

than as a logical progression . . ." (p. 864). Any fictional point of view implies an epistemology, and not all possible points of view are equally acceptable in the context of a given epistemology. These correlations need to be set out, and Ryan has done so. Her statement of purpose, however, remains slippery: "I should like to show in this essay how a number of writers took up these issues [of consciousness, self, and subjectivity] through their contacts, direct or indirect, with empirical thought" (p. 857). The reader who looks carefully at this sentence may have trouble determining just how a writer can *take up* an issue *through contact* with something. Ryan points out that she is not suggesting a simple causal relationship between "literature and philosophy," but the word *through* is evasive: does it here mean "by way of," "by means of," or (surely not) "because of"?

Studies on the impact of empirical psychology, as psychology, can support or qualify general statements about influences. Viewed as an experimental program, the psychology of James and Mach probably overlaps with literature in concrete ways. Perhaps connections can be made on a very specific level, for instance between research into thresholds of sensation and certain kinds of details Joyce places in Bloom's mind. Ryan has provided the conceptual framework within which such connections can best be understood.

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*Ms. Ryan replies:*

Michael S. Kearns's thoughtful letter gives me a chance to elaborate on two points that could not receive sufficient attention in the space of my article.

I shall deal first with the relationship between empirical philosophy and empirical psychology. The distinction we now make between these two disciplines has its origin, to be sure, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but it was by no means so clearly drawn at that time. There was considerable overlap between the two, and psychologists of the period were well schooled in the work of their philosophical forebears. The development, moreover, was not one-way (from philosophy to psychology): Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, for example, would be unthinkable without the "act psychology," as it was called, of Franz Brentano (*Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, 1874). The concept of "intentionality" fundamental to Husserl's phenomenology was first developed by Brentano.

In terms of my argument, what distinguishes nineteenth-century empirical psychology from earlier empirical philosophy such as that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume is the context in which seemingly similar problems were raised. Whereas the earlier empirical philosophers were more concerned with an inquiry into the nature of reality, the new empirical psychologists were more concerned with the workings of consciousness. The sentence Kearns quotes from my fourth paragraph is merely a transition to a series of issues I then enumerate in the continuation of that same sentence. Most of these issues are more germane to psychology as it was then understood: I refer to the intentionality of perception and the dependence of our concept of "self" on that principle. This new emphasis makes for a fundamental distinction between the nineteenth-century empirical psychologists and the eighteenth-century empirical philosophers.

Now it is true, as Kearns states, that the new psychology also incorporated experimental research. The move into psychology by a number of men first trained as physicists (Helmholtz, Fechner, Stumpf, and Mach) added an important dimension to the new explorations into the psychology of perception. William James's psychological laboratory is a result of this interaction; but James did not use it for research—it was a demonstration laboratory for teaching purposes. It is important in this connection not to confuse "empirical" with "experimental." "Empirical" means based on experience, either of the external world or of one's own mind. Introspection was the method by which the empiricists investigated the latter. Mach's *Analyse der Empfindungen* is almost entirely based on this method (his wonderful line drawing of himself looking at his virtually headless torso on a chaise longue is emblematic of the approach), and long stretches of James's *Principles of Psychology* and his short course book *Psychology* rely heavily on introspective proofs for his theories of attention and consciousness. The use of introspection as a valid method of psychological observation was common throughout this period; derived from more traditional, earlier conceptions of psychology, it was still central to the other branch of nineteenth-century psychology, that of Wilhelm Wundt and his followers, for whom experiment was merely an additional method of corroboration. Not until the advent of behaviorism was the introspective and phenomenalist basis of psychology seriously challenged.

Since the focus of my article was less the psychologists' investigations into sensory perception than their understanding of "self," I naturally based my argument on the "introspective" aspect of their method, not on the experimental.

Kearns's second point concerns my problematic preposition "through." I regret that I did not put my statement more clearly; it was not, however, meant to be evasive. In studies of this sort we are accustomed to think in terms of influence, but my point was that the idea of direct, one-way influence does not do justice to the complex interaction and parallelism between empirical thought and literature. Of Henry James, Musil, and Broch (and perhaps, though less clearly so, of Döblin), it can be said that their contacts with empirical psychology reinforced conceptions they were already develop-

ing within a more literary framework; in Virginia Woolf we find a more general participation in a mode of thought that had come to permeate a good deal of the literary and nonliterary writing of her time. My article is thus not an "influence study" of the conventional sort but a broader exploration of a phenomenon that crossed the boundaries of philosophy, psychology, and literature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

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