

and Merseburg, it is the first thorough study of the Dual Monarchy's preparations to intervene in the Franco-Prussian War, its attempts to work in the French interest when such intervention became inadvisable, its efforts to block South German adhesion to a new German imperial structure, its unsuccessful diplomacy during the crisis caused by Russia's abrogation of the Black Sea Clauses of the treaty of 1856, and the cumulative effect of these events upon the direction of Austro-Hungarian policy after the spring of 1871.

The key figure in this story is Franz Ferdinand Graf Beust, who was a minister in Saxony from 1849 to 1866, and Emperor Franz Joseph's foreign minister from 1867 until his retirement from politics in 1871. Metternich once called Beust a political tightrope walker, and Mr. Diószegi confirms the aptness of this description by recounting the way Beust pursued his hazardous course above the heads of the contentious political factions of his country. Although the factions had sharply divergent views on foreign affairs, Beust assured himself of their joint support at the beginning of his Austrian service by following a firmly anti-Prussian policy, which appealed to the resentment of the Court party over the defeat at Königgrätz, the anti-Bismarck prejudice of the Austrian liberals, and the fears of Prussian expansion that were rife among the Hungarian followers of Deák and Andrassy. But support for this line was not always reliable (the Deák party was more afraid of Russia than of Prussia, and the liberals were susceptible to the appeals of German nationalism), and external circumstances made it, in the long run, unsupportable. Prussia's defeat of France altered the European balance so completely that the Austro-Hungarian government felt compelled, by May 1871, to seek an accommodation with Prussia and, subsequently, with Russia. The government also began to think in terms of finding compensation, at Turkey's expense, in southeastern Europe.

This shift could hardly have been a happy experience for Beust. His dislike of the Prussians was deep-rooted, and the most fascinating aspect of this study is the author's description of the stubbornness with which Beust held to the anti-Prussian line and the extent to which it influenced his behavior even during the crisis caused by the Gorchakov note of October 31, 1870. Beust was a persistent man of many expedients, but unlike his colleague, War Minister Kuhn, who went on planning and urging a war against Prussia long after there was any likelihood that it would have the slightest chance of success, he was not the victim of illusions. Beust, whom Schwarzenberg once called his "best lieutenant," inherited something of his master's cold realism. Mr. Diószegi shows that Beust, by January 1871, had recognized that a revolution in power relationships had taken place in Europe and that Austria would have to accommodate its policy to the new situation. Consequently, and without vain regrets, he changed course and inaugurated the policy that led to the formation of the Three Emperors' League.

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PAL TELEKI (1879–1941): A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. By *L. Tilkovszky*.  
*Studia Historica, Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 86. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974. 70 pp. \$4.50.

Three aspects of Teleki's life are considered in this book: the sensation caused by his suicide when the German Panzer divisions rumbled across Hungary toward Yugoslavia in 1941; his philosophy and policies as chief theoretician of Hun-

garian revisionism; and his contribution to the consolidation of the Horthy regime. The last, of course, is given condemnatory treatment, and a lack of objectivity is also apparent in the sections dealing with Teleki's role as the advocate of revisionism. Teleki did indeed want to revise the conditions of the Trianon Treaty, but he wished to do so peacefully and with the consent of Europe, not as a reward from the Axis Powers. This point is not made clear. On Teleki's suicide, Tilkovszky writes: "According to the *News Chronicle*, this excellent and straightforward man laid down his life for focussing the attention of the civilized world on the intolerable situation created by Hitler's megalomany [sic] in Hungary and in South-Eastern Europe" (p. 8). He also cites less friendly views: "The *Manchester Guardian* qualified as erroneous that part of Teleki's conception that Italy might be a counterpoise to the exaggerated German demands" (p. 9).

The book is an abbreviated translation of the author's study published in Hungarian in 1969. It is based on the widest archival and other research possible in Hungary. Tilkovszky does not claim comprehensiveness. His title, in fact, calls this book, like the earlier Hungarian version, a "sketch" from the biography of this controversial but nonetheless significant scholar-statesman. Within such limits, this small work achieves its purposes.

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RELAȚIILE POLITICE ALE ANGLIEI CU MOLDOVA, ȚARA ROMĂNEASCĂ ȘI TRANSILVANIA ÎN SECOLELE XVI–XVIII. By *Ludovic Demény* and *Paul Cernovodeanu*. Biblioteca Istorică, no. 42. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1974. 287 pp. Lei 25.

Paul Cernovodeanu and Ludovic Demény have presented a detailed account of England's political and diplomatic relations with the Rumanian principalities and Transylvania from the latter part of the sixteenth to the first decades of the eighteenth century. As Cernovodeanu sums up, England, for the most part, tried to protect her economic interests in the Near East while defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Anglo-Rumanian relations were chiefly carried out through the sporadic intervention of the British ambassador at Constantinople for defense of the Levant Company's trade and for the rights of Scottish merchants in Rumanian lands. The authors conclude that England's relations with Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania must be viewed primarily within the context of the Eastern Question.

The fact that England's policies were determined by English interests is a cause for lamentation, if not condemnation, by the authors. Despite the admission that no other great power of that period made significant sacrifices beyond self-interest, emphasis is placed on England's complete lack of concern for the fate of the principalities when English interests were at stake. In proffering support to the principalities, the latitude of British ambassadors at the Porte was thus dictated by English interests, which were primarily economic.

English relations with the principalities are properly placed in the context of Ottoman-English ties, but perhaps too much attention is given to general diplomatic developments in Europe. The authors rely heavily on German, Hungarian, and Rumanian secondary sources because of the inaccessibility (to the authors) of British archival documents and the dearth of Rumanian primary sources.