

BALKANISTICA: OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, vol. 1, 1974. Edited by *Kenneth E. Naylor* et al. Published for the American Association for South Slavic Studies. Ann Arbor: Slavica Publishers, 1974. 189 pp. Paper.

The chances are not great that a new and struggling organization such as the American Association of South Slavic Studies (now the American Association for Southeast European Studies) should immediately produce a high quality publication. But that is just what Kenneth Naylor has done. This first issue of *Balkanistica* is worth reading.

In the lead article, Kemal Karpat reviews his reasons for opposing the standard view that nationalism came to Southeastern Europe in the absence of the social and economic changes that produced it in Western Europe. Karpat believes that significant changes in the Ottoman Empire paved the way for nationalism there too. Specialists on Rumania, Greece, and Bulgaria offer illuminating critical comments on his detailed presentation.

In the briefest of the three remaining sections, Mateja Matejić shows, on the basis of new documents from Hilendar, that Father Paisi died in 1773, instead of various other dates that have been previously proposed. In a section on Illyrianism, Elinor Murray Despalatović delineates the ambiguous legacy of the movement, which linked Croatian national identity to Yugoslavism, and Philip Adler characterizes it as a transitional phenomenon that was narrowly based, ethnocentric, and poorly led. A third section concerns modern Yugoslavia. Here Robin Remington speculates that recent developments in Soviet-Yugoslav relations may weaken the legitimacy of the Yugoslav regime, Bogdan Denitch argues that self-management is a relevant system for Yugoslavia, and Robert Christie defends the policy of diverting industrialization funds to Macedonia from the more developed Yugoslav republics.

If Naylor keeps his promise to go to press only when he accumulates enough stimulating articles such as these, *Balkanistica* will be a welcome addition to the scholarly literature on Southeastern Europe.

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THE CHETNIKS: WAR AND REVOLUTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1941-1945. By *Jozo Tomasevich*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975. x, 508 pp. \$20.00.

THE CHETNIK MOVEMENT AND THE YUGOSLAV RESISTANCE. By *Matteo J. Milazzo*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. xii, 208 pp. \$12.00.

The Chetnik movement in Yugoslavia during World War II has received a good deal of attention recently, first with the appearance in 1973 of Walter J. Roberts's *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945*, and now with two scholarly treatments of the movement by Tomasevich and Milazzo. Of these, Tomasevich's is considerably the most ambitious effort. As the title suggests, this is the first volume of a multivolume work to appear under the rubric *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*. The phrase *rat i revolucija* has, to a considerable degree, supplanted the older denotation "national liberation war" (*narodnooslobodilački rat*) in the works of

Yugoslav writers on the war. One suspects that the Communist conception of war, in which "the political is to the military as ten to one," has had a good deal to do with adoption of this term. If so, that alone does much to explain the defeat of the Chetnik movement; it was the narrowness of their political vision that robbed the Chetniks and the government in exile of any appeal to the non-Serbian peoples of Yugoslavia.

Tomasevich's work on the Chetniks is to be followed by volumes on the Ustasha and the Partisans. This first volume sets the scene for the whole, with a lengthy introductory section on domestic political affairs prior to 1941, and a description of the fall of Yugoslavia in May and June of that year. He then devotes some attention to the non-Mihailović Serbian nationalist movements, including the prewar "Chetnik" movement, led by Kosta Pećanac and the Nedić government's militia. He does not have much to say about the Nedić government itself, however, although he treats Mihailović's relations with the government in exile in Cairo, London, and the United States in considerable detail. In fact, Tomasevich's work is primarily a political-diplomatic history of the Draža Mihailović Chetnik movement. He deals as briefly as possible with the military aspects of the war, and omits much consideration of its social background. Tomasevich's book and Roberts's book are similar in tone. Tomasevich sets the scene more thoroughly and presents a solidly-grounded scholarly treatise; the Roberts volume is a narrative diplomatic history based principally on secondary materials, although important primary sources are used. Roberts also deals with the diplomatic aspects of the Partisan movement, a topic which Tomasevich promises to treat in a subsequent volume.

Any treatment of the Chetnik movement inevitably must focus on the question of collaboration. Both Tomasevich and Milazzo clear up any remaining doubt that "Chetnik" groups, purporting to be affiliated with the Mihailović movement, engaged in close and prolonged collaboration with the Italian and German occupations, and in the end even with the Ustasha. It is equally clear that Mihailović and Tito agreed that in the long run it was the revolution, not the war, that was most portentous for Yugoslavia's future. As a result, politically expedient considerations caused even Tito to consider at least the possibility of Partisan collaboration with the Germans—a revelation which, when first publicized by Roberts, created something of a furor in Yugoslavia. On the question of collaboration any "bad guy-good guy" dichotomy is simplistic.

Milazzo's primary concern is the question of collaboration by the Chetniks. The author hopes thereby to "gain a more clear understanding of the wide variety of ways in which important segments of the population . . . perceived and responded to the occupation." It is very much a dissertation in print, with all of the virtues (thorough study of a relatively narrow subject) and defects (pedestrian treatment, excruciating detail) which that implies.

Milazzo's study is useful particularly for his attention to the response to the Italian occupation, a topic which other authors have tended to slight somewhat in comparison with the German aspects. On the other hand, he virtually ignores the non-Mihailović "Chetnik" movements, and consequently fails to give his topic a balanced treatment.

Although it appears at the same time as Tomasevich's book, Milazzo's volume is the sort of work one would have expected to see as a spin-off from the more comprehensive treatment. Tomasevich sets the scene with by far the most comprehensive and scholarly study of the political aspects of *rat i revolucija* yet to appear;

Milazzo's study is a very useful elaboration on a part of the topic. Hopefully, other special studies will follow.

Both Milazzo and Tomasevich have written histories as bloodless as a diplomatic history, a remarkable feat considering the Yugoslav peoples' phenomenal losses in the war. Both works suffer because they take as a premise the fact that the Chetnik movement was a loser's movement, and then explain why it lost. Tomasevich, especially, is very thorough in explaining how Mihailović's narrow Greater Serb conceptions and mediocre leadership led to the defeat of the movement; and, although neither author says that the defeat was inevitable, this is the impression that comes through.

An illustration of this approach is the authors' conventional practice of referring to the Chetniks as a movement of "the officers." Officers, after all, have to have soldiers to lead, and the Chetniks found many to follow them. The Partisans did not seriously challenge the Chetniks in Serbian territory from late 1941 to late 1943. Neither of the authors pursues the piquant observation that, in the first half of the war, there were occasions when Partisan units deserted to the Chetniks; nor do they explain why, as late as April 1945, Mihailović was able to find as many as 12,000 men to set out with him on his last desperate trek through Bosnia. With one notable exception, the authors omit the human element to a degree that makes it impractical to account for the substantial support the Mihailović Chetniks enjoyed until the very end of the war.

The exception is found in Tomasevich's portrayal of Mihailović, who appears almost as a Kafkaesque figure—in Tito's words to Tomasevich, "an ordinary officer"—caught up in what Mihailović himself described as "the whirlwind, the world whirlwind, [which] carried me and my work away." Tomasevich, like Stephen Clissold in his earlier work, describes Mihailović as simply not the man to ride the whirlwind. Perhaps as much as anything else, the persisting fascination with Draža Mihailović and his loser's movement can be explained by the human tragedy implicit in the figure of an ordinary man caught up in extraordinary events, a victim of forces lying so far outside his frame of reference that he cannot even understand, let alone control them.

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ISTORIA ROMÂNILOR, vol. 1. By *Constantin C. Giurescu* and *Dinu C. Giurescu*. Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1974. 338 pp. Lei 37.

In the last fifteen years a number of single- and multi-volume histories of the Rumanians have appeared. The most important of these to date has undoubtedly been *Istoria României* (4 vols., Bucharest, 1960–64), a collective work sponsored by the Rumanian Academy and covering the period from prehistory to 1878. Now the first of eight planned volumes of a new general history of the Rumanians has appeared. Its authors are well known to American specialists in Rumanian and Southeastern European history. Before the Second World War, Constantin C. Giurescu was professor of history at the University of Bucharest, editor of the scholarly *Revista Istorică Română* (1931–47), and the author, among many other works, of a five-volume history of Rumania, *Istoria Românilor* (Bucharest, 1935–46). His son, Dinu C. Giurescu, is a specialist in Rumanian medieval history and the author of several important monographs, the most recent of which is a compre-