

years of the Risorgimento! Manzoni and the writers who collaborated on *Il Conciliatore* saw it as their duty to elevate, not debase, the minds of their countrymen. Another parallel with Italy is equally revealing: Cioranescu excuses Alecsandri's limited aims and lowered sights on the grounds that the Moldavian writer not only had to fashion a Rumanian theater out of nothing but also had to serve an apprenticeship in Rumanian poetic art. Yet Alecsandri was not the first man to become a student of his own language in order to write the literature his country needed. Vittorio Alfieri single-handedly created a tragic tradition in Italian literature, and Alessandro Manzoni produced his *I promessi sposi* without the aid of native models; both writers were forced to wash their linguistic linen in the waters of the Arno before setting about their great task.

Cioranescu is more persuasive when he allows his critical imagination freer rein, as he does in his discussion of Alecsandri's drama. But this only brings into sharp relief the contrast between the relative paucity of the early chapters, where Alecsandri's poetry and comedies are too often catalogued in the manner of a middle-school textbook, and the amplification and occasional depth of the analyses in the second half of the book. Can it be that at some stage in the editorial process excessive cuts were forced upon the author? A mere hypothesis perhaps, but one which would account at least in part for this peculiar discrepancy. It would also help explain why—in a book of some 170 pages—there is not a single citation from Alecsandri's literary works. Given the fact that no translations of his writings have appeared in English since the antiquated versions of Henry Stanley in 1856, such an omission is utterly inexplicable, and does a serious injustice to the bard of Mircești.

The result is that we experience Alecsandri's works only at a distance; they are arrayed before us in orderly fashion, neatly summarized and categorized according to biographical relevance and literary influence, but never presented for our appreciation and critical judgment. The suspicion must be that Cioranescu feared too close an inspection might confirm Alecsandri's standing as a major influence but minor writer.

Finally, two quibbles of a different nature. Nowhere does Cioranescu mention that—through the good offices of Prosper Mérimée—Alecsandri sent copies of his *Poesii populare* and *Doine* (his first cycle of poems) to the Spanish *costumbrista* Don Serafín Estébanez Calderón, nor does he give proper credit to the artistic revisions of the *romancero* which Alecsandri published in his *Mărgăritele* and *Pasteluri* cycles. Strange omissions for a scholar of Cioranescu's background! In addition, may we address a fervent appeal to the publisher, editors, and authors of Twayne's World Authors Series to decide once and for all on the spelling of Rumania and Rumanian. In the text these are spelt with a *u*, but on the book jacket and the title page the alternative spelling (Romania, Romanian) is used.

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THEORIE UND REALITÄT VON BÜNDNISSEN: HEINRICH LAMMASCH, KARL RENNER UND DER ZWEIBUND, 1897–1914. By *Stephan Verosta*. Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1971. xxviii, 660 pp.

World War I was not an historical necessity, not an unavoidable consequence of pitiless historical forces. This is the major inference I draw from this thought-

provoking and penetrating book written by an Austrian statesman and scholar from the University of Vienna. Only a writer whose mind is not chained to narrow ideological commitments and doctrinaire methods could have written this book—a book which has already provoked debate from the former Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg in the Viennese journal *Die Furche*.

The war and the decline of the Danubian monarchy were the results of a false foreign policy and the complete subordination of the conduct of foreign affairs to the military, especially to the German General Staff: so argues Verosta. The two chiefs of staff perceived nations not as people but as *Menschenmaterial*, human stuff—that is, in terms of army corps, divisions, and navy squadrons. Verosta's major thesis is that the Danubian monarchy was by no means in decline. On the contrary, before the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina it was moving toward a *Völkerstaat*, a state of nationalities—toward a tolerant and liberal union of many diverse peoples. The universal suffrage of 1907 changed the political scenario. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy, half-feudal as it was, had chosen the road of a progressive and liberal political development. The elections for the Reichsrat (in 1907) brought representatives of practically all major ethnic groups (nationalities) in the monarchy into the new parliament. In foreign policy, Prime Minister Heinrich Lammasch steered the Danubian *Völkerstaat* toward neutrality, and he, as well as the socialist leader and theoretician Karl Renner, perceived its role as that of a large, neutral, and peaceful Switzerland, a part of a cooperative Danubian and Balkan region. In this kind of approach, the South Slavs within the monarchy, such as the Serbians, would not differ much in status from the Italians or Germans in Switzerland or in attitude toward their respective homelands.

The crucial moment came with the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1908, a mistake of historical significance and catastrophic nature. This Austrian policy of expansion alerted and alienated, even antagonized, the South Slavic peoples, especially Serbia. Serbia's position of course involved Russia.

The change in government also resulted in the complete revision of the major foreign policy orientation. The new foreign minister, Alois Aehrenthal, and especially the chief of staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, now saw the one-time *Völkerstaat* as a *Festungstaat*, a fortress-state, surrounded by enemies and depending for its survival on either preventive wars or military alliances. The German-Austrian military treaty followed in 1909. This treaty subordinated the Austrian General Staff completely to the German one and to the German strategic plan—the famous Schlieffen plan to attack France. Thus any involvement with Austria or Germany must have resulted in an attack against France, owing to the nature of European alliances at that time. Even more important, the Austrian foreign policy was subordinate to and determined by the German and Austrian military. The German General Staff combined political naïveté with brutality. Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of staff, and his arrogant Kaiser were convinced that France would be on her knees within three to five weeks! Then, of course, the army would move to the Russian front, a “minor affair.” After the Sarajevo assassination, events moved swiftly. As is usual at such times, they had their own impetus and escaped from human control. The new Austrian foreign minister, von Berchtold, followed the path of aggression.

Verosta, who served for many years as Austrian ambassador and representative at international conferences and at the United Nations, combines historical insight with practical statesmanship. He does not hide his historical sympathy for a multi-

national, peaceful *Völkerstaat*, a Danubian Switzerland, a pivot of peace. His is a new and original outlook which differs from those classical theories that interpret the decline of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a consequence of nationality problems and slow inner disintegration. Highly readable and well written, based on extensive research in little-known archives and primary sources, this book—or at least substantial sections of it—calls for an English translation. It is a volume of major significance, written by an Austrian but also by a European with a humane world outlook, with talent and political acumen, and with the sensitivity of a philosopher.

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WITTGENSTEIN'S VIENNA. By *Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973. 314 pp. \$8.95, cloth. \$3.95, paper.

This work is properly titled, for the authors' analysis of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the unfinished *Philosophical Investigations* takes up only two of the nine chapters. The rest of the book concentrates on the Viennese atmosphere in which Wittgenstein grew up, and on the philosophers, literary men, and scientists whose conclusions were the inspirations for his arguments.

The basic thesis is that by 1900 "men in all fields of thought and art in Vienna" were ready for a "comprehensive critique of language, designed to draw together and generalize, in philosophical terms, all the more localized and particular critiques of established means of expression and communication already familiar in (for example) logic and music, poetry and architecture, painting and physics" (p. 165). Fritz Mauthner had attempted such a *Sprachkritik*, but there was need for a more rigorous treatment of the problem. Wittgenstein, member of a wealthy and talented family, apparently finished the *Tractatus* during the summer of 1918 after a stint in the army which brought him closer to his fellow man than would ever again be the case.

The analysis of Vienna's "last days" begins with an admirable summary of Karl Kraus's gifts for polemic and satire, but this reviewer is not convinced that Vienna's conscience was always more than a crank. A recent hearing of Offenbach's *Tales of Hoffmann* (Kraus doted on Offenbach and hated Lehár) increases one's doubts. Yet Kraus felt that he was doing for language what Adolf Loos was accomplishing in architecture and design, and the authors add that Wittgenstein and Arnold Schönberg were working away in their own fields in the same "struggle against moral and aesthetic corruption" (p. 93).

The villains were many: Franz Joseph, Col. Alfred Redl, the *Neue Freie Presse*, anti-Semitism, bourgeois hypocrisy, sexual frustration, sham constitutionalism, excessive ornamentation in design. Loos, Kraus, and Schönberg were notorious rebels before 1914, but it is rather an irony that Wittgenstein's concepts became the "foundation stone of a new positivism or empiricism" in Vienna and also in the England to which he migrated. Mathematicians, philosophers, and physical scientists held seminars at the University of Vienna to discuss the *Tractatus*, but the final confrontations with a rather diffident Wittgenstein revealed grave difficulties. Though four-fifths of the treatise could be used "as a source of forthright, no-nonsense positivist slogans" (p. 219), Wittgenstein broke completely with the logical positivists.

Obvious admirers of Wittgenstein, the authors note that he once jotted down,