Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A model of intra-party politics
- 3 Patterns of backbench dissent in four Westminster parliamentary systems, 1945–2005
- 4 Policy preferences and backbench dissent in Great Britain and Canada
- 5 Dissent, constituency service, and the personal vote in Great Britain and New Zealand
- 6 The cost of dissent to the party
- 7 Demotion and dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party, 1991–1997
- 8 Discipline and dissent in the Australian Coalition, 1996–1998
- 9 Career trajectories, socialization, and backbench dissent in the British House of Commons
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Comparative statics and proofs
- Appendix 2 Content and construction of ideological scales
- Appendix 3 Sampling and coding of media dissent and discipline
- Appendix 4 Demotion and the parliamentary careers of Canadian MPs
- References
- Index
6 - The cost of dissent to the party
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A model of intra-party politics
- 3 Patterns of backbench dissent in four Westminster parliamentary systems, 1945–2005
- 4 Policy preferences and backbench dissent in Great Britain and Canada
- 5 Dissent, constituency service, and the personal vote in Great Britain and New Zealand
- 6 The cost of dissent to the party
- 7 Demotion and dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party, 1991–1997
- 8 Discipline and dissent in the Australian Coalition, 1996–1998
- 9 Career trajectories, socialization, and backbench dissent in the British House of Commons
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Comparative statics and proofs
- Appendix 2 Content and construction of ideological scales
- Appendix 3 Sampling and coding of media dissent and discipline
- Appendix 4 Demotion and the parliamentary careers of Canadian MPs
- References
- Index
Summary
Introduction
The previous chapter showed that dissent can provide MPs with name recognition and votes; in this chapter, I explore the cost of dissent to the party. The party whips and MPs quoted in Chapter 2 suggested that any reward reaped by dissident MPs came at the party's expense. By dissenting, an MP weakens the authority and credibility of party leaders, places colleagues in the difficult position of having to explain away their loyalty to their own constituents, and undermines the party's image as a unified and coherent political force. This characterization of the situation casts party discipline as an archetypal prisoner's dilemma in which MPs, left to their own devices, defect from the party line to secure the benefits of independence and leave their colleagues to bear the burden of supporting unpopular party policies. The result of this myopically self-interested behaviour is to leave the party unable to sustain any collective effort that goes against its members' short-run interests.
This description of intra-party politics provides a tidy functionalist explanation for the institutions that are commonly taken to underpin party discipline (e.g., candidate selection rules, whips, patronage, etc.). Even so, one can point to arguments and evidence that contradict the theoretical assertion that there exists a collective action problem at the heart of intra-party politics.
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- Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics , pp. 130 - 149Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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