the stored results of the human estimative cogitation which judges the intentions of sensible experience, from the subsequent activity which leads to an attempt by reason to recall the mental similitude engendered by imagination's similitude. Prudence is for Albert a moral habitus and hence reminiscence is a psychological habitus, an active, discontinuous, syllogistic search amongst mental similitudes, whereas the recollection of impressions and events of the past is not a habitus in and of itself.