

discussions, and dual citizenship became a solution for development challenges. Here, Pailey offers a necessary and significant extension of these debates. Even though dual citizenship emerged as a contemporary policy mechanism to address diasporic claims, Pailey argues that, as a development model, it provides diminishing returns for democracy. A considerable number of Liberian locals whom Pailey interviewed came to see the new post-civil war government and the scattered diaspora as setting Liberia on a course that had contributed to the war in the first place. Pailey points to development as a process of amelioration and degeneration. The perceived symbiotic relationship between dual citizenship and development presupposed that the contributions of the diaspora would have a positive impact on development. Yet, Pailey critiques this “neoliberal framing of diasporas and donors as the panacea to post-war reconstruction” (p. 4). As she notes, the process of development might not necessarily result in positive outcomes but instead produce a form of deterioration.

Moreover, Pailey shows how development praxis has implicated various realms of life in Liberia. The oncentered hierarchy of immigrants that defined Liberia in its early history was reconfigured in contemporary times as “homeland Liberians, returnees, and diasporas” who sought to stake a claim in the development process (p. 7). Socioeconomic transformation in the country became tied to providing citizenship-like provisions and protections in exchange for returns that would improve the country. Indeed, the postwar reconstruction and development era afforded displaced Liberians a degree of latitude and a permissive atmosphere to become part of national growth. Ellen Sirleaf’s tenure solidified what Pailey calls a “diaspocracy,” given that those who occupied positions of power in her administration were from the diaspora. In a replay of Liberia’s founding, Liberian homeland citizens perceived that dual citizenship would violate their already restricted access to political, economic, and social privileges. The Liberian diaspora, in contrast, saw dual citizenship as strengthening their ties to the nation by enabling them to become more effective participants through remittances and other political activities. This neoliberal economic model of development that depended on an overreliance on the expertise of returnees, according to Pailey, served to bolster historical inequities and bitterness. Thus, the question of citizenship reemerged, centered around national belonging and rebuilding. Pailey uses other African countries for comparison (such as Eritrea, which extracts a diaspora tax as a way of extending rights with ties to responsible development practices) and Senegal (which allows voting from the diaspora and holding of political office or equivalent abbreviated version).

Pailey’s book is an important and innovative analysis of citizenship, postwar development, and reconstruction policies in Africa. It should be read alongside Mahmood

Mamdani’s *Citizen and Subject* (1996) and Bronwen Manby’s comparative study of citizenship law in Africa. It also adds to Dambisa Moyo’s *Dead Aid* (2009), which points to the ways foreign aid—whether through the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, private charitable organizations, or “voluntourism”—harms receiving countries. Yet, where others explore development and citizenship issues from a global, top-down perspective, Pailey’s research takes a different approach. Pailey outlines the kinds of epistemic violence that have historically excluded local Liberian works from the scholarly canon. She thus situates her work alongside Liberian scholars from Edward Blyden and Clarence Zamba to Carl Patrick Burrowes. While outlining the global developmental constraints that Africa faces from international organizations, government, and structural issues, Pailey centers the voices, policies, and actions of Africans through extensive fieldwork, primary sources, and more than 200 semistructured interviews in places such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, London, and Washington, DC.

Pailey’s theoretical work emerges from a multidisciplinary framing and a deep exploration of Liberia’s history. This is one of the best aspects of this book. She expertly combines history, politics, and development analysis with her empirical data in ways that broaden, trouble, and critique existing theories. This expands both the fields of political science and Liberian studies, as well as making the book both accessible and suitable for praxis. Pailey’s work does not retell the history of Liberia’s colonization and civil war. Instead, she asks us to think differently about these events not as part of the narrative arc of justice and progress in Liberian history but as an affirmation of a kind of deeply constrained and compromised conception of democracy and citizenship in the first place, which inevitably then gave way to constrained and compromised visions of it when creating the dual citizenship legislation.

Marketing Democracy: The Political Economy of Democracy Aid in the Middle East. By Erin A. Snider.

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In her book, *Marketing Democracy*, Erin Snider unpacks the “blackbox” of U.S. democracy promotion aid, elucidating its practices and construction in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) from the late 1990s until the mid-2000s. Drawing on two years of fieldwork, extensive archival research, and novel statistical data, *Marketing Democracy* is a timely and fascinating book, rich in both its empirical and theoretical contributions. Comparing U.S. democracy promotion aid to Egypt and Morocco, Snider seeks to address two main questions: First, why

have U.S. democracy promotion programs seemed to have such little impact in the MENA? And, second, why does this region's nondemocratic regimes—which intrinsically want to continue their hold on power over politics—tolerate the presence of such programs ostensibly committed to their own demise? Although both questions drew the curiosity of this reader, I found the second particularly interesting and counter-intuitive, without a clear answer found in the existing literature. In short, Snider argues, the United States has to figure out how to “sell” democracy promotion programs to nondemocratic regimes, which are suspicious that they may work to undermine their own stability and control over politics (p. 113).

Snider's theory, familiar to those who study forms of foreign aid in other policy realms, hinges on the notion of perverse unintended consequences—the idea that actions can sometimes have the opposite of the desired effect in a negative fashion. On this score, Snider argues that U.S. democracy aid helps to reinforce the nondemocratic regimes that receive it, rather than increasing whatever momentum might exist toward democratization. That's why nondemocratic regimes in the MENA will tolerate it (and perhaps sometimes even like such aid). To explicate this argument, Snider deploys a political economy approach that considers democracy programs as “negotiated deals” between donor and recipient states (p. 8). Rather than accepting these democracy programs as hand-outs with no questions asked, like Christmas dinner at a soup kitchen, recipient states actually impose numerous conditions upon them, which reconfigure them to align with the economic and political interests of the regime's elites (p. 8). These economic and political interests, Snider argues, often relate to elites' desires to promote market economy reforms or improve the effectiveness of existing regime institutions.

Snider subsequently provides several examples showing how her theory works. One of the best comes from her extensive fieldwork in Egypt. In Egypt, the United States wanted to promote the expansion of civil society (p. 109). Egyptian elites, however, feared such programs would empower the Muslim Brothers (i.e., Muslim Brotherhood), which was an illegal group though the largest and most powerful in civil society. So, due to the group's illegal status it was, as Snider writes, “excluded from any discussions of democracy assistance support” (p. 109). Rather, most U.S. democracy aid in Egypt ended up being channeled through Economic Support Funds (ESF) under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. These ESF funds reflected the “U.S. government's conviction that support for a market economy is necessary for the development of and transition to democracy” (p. 110). Ultimately, this U.S. democracy aid linked to promotion of a free market became much more successful, due to its popularity in the

U.S. Congress and also among Egyptian elites, notably Gamal Mubarak (son of the dictator and heir-apparent). During this period, Gamal Mubarak and his business allies had been simultaneously pushing for a “privatization boom” in the state-owned industries to enrich themselves (p. 198). The fact that democracy promotion became bound to market economy promotion aligned with the interests of Egypt's regime, one that was actively implementing neoliberal reforms. More broadly, Snider suggests, the regime would also likely benefit from these reforms if they were to spur economic growth, which could trickle down to benefit the masses (and make them less prone to cause unrest). This was a concern on the minds of Egyptian regime elites in these years, as a wave of labor strikes increased dramatically in *Al-Mahallah al-Kubrā* and other secondary cities in the mid-2000s, presaging the 2011 revolution.

Snider should be congratulated for this excellent book. Its timeliness and richness of empirical detail will attract not only scholars but also policymakers in the U.S. democracy promotion community. One particularly interesting chapter of the book examines “job switch” data on U.S. democracy promotion professionals in Washington, who pass through a revolving door between working at U.S. public agencies (e.g., State Department, USAID), to nonprofit organizations (like the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute), and even to for-profit contractors (pp. 81-82). One topic this reader would have liked Snider to unpack a bit more was the presumed uniformity of regime elites' economic interests. She may have somewhat overstated the homogeneity of economic preferences of elites, both in Egypt and Morocco. Before the 2011 revolution in Egypt, neoliberal reform—especially privatization and similar pro-market measures—became in vogue in some elite circles. Yet other Egyptian elites, especially generals and other top brass within the military apparatus (as Hicham Bou Nassif, Zoltan Barany, and others have shown) benefited (and continue to benefit) handsomely from state-owned factories and other industries. From that perspective, in theory, U.S. democracy aid's link with promoting market reforms would have run contrary to their interests and, thus, the military leaders would likely have been more likely to work to outwardly oppose it (than, say, Gamal Mubarak and his business allies in favor of privatization). Though it has a much smaller public sector than Egypt, some of Morocco's elites similarly have a vested interest in sustaining the royal conglomerates, like Al Mada Holding (formerly the *Société Nationale d'Investissement*). Yet no book can unpack all topics, cover all areas, and answer all questions, so this is to be expected and it emerges as a possible avenue of research for future scholars.

In short, I recommend *Marketing Democracy* for any student, scholar, or policymaker interested in learning

more about the perverse, unintended consequences of U.S. programs aimed at encouraging democratization. *Marketing Democracy* is an exemplar in showing how the United States can do more for the Arab world by doing less.

Ascending Order: Rising Powers and the Politics of Status in International Institutions. By Rohan Mukherjee.

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Rohan Mukherjee's book builds on the literature on status-seeking in international relations to investigate how states jockey for position within international institutions. In the first part of the book, Mukherjee develops "institutional status theory," which aims to predict whether rising powers will cooperate with, challenge, or seek to reform key institutions based solely on their characteristics. The book then tests the argument against the records of the United States during the nineteenth century, Japan during the 1920s, and India during the Cold War, suggesting that institutional status theory illuminates variation in China's approaches to different elements of the liberal international order.

Ascending Order makes an especially valuable empirical contribution to scholarship on status in world politics. Although prominent research on status focuses on questions related to militarized competition, Mukherjee reminds us that status concerns also inflect foreign policy in other areas. The case studies are well written and richly detailed, and they make excellent use of archival material. Although the Japanese case study largely replicates the analysis and confirms the findings of prior research (see Steven Ward, *Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers*, 2017, chap. 4), the other two empirical chapters are highly original. Mukherjee sheds new light on the United States' approach to the international naval order during the middle of the nineteenth century and on the rationale for India's shifting approaches to the Cold War (and post-Cold War) nuclear order.

The value of the book's theoretical contribution is more uncertain. At a broad level, the argument is reasonable and even familiar. Others have proposed logics similar to Mukherjee's central claim that the experience of being unjustly excluded from an "elite" club can turn a rising power against the international order (e.g., see Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, *Quest for Status*, 2019). Mukherjee aims to refine these models in ways that allow for more precise behavioral predictions (pp. 12–13) within the context of specific international institutions. But the refinements involve simplifying assumptions and

theoretical moves that create logical problems and raise questions about the model's ability to account for the historical processes documented in the empirical chapters.

Mukherjee proposes a structural account that predicts rising power behavior based on two features of an institutional order: (1) the degree to which the "great power" club is "open" to new members and (2) the "procedural fairness" of the institution's rules (p. 69). The theoretical framework explicitly assumes that states are rational (p. 35) and unitary (p. 55): they are modeled as status-maximizers that respond reasonably and predictably to incentive structures determined entirely by institutional openness and fairness, without any meaningful role for domestic political contestation or disagreement among elites.

To specify how institutional openness and fairness affect state behavior, *Ascending Order* relies on a reformulation of social identity theory (SIT; p. 56). SIT is a social-psychological framework for understanding how individuals manage membership in groups with inadequate status. SIT proposes three broad identity management strategies: (1) social mobility involves an attempt *by the individual* to join a different group with higher status, (2) social competition aims to raise the status of *the group* by improving its standing along valued dimensions of comparison, and (3) social creativity reinterprets the rules of status attribution in a way that improves the group's status position.

A prominent strand of IR research on status-seeking has promoted what I have argued is a misinterpretation of SIT that ignores the social-psychological framework's multi-level character and interprets all three identity management strategies as ways in which *states* can improve their status (for an overview and critique, see Ward, "Lost in Translation: Social Identity Theory and the Study of Status in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, 61, 2017). Mukherjee's theory adopts this approach but widens the divergence from the social-psychological framework by defining social mobility as institutional cooperation (p. 56) and social competition as behavior that challenges an institution's rules through noncompliance or withdrawal from the institution (p. 57).

Mukherjee claims these innovations are consistent with the social-psychological framework (p. 58), but this is not borne out by an examination of the social-psychological scholarship that *Ascending Order* invokes to buttress the argument. For instance, to support the equation of social mobility with cooperation, Mukherjee cites an article that mentions neither social mobility nor cooperation (Itesh Sachdev and Richard Bourhis, "Status Differentials and Intergroup Behaviour," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 17, 1987; p. 57, fn 10). To support the equation of social competition with rule-breaking, Mukherjee cites Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams's influential *Social*