The handbook under consideration contains an enormous amount of information. Mr. Zaninovich starts agreeably with a brief look at the Communist party (which absurdly calls itself a "League"), and then we have an exhaustive account of constitutional issues from Messrs. Mayer, Kristan, and Schweissguth, an account that is a bit like a treatise on alchemy. Mr. Petrovich (whose essay is one of the best in the book) tells us all we really need to know when he points out that Yugoslavia has had four constitutions in thirty years.

The section on the economy, written by the specialists Gumpel, Neuberger, Hoffman, and Singleton, offers many skillful insights. It is not the fault of the authors that we still do not fully understand how worker management in industry operates, or that economists differ among themselves as to the nature of the Yugoslav market. The socialist sector is obviously the most important, yet the very existence of worker management often leads to old-fashioned capitalist anarchy that drives party planners wild. Notoriously proud of their "separate road to socialism," the Yugoslavs nevertheless provide some explosive material for their critics in the socialist countries who maintain that they have slid back into a modified capitalism.

In the section entitled "Culture and Science," the scholars Lauer (literature), Hendrichs (mass media), and Velimirović (music) provide summaries, of which Lauer's is the most extensive and imaginative. Djordjević and Lipowschek probe more subtly into the educational system; the former points out the paradox of mass secondary and higher education accompanied by a persistently high rate of illiteracy. The book also includes fine essays on the social structure, religion, and emigration by Ronneberger, Rauch, and Velikonja.

One of the stronger pieces is the editor's essay on foreign policy. Those who recall John Foster Dulles's "neutralism is immoral" will appreciate the fact that Tito and his people were the original immoralists. They have succeeded, in large measure, because their success was in the interests of the West. The Yugoslavs naturally argue that they did it alone, but that falls into the same category as the maxim "Speak Serbian so the whole world will understand." Mr. Grothusen finds an "inner coherence" in Yugoslav foreign policy that transcends the person and myth of Tito and will, he believes, outlive him. But what if Victor Louis tells Belgrade, upon Tito's death, to come into line before certain "irreversible decisions" are taken in the Kremlin? Mr. Grothusen seems to feel that the Yugoslavs will stand their ground (Mr. Wagenlehner, who writes on national defense, ducks the issue). It is a sobering thought that the Balkans, and especially Yugoslavia, may provide the scene for the most serious East-West confrontation since 1962.

This is an admirable volume and all the contributions are of high caliber. Two things, however, are missing: there is very little on the nationality problem and nothing on UDBA, the secret police. Both permeate Yugoslavia with a foul stench and they ought to have been discussed.

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THE LEGITIMATION OF A REVOLUTION: THE YUGOSLAV CASE. By *Bogdan Denis Denitch.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976. xiv, 254 pp. Tables. $15.00.

The author of this work sees Yugoslavia's "self-management" system as an ideal laboratory for the analysis of the legitimation of a revolutionary elite. Beginning with a discussion of "the revolutionary transformation of Yugoslavia," and "the development of a new political culture," he focuses on the political and social changes and stresses which of these changes challenged the legitimacy of the old social order. Ac-

cording to Denitch, the Yugoslav revolution did not occur because it was based on an idea "whose time had come" but because "men mustered the requisite amounts of practical force to shatter the old social order, lay the foundations for a new one," and carry out in three stages "the complex processes of industrialization and modernization" (p. 206). The result of this process is "the least repressive and most open society run by a communist party"; a "transitional system" halfway between "a politically controlled" and a "free" society.

Among the more arresting observations in this study are those which deal with the Yugoslav social system. Denitch argues that the peasantry is largely "outside of the political system" and that the "industrial working class" represents "the basic clientele of the current regime" (pp. 4–5). Furthermore, "the technical intelligentsia" is rooted in "those institutions which are central to modern Yugoslav society," and generally reflects "the values of the new Yugoslav political culture." On the other hand, a "humanistic intelligentsia" (made up of two subgroups: preservers of traditional culture and Marxist humanists) is seen as only a "partial supporter" or as "a loyal opposition" to the regime. As a consequence of the regime's commitment to modernization, expertise is adequate "to assure an appropriate career without party membership," but "political activity still requires active membership in the League of Communists" (p. 104). And, while "it is no problem to maintain an ethnic or republic balance in the top levels of the League of Communists and other sociopolitical bodies on the federal and republic level," this balance is often lacking in the lower ranks (p. 113). The absence of an equitable representation is most notable in the officer corps, where Serbs and Montenegrins are heavily overrepresented. However, even here the national composition of generals, "with the exception of the Montenegrins," is much "more representative," and the high command is "scrupulously balanced," if not "disproportionately balanced against the Serbs" (p. 116). The author concludes that the future of Yugoslav institutions lies in the maintenance of the "delicate balance between the representation of legitimate national and local interests, and the representation of the industrial working class and the technicians in the modern sector of the economy" (p. 148).

The author is confident that without outside intervention "the continued process of change" will produce "a model of a democratic socialist society—a model with no real precedent" (p. 148). He is also confident that the LCY can overcome the crises engendered by nationality conflicts, local issues, and divergent group interests. Although this is certainly a superior study, the reviewer wishes that the author had examined more critically the "zig-zag" nature of Yugoslav development and some of the missteps and failures in the theory and practice of Yugoslav communism.

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LE CONFLIT DE CHYPRE, 1946–1959, 2 vols. By *François Crouzet*. Centre européen de la Dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale, Études de cas de conflits internationaux, 4. Brussels: Établissements Émile Bruylant, 1973. Vol. 1: 478 pp. Vol. 2: 710 pp. (pp. 479–1189). 3.040 francs belges, paper.

The Cyprus question once again absorbed the world during the Turkish invasion of the island in the summer of 1974 and afterward. In the course of its long history, this idyllic but unhappy island has passed through the hands of various conquerors—but nevertheless has managed to retain its Greek character. The Greek inhabitants of the island are now combined with a Turkish minority, the descendants of the Ottoman conquerors who controlled the island from 1571 to 1878. From 1878 to 1958 the Greek Cypriots asked for union (*enosis*) with Greece. In October 1915, Great