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Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion? - CORRIGENDUM

Roseanne W. McManus

The author apologizes for an error in the coding of the variable "Percentage of Capabilities Held by State A." This variable appears in all of the main regressions and, therefore, correcting it changes all of these regression results. Most of these changes do not affect the substantive conclusions, but this corrigendum presents the correct results for all tables and graphs in the order of the paper and appendix.

[Table 2](#) should be replaced with the following:

Table 2. Main results

	1 Initiation	2 Initiation	3 Reciprocation	4 Reciprocation
Continuous madness rep., A	0.213** (0.083)		0.264*** (0.065)	
Continuous madness rep., B	0.379*** (0.061)		0.032 (0.123)	
Strong madness reputation, A		0.177 (0.208)		0.436*** (0.156)
Slight madness reputation, A		0.100 (0.069)		−0.178 (0.222)
Strong madness reputation, B		0.902*** (0.140)		−0.563*** (0.201)
Slight madness reputation, B		0.170** (0.075)		−0.210 (0.183)
Recent MID initiations, A	0.206*** (0.031)	0.201*** (0.031)	−0.032 (0.099)	−0.026 (0.103)
Recent MID initiations, B	0.094*** (0.034)	0.080** (0.035)	0.058 (0.089)	0.091 (0.095)
Military capabilities, A	1.005 (0.790)	0.893 (0.805)	−0.297 (2.038)	−0.114 (2.055)
Military capabilities, B	2.479*** (0.680)	2.521*** (0.682)	−2.209 (1.566)	−2.903* (1.584)
% Military cap. held by A	0.352*** (0.099)	0.358*** (0.099)	−0.115 (0.247)	−0.170 (0.242)
Democracy, A	0.092 (0.058)	0.069 (0.057)	−0.271 (0.204)	−0.203 (0.203)
Democracy, B	0.136** (0.060)	0.134** (0.061)	0.023 (0.166)	−0.002 (0.158)
Joint democracy	−0.501*** (0.107)	−0.487*** (0.107)	−0.115 (0.310)	−0.167 (0.306)
Contiguity	0.537*** (0.072)	0.545*** (0.073)	0.386*** (0.134)	0.311** (0.137)
Distance	−0.118*** (0.025)	−0.119*** (0.024)	0.033 (0.038)	0.044 (0.041)
Dyad length	0.670*** (0.082)	0.631*** (0.078)		
Peace years	−0.042*** (0.004)	−0.043*** (0.004)		
Peace years squared	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)		
Peace years cubed	−0.000*** (0.000)	−0.000*** (0.000)		
First act hostility			−0.044 (0.153)	−0.065 (0.149)
Constant	−2.876*** (0.135)	−2.841*** (0.131)	−0.124 (0.602)	0.061 (0.596)
Observations	62,384	62,384	759	759

Note: Models 1–2 are probits predicting MID *Initiation*, with standard errors clustered by dyad. Models 3–4 are probits predicting *Reciprocation*, with standard errors clustered by State A. The madness reputation variables are lagged by one year. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

One change to the text is necessary due to the changes to the models in [Table 2](#). In the discussion of the results, the second part of the sentence, "In contrast, leaders with slight madness reputations are only 1.4 times more likely to be targeted than leaders with no madness reputation, and this difference is only significant at the 94 per cent confidence level," should be removed because this difference now surpasses the 95 per cent confidence threshold.

The predicted probabilities in Figure 1 also change, although the changes are difficult to discern with the human eye. The corrected Figure 1 appears below:

Figure 1. Predicted probabilities from Models 2 and 4
Note: the figure shows average predicted probabilities, produced by calculating the predicted probability for every observation and averaging. The lines represent 95 per cent confidence bounds.

The changes to Figure 2 are much more substantive. Figure 2 should be replaced with the following:


Figure 2. Marginal effects from interactions with relative capabilities
Note: these are average marginal effects. The dotted lines represent 95 per cent confidence bounds. The histograms in the background show the distribution of relative military capabilities.

As a result of this correction, the text in the "Military capabilities interaction" section should be replaced with the following:

"Hypothesis 4 can be tested by interacting the madness reputation indicators with relative military capabilities – specifically, with the percentage of military capabilities in the dyad held by State A. Figure 2 shows marginal effects plots from the interactions. First, analyzing the deterrence regression plots in the top row of Figure 2, the marginal effects of both *Strong Madness Reputation* and *Slight Madness Reputation* on the probability of deterrence failure increase as Leader B's relative power weakens (i.e., the percentage of capabilities held by State A increases). This does not support Hypothesis 4.

Turning to the bottom row of Figure 2, we analyze the crisis bargaining regression. The marginal effects from this regression provide support for Hypothesis 4. As State A's military capabilities increase relative to State B, *Strong Madness Reputation* has an increasingly large detrimental effect on the probability of reciprocation, while the effect of *Slight Madness Reputation* changes from helpful to insignificant. Therefore, the support for Hypothesis 4 is mixed, which might reflect a greater commitment problem within dyads that are already experiencing conflict.

Figure 2 also shows that perceived madness can actually be beneficial, as the bottom right graph shows that *Slight Madness Reputation* has a negative and significant marginal effect on

the probability of MID reciprocation when State A holds less than about 40 percent of capabilities in the dyad."

Due to the changes to Figure 2, some changes to the text in the introduction and conclusion are also necessary. In the introduction, the text beginning with, "I find that perceived madness is clearly harmful to general deterrence," should be amended as follows (with changes and additions in bold):

"I find that perceived madness is clearly harmful to general deterrence and typically has a harmful or insignificant effect in crisis bargaining. However, it may be helpful in crisis bargaining under certain conditions, particularly when the reputation for madness is slight and is coupled with **relatively weak military power**. My analysis suggests that the harmful effect of perceived madness, **at least in the context of crisis bargaining**, results from a commitment problem."

The first two paragraphs of the conclusion should be amended as follows (with changes and additions in bold):

"Overall, my findings suggest little support for the Madman Theory. For general deterrence, the effect of perceived madness is purely harmful. In crisis bargaining, the effect of a strong madness reputation seems to be generally harmful or at least unhelpful, but it does appear that a slight madness reputation can be beneficial when a leader's country **does not have too much relative military powe**r. In sum, therefore, the effect of perceived madness is more often harmful than helpful. The main apparent beneficiaries of a madness reputation are **militarily weak** leaders who are perceived as only slightly mad – not necessarily those we would be most likely to think of as 'madmen'.

Why does a reputation for madness often undermine coercive success? My findings suggest that the inability of perceived madmen to make credible commitments to peace **may be** key. I find that greater relative military power, which increases the commitment problem, causes the impact of a madness reputation to become more detrimental **in crisis bargaining (although not for general deterrence)**. This suggests that when a reputation for madness prevents a leader from credibly committing not to attack in the future, adversaries are more likely to resist the leader firmly. Thus, my findings are in line with research that emphasizes mistrust and the commitment problem as causes of war."

Finally, most of the tables in the appendix have changed slightly, although none of these changes affect the conclusions drawn in the text of the article. The corrected tables appear below in order:

Table A2: Summary Statistics from General Deterrence (MID Initiation) Dataset

Variable	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max
Initiation	0.007	0.083	0	0	1
Continuous Madness Rep., A	0.023	0.134	0	0	6.461
Continuous Madness Rep., B	0.023	0.134	0	0	6.461
Strong Madness Reputation, Leader A	0.005	0.067	0	0	1
Slight Madness Reputation, Leader A	0.120	0.325	0	0	1
Strong Madness Reputation, Leader B	0.005	0.067	0	0	1
Slight Madness Reputation, Leader B	0.120	0.325	0	0	1
Recent MID Initiations, Leader A	0.507	0.787	0.200	0	4.800
Recent MID Initiations, Leader B	0.507	0.787	0.200	0	4.800
Military Capabilities, State A	0.031	0.049	0.007	0.000	0.208
Military Capabilities, State B	0.031	0.049	0.007	0.000	0.208
% Capabilities Held by State A	0.500	0.425	0.500	0.00004	0.99996
Democracy, State A	0.534	0.499	1	0	1
Democracy, State B	0.534	0.499	1	0	1
Joint Democracy	0.288	0.453	0	0	1
Land Contiguity	0.151	0.358	0	0	1
Distance	3.871	2.783	3.851	0.005	11.989
Dyad Length (Days)	0.729	0.343	1	0.003	1.003
Peace Years	39.614	36.886	33	0	194

Table A3: Summary Statistics for Crisis Bargaining (MID Reciprocation) Dataset

Variable	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max
Reciprocation	0.418	0.493	0	0	1
Continuous Madness Rep., A	0.065	0.352	0	0	3.457
Continuous Madness Rep., B	0.115	0.433	0	0	3.457
Strong Madness Reputation, Leader A	0.019	0.137	0	0	1
Slight Madness Reputation, Leader A	0.117	0.321	0	0	1
Strong Madness Reputation, Leader B	0.065	0.246	0	0	1
Slight Madness Reputation, Leader B	0.077	0.267	0	0	1
Recent MID Initiations, Leader A	0.803	0.898	0.500	0	4.400
Recent MID Initiations, Leader B	0.497	0.687	0.250	0	4.800
Military Capabilities, State A	0.026	0.045	0.007	0.000	0.208
Military Capabilities, State B	0.017	0.038	0.004	0.000	0.208
% Capabilities Held by State A	0. 584	0. 305	0. 635	0.002	0.9997
Democracy, State A	0.397	0.489	0	0	1
Democracy, State B	0.336	0.473	0	0	1
Joint Democracy	0.132	0.339	0	0	1
Land Contiguity	0.553	0.497	1	0	1
Distance	1.521	1.883	0.784	0.005	11.718
First Act Hostility Level	3.260	0.662	3	2	4

Table A5: Observations with the Highest Values of Cook's D in the Initiation Regression

Leader A	Leader B	Year	Cook's D
Kim Il-Sung	Hosokawa	1994	0.024
Saddam Hussein	Kaifu	1991	0.023
Saddam Hussein	Khalifah Ath-Thani	1991	0.023
Saddam Hussein	Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah	1991	0.022
Saddam Hussein	Kohl	1991	0.022
Saddam Hussein	Jabir As-Sabah	1999	0.021
Saddam Hussein	Jabir As-Sabah	1991	0.021
Saddam Hussein	Jabir As-Sabah	1992	0.021
Bush	Milosevic	1992	0.020
Blair	Mugabe	2002	0.020
Major	Milosevic	1992	0.020
Bush	Saddam Hussein	1991	0.020
Mitterrand	Milosevic	1992	0.020
Bush	Saddam Hussein	1992	0.020
Mitsotakis	Milosevic	1992	0.019
Ibn Al-Khalifah	Saddam Hussein	1994	0.019
Clinton	Saddam Hussein	1994	0.019
Bush	Kim Jong-Il	2004	0.019
Bush	Ahmadinejad	2007	0.019
Schroder	Saddam Hussein	1999	0.019

Table A6: Observations with the Highest Values of Cook's D in the Reciprocation Regression

Leader A	Leader B	Year	MID No.	Cook's D
Kim Jong-Il	Roh Moo Hyun	2007	4479	0.014
Saddam Hussein	Jabir As-Sabah	1999	4274	0.013
Saddam Hussein	Kaifu	1991	3971	0.012
Ahmadinejad	al-Maliki	2007	4536	0.011
Noriega	Reagan	1989	3901	0.010
Ahmadinejad	al-Maliki	2010	4547	0.010
Netanyahu	Saddam Hussein	1998	4273	0.009
Ayatollah Khomeini	Reagan	1988	2834	0.009
Obama	Hugo Chavez	2010	4506	0.008
Bush	Saddam Hussein	1991	3974	0.008
Bush	Saddam Hussein	1992	3552	0.008
Howard	Saddam Hussein	2003	4273	0.007
Deng Xiaoping	Gorbachev	1986	2718	0.006
Alfonsin	Chiang Ching-Kuo	1986	2579	0.006
Rafsanjani	Bush	1991	3973	0.006
Deng Xiaoping	Yeltsin	1994	4104	0.006
Ahmadinejad	Hamid Karzai	2010	4599	0.005
Bush	Kim Jong-Il	2003	4455	0.005
Khatami	Bush	2004	4519	0.005
Kim Il-Sung	Hosokawa	1994	4022	0.005

Table A7: Alternate Indicator Cutoffs and Dropping Outliers (Initiation Model)

	(1) Top 5% Indicator Cutoff	(2) Top 20% Indicator Cutoff	(3) Top 40% Indicator Cutoff	(4) Cont. Measure, Drop Top 16%
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.861*** (0.269)	0.250 (0.181)	0.146 (0.133)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.066 (0.067)	0.086 (0.070)	0.099 (0.072)	
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	1.067*** (0.248)	0.912*** (0.124)	0.610*** (0.104)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.297*** (0.070)	0.128 (0.079)	0.144 (0.089)	
Cont Madness Rep, Leader A				0.209** (0.084)
Cont Madness Rep, Leader B				0.939*** (0.295)
Observations	62384	62384	62384	62077

Table A8: Address Regional and Time Bias (Initiation Model)

	(1) Region Fixed Effects	(2) Time Fixed Effects
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.120 (0.202)	0.172 (0.210)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.085 (0.069)	0.123* (0.069)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.919*** (0.144)	0.904*** (0.138)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.171** (0.076)	0.200*** (0.077)
Observations	62384	62384

Table A9: Address Pro-Western Bias and Strategic Use of Madness Adjectives (Initiation Model)

	(1) Drop Quotations	(2) Control for US Affinity	(3) Only Non-US Sources	(4) Drop English-Speaking Western Countries
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.327 (0.220)	0.190 (0.210)	0.364* (0.200)	0.229 (0.220)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.173** (0.073)	0.067 (0.071)	0.142** (0.072)	−0.071 (0.099)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.997*** (0.170)	0.916*** (0.142)	0.920*** (0.150)	0.740*** (0.192)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.285*** (0.079)	0.158** (0.079)	0.228*** (0.077)	0.103 (0.113)
Affinity with US, State A		0.067 (0.084)		
Affinity with US, State B		−0.091 (0.073)		
Observations	62384	57730	62384	45980

Table A10: Address Potentially Confounding Leader and Country Characteristics (Initiation Model)

	(1) Control for Time in Office	(2) Drop Leaders in Office <5 Years	(3) Matched Sample	(4) Control for Bluffing Reputation
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.181 (0.210)	0.282 (0.248)	−0.759** (0.307)	0.101 (0.207)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.102 (0.069)	0.084 (0.090)	0.167 (0.149)	0.081 (0.069)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.948*** (0.136)	0.719*** (0.169)	0.689*** (0.145)	0.898*** (0.137)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.185** (0.075)	0.160 (0.098)	0.094 (0.085)	0.168** (0.076)
Years in Office, Leader B	−0.011** (0.005)			
Recent Bluffs, Leader A				−0.409*** (0.095)
Recent Bluffs, Leader B				−0.058 (0.093)
Observations	62384	32962	35396	62384

Table A11: Adjustments to the Madness Measure (Initiation Model)

	(1) Compare to Resolve Reputation	(2) Drop Words Used outside FP Context	(3) 5-Year Average	(4) 10-Year Average
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.177 (0.208)	0.182 (0.208)	0.148 (0.142)	0.080 (0.137)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.101 (0.069)	0.141** (0.069)	−0.011 (0.064)	−0.042 (0.064)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.890*** (0.136)	0.897*** (0.144)	0.691*** (0.152)	0.736*** (0.141)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.144* (0.076)	0.202*** (0.077)	0.176** (0.069)	0.135* (0.071)
Strong Resolve Rep, Leader B	0.051 (0.137)			
Slight Resolve Rep, Leader B	0.073 (0.076)			
Observations	62384	62384	62384	62384

Table A12: Different Sample and Dependent Variables (Initiation Model)

	(1) No Politically Relevant Restriction	(2) Only Dyads with a MID in Last 15 Years	(3) Forceful MID DV	(4) Fatal MID DV
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.160 (0.130)	−0.264 (0.199)	−0.008 (0.249)	0.308 (0.210)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.217*** (0.061)	0.013 (0.074)	0.023 (0.094)	−0.166 (0.107)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.899*** (0.079)	0.524*** (0.128)	0.784*** (0.149)	0.810*** (0.156)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.294*** (0.067)	0.133* (0.079)	0.096 (0.098)	0.032 (0.120)
Observations	605264	11092	62384	62384

Table A13: Interaction (Initiation Model)

Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.177
	(0.208)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.904***
	(0.140)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.052
	(0.074)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.103
	(0.084)
Slight Madness Rep A X Slight Madness Rep B	0.438*
	(0.227)
Observations	62384

Table A14: Alternate Indicator Cutoffs and Dropping Outliers (Recip Model)

	(1) Top 5% Indicator Cutoff	(2) Top 10% Indicator Cutoff	(3) Top 20% Indicator Cutoff	(4) Cont. Measure, Dropping Top 1%
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.665***	0.686***	0.249	
	(0.215)	(0.218)	(0.177)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.194	−0.189	−0.159	
	(0.208)	(0.218)	(0.226)	
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.647*	−0.288	−0.616***	
	(0.389)	(0.220)	(0.198)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.495***	−0.372**	−0.072	
	(0.154)	(0.171)	(0.206)	
Continuous Madness Rep, A				0.099
				(0.116)
Continuous Madness Rep, B				0.034
				(0.123)
Observations	759	759	759	753

Table A15: Address Regional and Time Bias (Recip Model)

	(1) Region Fixed Effects	(2) Time Fixed Effects
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.278**	0.570***
	(0.133)	(0.213)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.141	−0.021
	(0.198)	(0.210)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.542**	−0.420*
	(0.225)	(0.223)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.251	−0.066
	(0.176)	(0.182)
Observations	759	759

Table A16: Address Pro-Western Bias and Strategic Use of Madness Adjectives (Recip Model)

	(1) Drop Quotations	(2) Control for US Affinity	(3) Only Non-US Sources	(4) Drop English-Speaking Western Countries
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.219 (0.250)	0.408*** (0.143)	0.430* (0.247)	0.492*** (0.148)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.097 (0.192)	−0.023 (0.195)	−0.157 (0.230)	−0.233 (0.222)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.482** (0.231)	−0.447** (0.202)	−0.252 (0.230)	−0.653** (0.272)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.339** (0.164)	−0.283 (0.177)	−0.371** (0.175)	−0.626** (0.291)
Affinity with US, State A		−0.403* (0.237)		
Affinity with US, State B		0.008 (0.202)		
Observations	759	723	759	651

Table A17: Address Potentially Confounding Leader and Country Characteristics (Recip Model)

	(1) Control for Years in Office	(2) Drop Leaders in Office <5 Years	(3) Matched Sample	(4) Drop Strategic Blunders	(5) Control for Bluffing Reputation
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.435*** (0.160)	0.439*** (0.165)	0.749* (0.447)	0.450*** (0.162)	0.289* (0.156)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.178 (0.223)	−0.527* (0.274)	0.334 (0.336)	−0.073 (0.226)	−0.160 (0.194)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.563*** (0.201)	−0.900** (0.442)	−0.476 (0.524)	−0.624*** (0.203)	−0.619*** (0.201)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.210 (0.183)	0.027 (0.221)	−0.005 (0.284)	−0.203 (0.191)	−0.192 (0.182)
Years in Office, Leader A	0.000 (0.011)				
Recent Bluffs, Leader A					−0.515* (0.299)
Recent Bluffs, Leader B					−0.308* (0.184)
Observations	759	449	347	707	759

Table A18: Adjustments to the Madness Measure (Recip Model)

	(1) Compare to Resolve Reputation	(2) Drop Words Used outside FP Context	(3) 5-Year Average	(4) 10-Year Average
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.400** (0.160)	0.703*** (0.222)	0.072 (0.167)	−0.060 (0.165)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.256 (0.223)	−0.180 (0.247)	−0.245 (0.188)	−0.254 (0.183)
Strong Resolve Rep, Leader A	0.551* (0.325)			
Slight Resolve Rep, Leader A	0.026 (0.245)			
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.584*** (0.202)	−0.343 (0.219)	−0.328* (0.191)	−0.343* (0.190)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.208 (0.191)	−0.243 (0.179)	−0.559*** (0.146)	−0.113 (0.139)
Observations	759	759	759	759

Table A19: Dropping Some MIDs (Recip Model)

	(1) Drop MIDs Beginning with Force	(2) Drop Non-Revisionist MIDs	(3) Retain Only One Observation per MID Target
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.386** (0.181)	−0.313 (0.445)	0.425*** (0.162)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.317 (0.254)	0.046 (0.192)	−0.308 (0.272)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.510** (0.208)	−0.726*** (0.249)	−0.240 (0.196)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.211 (0.228)	−0.434 (0.265)	−0.145 (0.231)
Observations	468	491	644

Table A20: Interaction (Recip Model)

Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.436*** (0.156)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.563*** (0.201)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.174 (0.218)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.204 (0.232)
Slight Madness Rep A X Slight Madness Rep B	−0.031 (0.434)
Observations	759

Table A21: Conflict Selection Model (Recip Model)

Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.850*** (0.249)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.226 (0.290)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.211 (0.276)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.302 (0.214)
Rho	−0.078 (0.227)
Observations	62384

Table A22: Interactions with Relative Capabilities

	(1) Deterrence	(2) Crisis Bargaining
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.176	−0.363
	(0.210)	(0.417)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.096	−1.063**
	(0.069)	(0.534)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.437	−0.565***
	(0.365)	(0.203)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.030	−0.196
	(0.117)	(0.188)
% of Military Capabilities Held by A	0.333***	−0.234
	(0.099)	(0.247)
Strong Madness Rep A X % Capabilities		1.302**
		(0.551)
Slight Madness Rep A X % Capabilities		1.244*
		(0.703)
Strong Madness Rep B X % Capabilities	0.662	
	(0.459)	
Slight Madness Rep B X % Capabilities	0.506**	
	(0.209)	
Observations	62384	759

Table A23: Tests Mentioned in Footnotes (Initiation Model)

	(1) Retain Tiny Countries	(2) Drop Extreme Outlier	(3) Count Recent MIDs by Country	(4) Count Only Losing Recent MIDs by Leader
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.170	0.179	0.139	0.231
	(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.211)	(0.207)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.094	0.099	0.194***	0.238***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.069)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.912***	0.909***	0.857***	0.902***
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.139)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.172**	0.170**	0.180**	0.207***
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Observations	67522	62366	62384	62384

Table A24: More Tests Mentioned in Footnotes (Initiation Model)

	(1) Minimalist Model	(2) Logged Madness Measure
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.191	
	(0.209)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	0.057	
	(0.070)	
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	0.855***	
	(0.139)	
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	0.163**	
	(0.073)	
Logged Continuous Madness Rep, A		0.362**
		(0.184)
Logged Continuous Madness Rep, B		0.917***
		(0.138)
Observations	62384	62384

Table A25: Tests Mentioned in Footnotes (Recip Model)

	(1) Retain Tiny Countries	(2) Count All Recent MIDs	(3) Count Only Recent Losing MIDs Initiated by Leader
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.457*** (0.145)	0.242** (0.122)	0.424*** (0.164)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.158 (0.217)	−0.236 (0.202)	−0.210 (0.202)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.536*** (0.201)	−0.709*** (0.198)	−0.557*** (0.198)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.198 (0.182)	−0.270 (0.184)	−0.196 (0.190)
Observations	773	759	759

Table A26: More Tests Mentioned in Footnotes (Recip Model)

	(1) Minimalist Model	(2) Logged Madness Measure	(3) Cluster by Leader A	(4) Cluster by Country B
Strong Madness Rep, Leader A	0.418*** (0.153)		0.436** (0.209)	0.436 (0.358)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader A	−0.128 (0.234)		−0.178 (0.209)	−0.178 (0.190)
Strong Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.516*** (0.198)		−0.563** (0.246)	−0.563 (0.381)
Slight Madness Rep, Leader B	−0.190 (0.190)		−0.210 (0.172)	−0.210 (0.214)
Logged Continuous Madness Rep, A		0.416** (0.162)		
Logged Continuous Madness Rep, B		−0.184 (0.242)		
Observations	759	759	759	759

Reference

McManus, R.W. (2019) Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion? *British Journal of Political Science*. Published by Cambridge University Press, 9 December 2019. doi: 10.1017/S0007123419000401.