

Churchward shows that the major factor determining the social roles and political attitudes of Soviet intellectuals is their high degree of integration into the system: "The basic role of the Soviet intelligentsia is to provide high-level specialists for all branches of human endeavour, including government and administration" (p. 90). He also notes that a "clear distinction cannot be drawn between intellectuals and the *apparatchiki*" (p. 123). If so, the author's belief that they significantly influence policy-making is questionable, since it is hard to decide in what capacity—apparatchik or intellectual—they do so and with what degree of autonomy.

In addition to such issues the book also discusses and documents the social, ethnic, sexual, and occupational composition of Soviet intellectuals, their training, recruitment, internal differentiation and life-styles, using Soviet sociological data. This is an indispensable volume for a better understanding of the Soviet intelligentsia in the 1960s and the present.

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MEZHDUNARODNYE DOGOVORY V SOVREMENNOM MIRE: VO-  
PROSY PRAVA MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOGOVOROV V SVETE  
RABOTY VENSKOI KONFERENTSII OON, 1968–1969 GG. By *A. N.*  
*Talalaev*. Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1973. 247 pp. 93 kopeks.

Peaceful coexistence is linked with ideological struggle in the Soviet Communist Party program of 1961. Talalaev uses his Moscow University textbook to this end: to explain minute details while flaying bourgeois authors and imperialist powers for attempting to prevent progressive development. Progressivism is shown to require acceptance of universality of treaties (no state may be excluded from adherence to treaties of general concern), rejection of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, acceptance of a multilateral treaty as binding to which reservations have been entered if other parties do not object, rejection of a treaty as ineffective if negotiated under conditions of duress or fraud or in violation of imperative norms, and rejection of a treaty designed to foster colonialism or aggression.

Soviet practice is praised while other practice is derided, sometimes with incomplete exposition. For example, the thirty-five-second ratification of a treaty by the Japanese Diet is compared with the report by the foreign minister and other speeches in Supreme Soviet committees prior to ratification by the Presidium. A fair account would require comparison of the Communist Party consideration and the Japanese committee consideration leading up to the floor drama.

Clearly the USSR as an established power now wants predictability of law. Thus Talalaev disapproves of unilateral denunciation of treaties under *rebus sic stantibus* and praises *pacta sunt servanda*. Regrettably he omits consideration of disputes over interpretation of an obligation. Thus he finds the Soviet side has never violated a treaty, while others often do. The example he gives is the delayed opening of a second front in France by the Allies in 1942. His students ought to hear the debate over what the obligation was. And what of Yalta?

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