

SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION: TRIESTE 1954. AN APPRAISAL BY THE FIVE PARTICIPANTS. Edited by *John C. Campbell*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. x, 181 pp. Maps. Appendixes. \$11.50.

In *Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954*, John C. Campbell loses no time in giving us his own assessment, in the foreword, of these negotiations: "successful," "extraordinary," and "unusual." The rest of the volume justifies Campbell's judgment on the basis of the comments made by the five key participants to those negotiations, namely, Llewellyn Thompson, Geoffrey Harrison, Vladimir Velebit, Manlio Brosio, and Robert Murphy.

In spite of obvious national differences (including an American position especially sensitive to Italian needs, as the Yugoslavs saw it, and a British position more responsive to Yugoslav demands, as the Italians saw it), the reminiscences gathered from these individuals eighteen years after their meetings in 1954 show a remarkable agreement. Thus, as the main elements that contributed to the final outcome, all of them list secrecy, achieved in spite of the length (nine months) of the proceedings; a "relatively free hand for the middlemen," who promptly dismissed their initial delegations; the effective search for face-saving concessions as "an exercise in window dressing"; the use of implicit threats as the catalyst for bringing about such concessions (acknowledged by both Italy and Yugoslavia), and the implicit offer of rewards (although denied by both Velebit and Murphy) to finalize them; the stage-by-stage procedure adopted by a two-party third party who was willing at times to move from a mediatory role to a more persuasive one; and, of course, timing: "that atmosphere [for a negotiated settlement] did not exist earlier, and it might not have recurred later."

Under the adroit probing of John Campbell, assisted by Joseph E. Johnson, these five diplomats appraise their actions in a candid and revealing way. Both Thompson and Harrison were able to strike a balance of dissatisfaction between Velebit and Brosio, whose mutual bitterness over the outcome of the negotiations remains the best explanation of why such a "temporary" settlement of a most delicate territorial dispute proved to be permanent. "We felt that we deserved the support of the U.S. and the U.K. because of a community of ideology, of systems, and of the alliance," complains Brosio. "I started with a more optimistic approach, and I was taught some further realities of foreign policy through this experience" (pp. 119–20). And following a long diatribe against Churchill, who "pushed us out of Trieste" through "an agreement between the British and the Germans" as shown by "the absolute stubborn fighting of the Germans at the last moment" (pp. 85–86), the former Yugoslav ambassador states: "You, of course, had promised, in order to help the shaky Italian government win their elections . . ." (p. 89).

Implicit in the presentation of this original and enlightening book is the question of whether or not such techniques could be used elsewhere. As Anthony Eden kept saying afterward, "Why can't we settle Cyprus? Why can't we settle the Arab-Israeli conflict along the same lines as the Trieste negotiations?" Unfortunately, the question is not really answered. At times, it is raised—with Velebit, for example, when he is asked for specific comments about timing ("When is the time ripe to move?") and mediation ("When are the disputants close enough to permit successful mediation?") (p. 109). But Velebit does not answer such questions, and the interviewers do not pursue the point further. As to Campbell's concluding chapter—"What is to be learned?"—the reader is left with Campbell's apparent endorsement of a "two-stage negotiation by the third party with first one side, then the other" (p. 155) for the Arab-Israeli dispute, "but only if the third party had some real influence on both sides" (p. 155): is this now the case for the United States—in short, is the time ripe

for a stage-by-stage U.S. effort in the Middle East à la Trieste? Even if the answer is negative, the question is worth pursuing at greater length by the editor of this interesting short volume, as well as by its readers.

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VLAD ȚEPEȘ. By *Nicolae Stoicescu*. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1976. 238 pp.

Voivode Dracula, ruler of Wallachia from 1456 to 1462 (and for a few months in 1448 and 1476), and remembered in his country's history as Vlad *Țepeș*, that is, the Impaler, horrified contemporary Europe by the terror he unleashed against real and imagined opponents and with which he beat his subjects into total submission. At a time when sovereigns resorted to terror as a legitimate instrument of statecraft, the Wallachian prince was generally regarded as a practitioner of forms of violence of unparalleled viciousness; these excesses earned him a lasting reputation as a blood-thirsty tyrant.

The Impaler has been traditionally approached in Rumanian historiography with caution and ambivalent feelings. Some evaluations have been wholly negative; others, while crediting him with great military valor and victories in battle against the Turks, have been balanced by a sober view of his cruel internal excesses. The five-hundredth anniversary of Vlad's death has prompted a coordinated effort in Rumania to emit a positive reevaluation of the terrible prince, with an attendant educational emphasis upon the constructive effects of autocratic rule. The present biography, which has the merit of being the first Rumanian monographic treatment of Prince Vlad, is one contribution to this effort.

The book proposes to construct a new interpretation of Vlad's place in national and European history, to reassess his record, and to exonerate him from the stigma attached to his name. The author claims that contemporary accounts spread by Vlad's enemies and detractors (the Transylvanian Saxons, the Hungarian Royal Court) deliberately magnified the theme of morbidity in his actions in order to defame him, and contends that the prince employed ruthless methods not to gratify morbid impulses but for the good of the country and in pursuit of well-defined political objectives, thus acting no differently than other European sovereigns of the time. These propositions are, however, open to the counterargument that many sources other than those of German-Saxon or Hungarian provenance or inspiration also emphasize the maniacal streak in Vlad's personality, and that it is precisely by the standards of the time that contemporaries judged his methods of rule and found them unique in their excesses.

The author's assessment of Vlad's record as a ruler is unqualifiedly laudatory. He credits his personage with nobility of purpose and signal accomplishments. Vlad emerges from the book as a heroic national figure, striving to secure the sovereignty and prestige of the state against powerful external adversaries, to establish internal order and discipline, and to promote economic development. The thrust of the argument here is that Vlad's "severe measures" can be properly understood only in relation to such goals, by which the measures were necessitated and, in the perspective of history, validated.

Thus, Vlad's repressive domestic actions, particularly the extermination of boyars, is explained in terms of his objective of reinforcing the central authority of the state, by doing away with debilitating factional strife and consequently ensuring internal cohesion. (Vlad's terror struck all social classes and population groups indiscriminately, but the motivations and implications of this phenomenon are not explored in the book.) Similarly, the murderous persecutions of Saxon merchants are explained as