The peace made between Britain and France, first by the preliminary agreement in London in October 1801 and then by the final treaty at Amiens in March 1802, was regarded by both sides, in George III’s all too accurate description, as ‘experimental’. But in this case the experiment was regarded as having a different purpose by the two participants. For the British government the experiment was in living alongside a swollen French Republic controlled by a charismatic military dictator; for the military dictator the experiment was in expanding his power in times of peace rather than by conquest. Bonaparte thus had a certain interest in maintaining the peace for as long as possible, and the longer it lasted the more he would be able to consolidate and expand his power, both domestically and internationally.

From the start the British were alert to the difference between the two countries’ approaches to the peace, though Bonaparte perhaps was not. Bonaparte’s actions at home established his personal power, and internationally his expansions took place within territories which he already in many ways controlled – in Holland, in northern Italy, in Switzerland – or into colonies returned to him as part of the peace treaty. In such circumstances it was difficult for the British to do anything to hinder him, as the Swiss crisis and the mounting of French expeditions to San Domingo and New Orleans clearly showed. The absence of any apparent concern on the part of the continental powers also prevented the application of British power in the interior of the continent. But the result of Bonaparte’s moves was to consolidate his power even more, and to refresh his finances, and to reduce the internal options for action which he still had. With full control of France and the satellites, his next expansions had to be into other lands.

Germany was one target, Spain and Portugal another, the colonies a third. All these possibilities provoked concern in Britain, particularly the overseas expansions, and Bonaparte’s actions in Germany and Iberia alerted other powers. The acquisition of Louisiana was done by treaty, but its disposal for cash broke that treaty. The expedition of Decaen to India and the Indian Ocean was explicitly designed as an anti-British move, a fact fully appreciated in London and India.