

background demonstrate how historians can use personal histories to better access the emotional and the forgotten—those subjects on which archives can be quiet. Family history here, as McCabe highlights, is a highly unequal business; records are much more easily accessed for white, English-speaking researchers. But simultaneously, family history can help decenter the nation, and place individuals and familial networks ahead of national and colonial structures. Furthermore, this book usefully demonstrates how genealogical methodologies can be interwoven with other social history methodologies, and how family historians might have lots to offer other researchers.

It is important to remember this is not a book about the children of British men and Indian women in colonial India; it is a book about a very particular group of them. The subjects are children whose fathers were emotionally and financially invested in them, enough to send them to and usually pay for their education at Graham's Homes. Many other children, for better or worse, stayed with their Indian families. Though some of these families were affectionate, many relationships between tea planter men and Indian women were violent, characterized by highly unequal power relationships, and the children that resulted from them were often not in contact with their fathers. Moreover, the children studied by McCabe were the ones who were, in Graham's thinking, fortunate enough to migrate to New Zealand. And the individuals whose stories are most fully represented in the book, those of the six families whose personal files reside at the Graham's Homes' archives and in the personal family archives McCabe uses, are by nature those who thrived, integrated, and married in later life—those who have interested descendants today. McCabe highlights and carefully contextualizes this in the book. It is by no means always a happy tale she tells, as she charts the many difficulties, traumas, and emotional turmoil individuals faced. But a less specialist reader, lacking detailed knowledge of the often brutal nature of colonial, white, masculine power in colonies such as India, might forget these are not typical children of mixed British and Indian parentage when reading extracts from the letters of fathers in touch with their children or Graham. These fathers may have been distant, and children frustrated at their lack of contact with them, but these men who did at least something to secure their children's futures do not represent a full range of experience. Furthermore, one important legacy of the Graham's Homes and the actions of tea planter fathers is a recurring tension throughout the book and for the descendants McCabe interviewed. Was the move of Homes graduates away from their mothers and eventually thousands of miles from their first homes a good or bad thing for these individuals and their children and grandchildren, who themselves in time felt a sense of loss at having no knowledge of their Indian grandmothers?

Overall, however, this is a great success. McCabe beautifully brings to light a truly fascinating story of a small group of children, and deftly analyzes their subjectivities and emotional experiences by tracking their lives. A lovely read.

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DAVID G. MORGAN-OWEN. *The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880–1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 256. \$85 (cloth).  
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The centenary of the First World War has inevitably brought a plethora of new titles that deal with its naval aspect. While many of these have focused on Jutland, the only major naval battle of the war, David Morgan-Owen's *The Fear of Invasion* looks to help the reader understand how

the politics of the previous quarter of a century influenced the strategic outlooks of both the army and navy. By doing so, it seeks to present us, as the cover suggests, with “a new interpretation of how strategy was formed in Britain on the eve of the First World War.” Analyzing the relationship between the independent policies of the two services, Morgan-Owen argues that a focus on home defense left the Admiralty subservient to the needs of the British Expeditionary Force. This imbalance, he suggests, precipitated strategic confusion within the navy, and ultimately led them to focus on the possibility of a German invasion.

As Morgan-Owen points out, this thesis is at odds with the view of many historians, who have often seen the invasion threat as something of a distraction, something that had spawned its own genre of literature yet had been seen as fiction—not a prospect taken seriously by war planners. While other scholars have shown that it could be a useful drum to bang in order to whip up a public frenzy for new warships, this monograph is the first serious research to put the fear of invasion, and the place of the defense of Britain (and particularly London, the metropole of the British World System), at the center of analysis. By doing so, Morgan-Owen suggests unequivocally that “how Britain planned to repel an invasion exercised an influence over virtually every other aspect of her military preparations before 1914 and must be understood in order fully to appreciate her position at the outbreak of the war” (3).

This is rather a bold argument. When presented with such a thesis, a reader immediately questions why, if this is the case, no one has thought of this before. It is not as if this is an understudied period, nor is the author drawing from obscure or unknown archives. Morgan-Owen, however, offers convincing reasons why the issue has largely been ignored. Above all, he argues, there has been a fundamental misunderstanding of the sources, whereby scholars have tended to assume that a lack of invasion plans in the documents of the French or German archives is synonymous with British officials’ not seeing invasion as a credible risk. Perhaps more importantly, he points to issues of teleology leading to studies concentrated elsewhere. We know now that invasion plans did not exist, nor were they feasible, and that instead the Royal Navy’s most visible contribution to the war was Jutland, an episode that breeds controversy, and thus has dominated studies of the First World War navy. Moreover, the wider perception of the war as one of trenches in France and Belgium has led to a focus on the continental aspect of British strategy. Often, in fact, these two have been seen as opposites, with the blue-water school of the navy warring against the continental strategy of the army.

This traditional narrative has led to problematic oversights. First, British army and navy strategy are necessarily intertwined, and thus the planning of both needed to involve the other. Second, it negates the agency and key role played by consecutive governments, who had to create a war strategy in the face of two competing armed services knowing that favoring one over the other would have inevitable consequences for both. Third, it has led to an overt focus on British offensive, rather than defensive, planning. This is perhaps, again, a teleological issue, with knowledge of the unfolding of the First World War shaping how scholars have interpreted policy envisioned by governments, which inevitably wanted to preserve a status quo in which Britain was the global hegemon.

As Morgan-Owen ably shows, it was in fact Britain’s global power that required it take stock of exactly how it would defend the homeland. Worries about the performance of the forces deployed to South Africa at the turn of the century and the perceived possibility of Russian invasion of India necessitated a decision be made about the purpose of the army, which seemed fit neither for home nor imperial defense. To solve this conundrum, Balfour decided that the navy would be responsible for the defense of trade and that the army would be used as a reserve force in India. This sent both leaderships in decisive directions that profoundly affected preparedness for war. With an alliance with France, and Germany becoming the obvious rival, the army increasingly assumed a continental stance, looking to deploy an expeditionary force in support of France. Becoming less sure of its ability to defend Britain’s shores, the navy became increasingly focused on resisting any German attack on its east coast. Thus, by

1914, the fear of invasion had led Britain to prioritize its key strength, that of its navy, on facilitating the expeditionary force's shoring up of France, and in protecting its own shores.

Morgan-Owen writes persuasively and is clearly a master of both his sources and the historiography. Thus, although the book is relatively short, at 233 pages, it certainly packs a punch. Where its strength really lies is Morgan-Owen's skill in communicating how complicated, and changeable, the picture is in this period. As any scholar of this period knows, geopolitical reality and popular sentiment and belief (often whipped up by far-from-disinterested public figures), were often at odds. Thus, it is not enough to simply dismiss fears as fantastical as, if acted upon, they had real and long-term effects. Moreover, *Fear of Invasion* ably shows the important complexities, and sometimes contradictions, within British decision making. By putting the Admiralty, the War Office General Staff, and the (only sporadically interested and often distracted) government of the day in the same frame, Morgan-Owen brings nuance to the discussion, convincingly placing home defense into debates about prewar defense planning.

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LYNDA NEAD. *The Tiger in the Smoke: Art and Culture in Post-War Britain*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. Pp. 407. \$45.00 (cloth).  
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With its intriguing title and sumptuous illustrations, Lynda Nead's latest book delves into cultural atmospheres alive in the decade and a half that followed the Second World War. As commentators quipped at the time, a visitor to Britain in the late 1940s or early 1950s could have been forgiven for thinking that Britain had lost the war; a gray depression seemed to hang in the air and cling to threadbare clothes. Nead pursues this and other cultural feelings by explaining how moods were articulated in the visual culture, journalism, and imaginative fictions of the day, and by locating material resources that linked these moods to specific social and cultural forces. Organized into three sections, the chapters in *The Tiger in the Smoke* capture a set of feelings that gather around fogs and ruins, connect to color and Commonwealth migration into Britain, and circulate in domestic interiors, animating a world of love and sex. If the book has an overriding theme, it is that these postwar atmospheres indicate how a gleamingly modern world of reconstruction never quite manages to shrug off the past: like a dense smog, the past leaks into the present, leaving grubby marks and obscuring vision. For *The Tiger in the Smoke*, the postwar modern is never fully born, never fully realized.

Nead draws evidence from assorted artifacts: movies and magazines, statements from slightly cranky pressure groups, advertisements and novels, color charts and dress patterns, Mass-Observation reports and radio shows. Her characteristic maneuver is to unfold a theme that on first flush might seem to be minor. For instance, in the chapter "An English Sunday Afternoon," she begins with the dragging ennui of a wet day. Such a setup initially feels ahistorical, as if the feeling described could pertain to any number of decades and social contexts. Yet the triumph of the book is Nead's flair for making vague atmospheres do surprisingly precise historical work. Not only was Sunday, with its dank moods, the setting of some of the best-known dramas of the immediate postwar period (such as John Osborne's 1956 play *Look Back in Anger*, or Alan Sillitoe's 1958 novel *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning*), it was also the topic for a sustained investigation by Mass-Observation, whose *Meet Yourself on Sunday* was published in 1949. At the same time, a pressure group