

garian revisionism; and his contribution to the consolidation of the Horthy regime. The last, of course, is given condemnatory treatment, and a lack of objectivity is also apparent in the sections dealing with Teleki's role as the advocate of revisionism. Teleki did indeed want to revise the conditions of the Trianon Treaty, but he wished to do so peacefully and with the consent of Europe, not as a reward from the Axis Powers. This point is not made clear. On Teleki's suicide, Tilkovszky writes: "According to the *News Chronicle*, this excellent and straightforward man laid down his life for focussing the attention of the civilized world on the intolerable situation created by Hitler's megalomany [sic] in Hungary and in South-Eastern Europe" (p. 8). He also cites less friendly views: "The *Manchester Guardian* qualified as erroneous that part of Teleki's conception that Italy might be a counterpoise to the exaggerated German demands" (p. 9).

The book is an abbreviated translation of the author's study published in Hungarian in 1969. It is based on the widest archival and other research possible in Hungary. Tilkovszky does not claim comprehensiveness. His title, in fact, calls this book, like the earlier Hungarian version, a "sketch" from the biography of this controversial but nonetheless significant scholar-statesman. Within such limits, this small work achieves its purposes.

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RELAȚIILE POLITICE ALE ANGLIEI CU MOLDOVA, ȚARA ROMĂNEASCĂ ȘI TRANSILVANIA ÎN SECOLELE XVI–XVIII. By *Ludovic Demény* and *Paul Cernovodeanu*. Biblioteca Istorică, no. 42. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1974. 287 pp. Lei 25.

Paul Cernovodeanu and Ludovic Demény have presented a detailed account of England's political and diplomatic relations with the Rumanian principalities and Transylvania from the latter part of the sixteenth to the first decades of the eighteenth century. As Cernovodeanu sums up, England, for the most part, tried to protect her economic interests in the Near East while defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Anglo-Rumanian relations were chiefly carried out through the sporadic intervention of the British ambassador at Constantinople for defense of the Levant Company's trade and for the rights of Scottish merchants in Rumanian lands. The authors conclude that England's relations with Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania must be viewed primarily within the context of the Eastern Question.

The fact that England's policies were determined by English interests is a cause for lamentation, if not condemnation, by the authors. Despite the admission that no other great power of that period made significant sacrifices beyond self-interest, emphasis is placed on England's complete lack of concern for the fate of the principalities when English interests were at stake. In proffering support to the principalities, the latitude of British ambassadors at the Porte was thus dictated by English interests, which were primarily economic.

English relations with the principalities are properly placed in the context of Ottoman-English ties, but perhaps too much attention is given to general diplomatic developments in Europe. The authors rely heavily on German, Hungarian, and Rumanian secondary sources because of the inaccessibility (to the authors) of British archival documents and the dearth of Rumanian primary sources.

Despite such notable omissions as an index and a bibliography, the book reflects a laborious compilation of data on a subject which has been virtually ignored. For this and for the overall merit of their work, the authors are to be commended.

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BULGARIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By *Marshall Lee Miller*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975. xiv, 290 pp. \$10.95.

Miller, a Washington, D.C. attorney and a former associate deputy attorney general of the United States, pursues his side interest of Bulgarian history in a highly professional manner. This book—which draws upon an impressive array of sources in an impressive array of languages—is the fruit of that interest. The author investigates the political history of Bulgaria during its involvement in the Second World War, skillfully interweaving threads of domestic and foreign politics. He pays relatively little attention to the purely military history of Bulgaria's participation in the war. Miller's study is skewed slightly toward the history of the Bulgarian Communist Party during that period, because of the nature of the published and unpublished sources with which he worked, but the author is aware of this imbalance and keeps it within bounds.

Any book dealing with the complexities of political history is bound to contain controversial interpretations. In this case, the "Historical Introduction," summarizing the course of Bulgarian history from 1878 to the eve of World War II in nine pages, leaves much to be desired. But a survey of this type is exceedingly difficult to write, and when Miller embarks upon his direct investigation, the interpretations are always judicious and at least supportable, if not entirely acceptable. His book, in short, is a solid discussion of an interesting period in Bulgarian history.

After reading this work, one is astonished that Nazi Germany exercised so little control over the policies of its satellite. Miller writes, for example, that after King Boris visited Hitler in March of 1942, "Hitler came away . . . convinced that Bulgaria was not a country on which Germany could completely rely." Hitler constantly pressured Boris for concessions and for further assistance in the war effort, but with only limited success. Moreover, Germany was often ill-informed about internal Bulgarian developments and very poor at predicting their course, much less capable of directing that course. The relatively humane treatment of the Bulgarian Jews provides a good illustration of this point.

Bulgaria's central problem during the war years was that of leadership. King Boris dominated the country's political life. He reduced the parliament to subservience and made the major decisions of state himself. Prime ministers and ministers served at his pleasure. At the same time, however, Boris never managed to elaborate an ideology capable of buttressing his regime intellectually. In 1942, Prime Minister Bogdan Filov made an abortive attempt to breathe life into Boris's established political approach: the notion that Bulgaria should develop a social order "in which individuals rather than parties would play the leading role in the service of the nation." This philosophy never really took hold, although it could have been described as working so long as the king was at the center of things.