that would prevent any repetition of the repressions. What emerges is a fascinating, forthright, inside picture of the working of the Stalinist regime. Quiet, almost icy reasoning based on a wealth of evidence makes this documentary work required reading for any student of contemporary history and politics. As far as this reviewer can judge, the texts present an accurate translation of the Czech original, which was smuggled out of the country. By omitting the draft speech for the commission chairman, which largely duplicated evidence contained in the report and in the draft resolution of the committee, the English translation actually improves on the repetitive Czech original and the German version. However, the English title contains a serious error, since the Piller Commission was a party body and there never existed any "Dubček Government's Commission." Furthermore, unlike the Czech and German texts (1949–68), the title of the English version reads "1950–1954." Unfortunately, footnotes are scarce and not very informative. An extensive list of personalities is appended to both versions.

The Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the KSČ was convoked for September 9, 1968, to endorse the basic themes of the post-January development. Instead, on August 22 the congress met illegally in a Prague factory, despite the presence of Soviet troops, to symbolize popular resistance to the Soviet aggression. The most valuable part of the third volume is the minutes of the sessions of the congress, attended clandestinely by more than two-thirds of the regularly elected delegates. The text of the minutes is published for the first time from a transcript of the tape recording. This makes for immediacy, but the final result is disappointingly incomplete, since the microphone did not record the many interventions from the floor. However, the editor has inserted an illuminating group of documents prepared by party experts for the congress. They consist of the theses for the party program (the KSČ had no program of its own), the new Draft Statutes, and the draft of the report on the situation since 1966 that was to form the basis for the address by First Secretary Alexander Dubček to be delivered at the September congress. Of special interest is the comparison of the original version of the party Draft Statutes with the final text modified under pressure of the party bureaucracy. The main theme binding the different topics of the volume together consistently remains that of power: how to formulate the basis for a pluralistic multiparty system allowing no opposition outside the National Front dominated by the KSČ. The addition of a subject and personal index and some explanatory notes would have increased the value of this useful source book.

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DUBCEK. By *William Shawcross*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970. xvii, 317 pp. $7.95.

William Shawcross, a British expert on Eastern Europe who works for the London *Sunday Times*, has written at the enviable age of twenty-four an outstanding book that would be a credit to any senior author in that complex area which is Communist Europe. He did an unusual research job inside Czechoslovakia. He interviewed politicians, writers, students, workers, and the family and friends of Alexander Dubček, in addition to reading carefully and judiciously everything available on Dubček or by Dubček himself. The result is an excellent political biography by a first-class journalist.

Dubček had what Shawcross calls an "almost perfect pedigree" in the Kremlin's

eyes: "Son of working-class parents, brought up and educated in the Soviet Union, loyal *apparatchik*, university in Moscow, a man whose regard for Russia had always been quite unconditional, who seemed, in many ways, more Russian than Czechoslovak" (p. 141). Yet, as Shawcross points out, despite Dubček's great love for all things Soviet, doubts had crept into his mind concerning the practice of communism. Slovak patriot, partisan, organizer of the independent Slovak Communist Party during the war, Dubček resented the return of Czech centralism following the Communist seizure of power in Prague in 1948. The continued conflict with the Czechs disturbed him even more during the long Novotný era (1953–67). Antonín Novotný, the Czech boss of the Czechoslovak Party, was not only unfair to the Slovaks but also resisted de-Stalinization. This gave Dubček, a faithful follower of Khrushchev's more liberal policies, an additional reason to dislike Novotný. Yet, with his sense of duty to the party, Dubček was loyal enough to the Prague regime to be able to climb steadily in the Communist hierarchy.

Dubček, the sentimental Communist, loved the party dearly and wanted everyone to love it. When, with Soviet blessings, he succeeded Novotný in January 1968 as first secretary of the party, Dubček dedicated himself to correcting Novotný's mistakes. The Prague Spring was not of his making, but Dubček shared its sense of euphoria and endorsed the idea of a "socialism with a human face." The reformers in Prague thought that even freedom of the press could be compatible with communism. The Soviet-educated Dubček would never have dreamed of such heresies. But he sided with the heretics and saw no reason why the Kremlin should be upset with Prague's unorthodoxy. The party after all was finally doing what the people wanted, and as a result the party was loved by the people as never before. At least that is what Dubček thought, and he argued accordingly with Leonid Brezhnev and his Kremlin associates.

Shawcross's interpretation makes good sense in explaining Dubček's role in the Prague Spring. He is somewhat less successful in dealing with the Dubček problem in the summer showdown with the Soviet Union. Shawcross justifiably sees Dubček mainly as a man growing in stature, yet he rightly notes that Dubček "is a small town politician rather than an international or even national statesman, a man who feels much more at ease amongst his family in Slovakia than on his own in Bohemia" (p. 83). Of course, Dubček's limited sophistication was not a cause of the Russian armed intervention of 1968. The much more sophisticated Edvard Beneš was no more successful in averting the catastrophes of 1938 and 1948. The causes of Czech and Slovak misfortunes are deeply rooted in the tragic structure of Central European history. The Dubček drama cannot be fully comprehended except in that broader context. Such historical perspective is missing from Shawcross's Dubček biography. Incidentally, he regrettably omits the diacritical marks in Czech and Slovak spelling.

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DIE SLOVAKISCHE GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT NACH 1945. By *Horst Glassl*. Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München, vol. 37. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971. 166 pp. DM 28, paper.

In 1962 *Historische Zeitschrift* inaugurated a series of special volumes (*Sonderhefte*) devoted to historiographical surveys. Four volumes have appeared so far