but also present detailed historical/political context as well as fascinating discussions of the acts' public reception and symbolic resonance.

As a historian, Dietze possesses the virtues of engaging storyteller and a rigorous theoretician. Her discussion of Becker, Booth, and Karakozov is prefaced by dramatic narrative accounts of their terrorist assassinations followed by comparative analysis that toggles between cases to show that all three actors were politically engaged members of an educated elite; all three actors found their agendas blocked; all three actors suffered personal crises before their acts of violence. In some respects, the imitators seemed to have learned little from their models: they were hastier in their preparations for the attacks, lacked experience with media and publicity, and failed to broadcast their self-justifications or find support among the public (Dietze attributes the new genre of Bekennerschreibens ["Claims of Responsibility"] to these imitators). For these reasons, all three could have been said to "fail" even if they met their mark, and their broader political agendas were thwarted.

Where these imitators ran aground, Dietze's argument, too, stumbles. If the "imitators" are quashed, to what degree are they generative and to what degree full stops? Dietze's narrative ends without her compellingly showing *how* Becker, Booth, or Karakozov influenced the future development of terrorism. Likewise, the argument for the salience of transnational influence—rather than more localized political and cultural influence—leaves room for debate, especially in Karakozov's case, where Dietze credits John Brown, mediated by Nikolai Chernyshevskii's Rakhmetov in *What is to Be Done* (1863), as the model for Karakozov. While she provides compelling evidence for Brown's influence on Booth and Orsini's on Becker, Brown's status as a source for Rakhmetov is largely speculative, though Chernyshevskii's own admiration for Brown is well substantiated. Both Brown and Karakozov were undeniably galvanized by the same emancipatory ideals, but the connection between the two is otherwise tenuous.

In her conclusion, Dietze forthrightly addresses counterarguments and raises the question of other possible models, such as Karl Ludwig Sand, terrorism's traditional point of origins in German historiography, or Charlotte Corday, or the numerous plots against Napoleon I. What then constitutes modern terrorism's prehistory, and what is its "history," or are the distinctions of "pre/history" better understood as an evolution or a continuum? To what extent were transnational models definitive—do they carry such weight that the historical narrative must be reorganized around them? To what extent is it accurate to use the characterization "imitators" (Nachahmer) rather than simply successors (Nachfolger), and do imitators require further imitators to form a link in the chain and ultimately a tipping point for the emergence of terrorism as a concept? Certainly, the most significant contribution of the *Die Erfindung der Terrorismus* is, as Dietze puts it, "bringing the United States back in" (649). The US's history of political violence has too long been exempted from histories of terrorism, and Dietze's masterful study deserves an English edition that it will be accessible to a broader audience of historians and terrorism experts.

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The Social History of Post-Communist Russia. Ed. Piotr Dutkiewicz, Richard Sakwa, and Vladimir Kulikov. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016. xvi, 313 pp. Notes. Index. Illustrations. Figures. Tables. Maps. $160.00, hard bound.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2017.228

In the twenty-five years since Soviet collapse, countless books have been published that try to make sense of the political and social changes taking place in Russia

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https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.228 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and the CIS. Two factors make this book stand out: first, the authors are exclusively Russian (bar a short epilogue by Richard Sakwa), and have lived through the changes they analyze; second, the book focusses on the opinions and material conditions of everyday Russians, rather than elite politics or institutional change that are so often the focus of studies of Russia's post-communist transformation. The picture of Russia that emerges is a contradictory one, on the one hand relishing the stability brought by the Putin era, but riven by new and multiple inequalities on the other. *The Social History of Post-Communist Russia* thus makes for a sobering and, at times, emotional read.

In Chapter 1, Piotr Dutkiewicz introduces the main themes of the book, making the important observation that the western focus on the development of civil society has hindered an exploration of Russian society as a whole (2). Chapter 2, by Boris Kapustin, seeks to re-embed discussions of "the people" into discourses of postcommunist transition and argues that instead of a linear process, change in contemporary Russia consists of a situation where "different strategies pursued by different actors clash, intersect, combine, and resonate" (25). Considering the material effects of postcommunist transformation on the public, Chapter 3 by Vladimir Popov and Piotr Dutkiewicz presents a stark picture of the drop in quality of life and explosion in inequality that emerged in the decade after Soviet collapse. In Chapter 4, Leonid Grigoryev traces the emergence of new powerful elites during the 1990s and highlights the role of cultural factors driving the changes. Chapter 5 by Vladimir Popov considers the extent of popular support for the transition to capitalism and shows that, despite the deepening inequality and growth of a super-rich class of oligarchs, market reforms have not lost their popular legitimacy. Mikhail Gorshkov in Chapter 6 examines the evolution of public opinion on the reforms over the 20 years, showing that most Russians believe that their country is on a "trajectory of sustained and stable development" in which it is beginning to recover its "status as an influential world power" (127).

In Chapter 7, Natalya Tikhonova explores social stratification in the post-Soviet period and presents data regarding Russians' self-perception of their place in the overall structure of society. In Chapter 8, Valery Fyodorov shows how public debate shifted from a "pragmatic-political" plane in the Yeltsin period to Putin's "moral-ideological" plane, giving a fascinating overview of the contemporary conservative-patriotic Putinite ideology. In Chapter 9, Elena Shestopal presents an analysis of Russians' perceptions of democracy and authority, arguing that Russians overall are dissatisfied with the government for "not making progress or working to effect positive change" (199). Chapter 10, by Galina Gribanova, considers the resurgence of ethnic and religious tensions in the post-Communist period; however, she also notes that there has been less inter-ethnic violence than one might have expected at this time. Chapter 11, by Natalya Zubarevich, examines elite-society relations throughout the Russian regions, noting the various power configurations that exist across the Federation. In Chapter 12, Andrei Margolin considers state investment in welfare over the past two decades and shows that while the incremental growth in public spending is encouraging, much more still needs to be done. The final chapter, by Boris Mezhuev, argues that liberal-minded Russian elites have consistently pursued an inadvertent "self-isolation" strategy, since they are unable to relate to the concerns of everyday people.

While the book constitutes a rich source of statistics, many of which are neatly visualized in graphs and tables, what is missing, in the view of this reviewer, is some accompanying qualitative materials, which could have added color to the data. One notable exception is Fyodorov's chapter, where the reader is introduced to a kaleidoscope of characters that comprise the "New Russia," some of whom would not be out

https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.228 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of place in a Pelevin novel. Here, we meet, for example, the "disoriented engineers" of the early 1990s, who "turned to selling gum and beer in the kiosks that lined the streets in Russian cities' (156); "the 'red directors' of the mid-1990s, who paid their workers meagre wages while requesting subsidies from the regional government or Moscow to produce goods which no one needed" (160); and "the young ministers" that oversaw the 1998 financial crash, "protégés of the half-dead president, who were completely useless in a crisis but were always in good standing with any government" (164). These miniature portraits bring Fyodorov's accompanying statistics to life and enabled this reader to comprehend more profoundly the effects of Soviet collapse on Russians' everyday lives.

Although the book's conclusions are at points repetitive and at others contradictory (hardly surprising given the diversity of authors, methodologies and disciplines), the chapters present strong evidence for why the vast majority of Russians support Vladimir Putin. In the words of Popov and Dutkiewicz, "it must be acknowledged that Russia's socioeconomic situation today (2014) is not just satisfactory; it is rather successful" (55). After the tumult and tragedy of the 1990s, a comparatively stable and prosperous society has emerged in a country that is ethnically, religiously, socially, and regionally diverse. The central challenge for the contemporary Russian leadership, therefore, is to manage this diversity and minimize the inequalities that run alongside it in order to ensure that stability may continue.

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The Biopolitics of Stalinism: Ideology and Life in Soviet Socialism. By Sergei Prozorov. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. xiv, 337 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £24.99, paper.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2017.229

"Did you know, Stalin was a hipster?" is printed on a T-shirt, together with a picture of young Iosif Dzhugashvili, and sold at a tourist shop in Moscow. It is very puzzling to see the communist leader responsible for the death of millions glorified in a contemporary Russia that is characterized by non-ideological political nihilism accompanied by "mindless consumerism and superstitious religiosity" (259), as described by Sergey Prozorov. His book is extremely useful for those trying to understand the nature of Stalin's terror and the whole Soviet-socialist enterprise, as well as the roots of rationality behind today's ideology-poor, imperialist-minded Russia. Typically, the Stalin era has been approached with concepts like totalitarianism, with many scholars finding little difference between Nazism and communism. Or, it has been looked from ideological and governance angles, stating that Stalin's terror is proof that socialism always leads to atrocities or rather that its implementation was just flawed, and thus the ideology should not be blamed. According to Prozorov, this has distorted the whole analysis of Russian political history.

Prozorov, an expert on Russian politics and history, proposes a different and, in my view, a very solid methodological tool to reveal the essence of the Soviet-socialist enterprise and Stalin's rule. By operationalizing the concept of biopolitics and leaning on the works of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, and Roberto Esposito, Prozorov manages to unfold the specificities of Stalin's power. The main argument concerning the interpretation of Stalin's rule is that it was qualitatively very different from what we have come to think of as biopolitics. In the mainstream understanding of biopolitics, by which both liberal democracies and totalitarian Nazism have been analyzed,

https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.228 Published online by Cambridge University Press