

Belgrade after World War II, there was a wreath from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

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GREECE AND THE ENTENTE, AUGUST 1, 1914—SEPTEMBER 25, 1916.

By *Christos Theodoulou*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1971. xxxvii, 379 pp. Paper.

The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 placed the Greek kingdom in a harsh predicament. Allied with Serbia in the Balkan Wars it had fought first the Ottoman Empire and then Bulgaria for what remained of "Turkey-in-Europe." Thus Greece's reaction to the war was intimately tied to what its two neighbors would do. In addition, her strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean could only lead to pressures by the great powers as the war expanded and each camp sought to gain more allies. If ever the small state needed wise and vigorous leadership this was the moment. What befell Greece during the next two years is the subject of *Greece and the Entente*.

The author has written a detailed piece based on diligent archival research documenting Greece's relations with the Allied camp. Its scope is limited to the period from the outbreak of the war to the decision by Eleutherios Venizelos to set up a government in Thessaloniki in opposition to that of King Constantine. The chapters of the book are divided according to the various governments that succeeded one another during the period from August 1914 to September 1916.

Greece's success in the Balkan Wars had brought her a sizable portion of territory and heightened hopes of realizing an irredentist dream called the *Megale Idea* (Great Idea). There were still thousands of conationals in the Ottoman Empire, and the expansion of the kingdom to include these people had figured prominently in Greek foreign policy and nationalist thinking for decades. Prime minister from 1910 until the spring of 1915, Venizelos had pursued a careful and intelligent foreign policy during the Balkan Wars. Yet Greece's very success meant that her neighbor Bulgaria was now a revisionist state waiting for a chance to gain what it felt rightfully belonged to it—namely, a large part of Macedonia that was now in Greek and Serbian hands. In addition, Greek-Turkish relations were still strained when the world war began, and the Greek government was sensitive to the position of the Greek population in Anatolia.

Both king and prime minister were fully aware of their country's Balkan and Mediterranean position in relation to its neighbors and the great powers. But they came to different conclusions concerning what Greece's policy ought to be. Theodoulou brings this out clearly, noting the personal preferences of each man and that they reflected to some extent the thinking of larger segments of society. There were strong merits to both positions—the king arguing that Greece must remain neutral, Venizelos avowing that the nation must come out for the Entente. But once the Ottoman Empire, and in the following year Bulgaria, joined the Central Powers the king's position became more difficult to maintain. Theodoulou painstakingly details the hardening of the positions of the king and Venizelos and the increasing Allied pressure on Greece. The dreary record of Entente relations with the kingdom during this period does show the deleterious effect of great power interference in the nation's affairs. Yet it would be unfair to state, as the author

does, that "the greatest impediment to Greek progress and the cause of many misfortunes of the Greek Nation was . . . the influence of the Great Powers of the moment in Greece." As the author himself notes, Greek development or the lack of it was the result of a series of factors—historical and economic, internal and external—interacting with one another.

The author's study reveals the great extent to which Greek affairs were bound up with the leading figures of the period. This was accepted by both the Greeks and the European diplomats who dealt with that state, and they acted accordingly. This can be seen in the decision by Venizelos to set up a revolutionary government in Thessaloniki and the determination of England and France to force the issue of Greece's role in the war with the king.

The work as a whole is a sound diplomatic history gathering together a good deal of previously unpublished material. It would have benefited, however, from a judicious pruning of the innumerable and often inordinately long quotations from diplomatic correspondence that are found on almost every page of the text. All in all the author has made a useful addition to the literature of this important period in modern history.

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HISTORIA TOU HELLĒNIKOU ERGATIKOU KINĒMATOS. 3rd edition.

By *Gianēs Kordatos*. Athens: Mpoukoumanes, 1972. 340 pp.

Kordatos's study of the Greek labor movement was first published four decades ago. A second revised edition appeared in 1956; the present edition is a reprint of the latter. Kordatos was an indefatigable worker and a prolific writer (he wrote more than twenty-five books, several of them multivolume), but he was not a careful researcher. Perhaps the latter consideration was irrelevant to him, for historical objectivity was hardly one of his aims. To him Ranke's dictum *wie es eigentlich gewesen* was no more than an instrument of bourgeois philistinism, as in fact it frequently was in the hands of official Greek historiography. He would not deny the legitimacy of the historian's search for the "truth," but he sought to discover it through his effort to reconstruct the past in the Marxian mold, or at least what he perceived as Marxist methodology. Above all, Kordatos's aim was to rewrite history for the "education" of the "broad masses." No doubt the functional aspect of his work affected the fruits of his labors: his work reflects all the weaknesses of a vulgarized mechanistic conception of Marxism, characteristic of most Greek Marxists of his generation, and none of the strengths of Marxist social analysis. What is striking in his work is not so much his bias and polemics, or his not infrequently shoddy work, but rather the lack of the essence of a Marxist conceptualization of his subject—that is, class analysis through the material forces of production as related to social organization. Kordatos, like most Greek Marxists of his generation, lacked the sophisticated methodological tools for an effective dissection of the Greek social structure, despite his sincere efforts to overcome the romantic ultranationalistic conservatism characteristic of Greek academic historiography. Thus, when stripped of the official Communist jargon and its visceral polemics, Kordatos's work remains essentially traditional.

He has, however, explored areas of modern Greek history untouched by Greek academic historians for whom social analysis was either alien or taboo.